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Abstract 
It is interesting that nationalism and democracy can be 
closely related and can reinforce each other in some countries. 
Most social scientists, however, concentrates their research 
either on nationalism or democracy. 
This thesis explores the correlation between nationalism 
and democracy. Based on Huntington and other scholars' 
theories on democratization, I will argue that four possible 
factors (structural changes, the political elite's patronage, 
external influences and legitimacy crises) may contribute to the 
development of both nationalism and democracy although they 
were originally only used to explain how and why 
democratization happened in some countries but not others. 
There are two main findings in this thesis. First, although 
Taiwanese nationalism was also a product of decades of colonial 
rule, it did not demand nation-building as much as its 
counterparts in countries such as Indonesia. Furthermore, 
Taiwanese most significant nationalist movement, the 228 
Incident, aimed at the new coming rulers, the Chinese, instead of 
their previous colonizers, the Japanese. The incident also 
seemed to illustrate that shared history and common suffering is 
more meaningful in forming the sense of an imagined 
vi 
community, a nation, than common myth of descent. 
Second, structural changes, the political elite's patronage, 
external influences and legitimacy crises may have inspired 
Taiwan's democratization as well as Taiwanese nationalism in 
the 1970s-90s. Fmihennore, although less apparent, to some 




The existence of Taiwan is probably one of the most ironic 
events in the history of the twentieth century. As a nation that is 
not recognized by most major countries since the 1970s, it has 
existed for more than forty-five years. 1 Being a small island 
without many natural resources, it created one of the most re-
markable records in economic and political terms. While much 
research has been done to discover the secrets of its economic 
success, the political aspect of the "Taiwan miracle" did not gain 
the attention it deserved until recent years. The political evolu-
tion in Taiwan has been a very good example of the so-called 
"Third Wave" democratization.2 The development not only 
shattered the assertion that Confucianism in the Chinese culture 
is incompatible with democratic values, it also contradicted the 
' 
belief of scholars like Rustow (1970,p.351) that a consensus on 
national identity is a crucial characteristic of democracy. 
National identity has been a controversial issue in Taiwan 
for decades. Because of its linique histmical relationship with 
both China and Japan, Taiwan's democratization was closely 
related to the demand of Taiwanese people to have their own 
nation, that is, to Taiwanese nationalism. Although the majority 
of the population has Chinese ancestry, due to some historical 
experiences such as Japanese colonization and the 228 Incident 
in 19473, Taiwan's residents with Chinese ancestry are subdvid-
1 This is counted from 1945 when the Chinese Nationalist Party, the KMT, 
started ruling Taiwan. 
2 The term "Third Wave" came from Huntington's book The Third Wave, 
3 A small incident that happened 27th of February 1947 turned into an island-
wide rebellion in Taiwan the next day. It also caused a massacre carried out 
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ed into two ethnic groups, Mainlanders and Taiwanese. 
In the past and even nowadays not all residents of Taiwan 
have been perceived or self-ascribed as Taiwanese. Only those 
whose parents both have ancestors who emigrated from China 
before the retreat of the government of the Chinese Nationalist 
Party (Kuomintang in Chinese, KMT hereafter) during 1945-
1949 have been accepted as Taiwanese. Taiwanese, together 
with the other two major ethnic groups, Mainlanders (those Chi-
nese who settled in Taiwan during 1945-1949 and their off-
spring) and Aborigines4, have comprised the population of Tai-
wan since 1945. 
Although Chinese claim their awareness of Taiwan can be 
traced as early as the Han dynasty (206B.C. - A.D.221) when 
Han-shu (the book of History) recorded the inhabitants of Tai-
wan (Lamley, 1976,p.24), the first known permanent Chinese 
settlement was not established until the sixteenth century (Men-
del, 1970,p.11). Furthermore, China's last dynasty, Ching, was 
the only Chinese imperial court which officially ruled Taiwan, 
from 1683 to 1895.For most of the period of Chinese imperial 
history, Taiwan was neglected. 
Taiwan's brief connection with China was cut off when the 
Ching Dynasty lost the Sino-Japanese war during 1894-1895 
and ceded Taiwan to Japan. During 50 years of Japanese coloni-
zation, the long-standing rivalry in Taiwan between Chinese 
emigrants from China's southern provmces (Lumley, 
1976,pp.283-318), Fukien and Kwantung, was gradually eased. 
Fifty years of colonial experience also shaped Taiwanese into a 
distinct group with their own culture, identity and a sense of 
solidarity which distinguished them from the later arriving 
by Chinese soldiers from China. Details will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
4 They are ofMalayo-Polynesian descent. 
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Mainland Chinese. This made conflict between Taiwanese and 
Mainlanders more ~asily break out when Taiwan was retumed to 
China after Japan lost the Second World War. 
Due to the civil war with communists in China, Mainland 
Chinese migrated to Taiwan in large numbers between 1945 and 
1949. Although as a group they have been a minority in popula-
tion, they have dominated Taiwan's political arena since then, 
up until democratization. Consequently, Taiwan's democratiza-
tion has been a power struggle between a majority group, Tai-
wanese, and the minority group, Mainlanders. 5 
In the past, while Taiwanese outnumbered Mainlanders, the 
former were in a subordinate position; consequently the rela-
tionship between these two groups was in a tense but superfi-
cially harmonious condition. Since Mainlanders dominated the 
political arena, despite their smaller population, when Taiwan 
had a one-party authoritarian regime, democratization in Taiwan 
has involved a power redistribution between the two major 
groups. Taiwanese gradually expanded their political participa-
tion and finally gained control of the govemment by taking over 
Mainlanders' power. 
Several factors have played an essential role in Taiwan's 
democratization process. The most significant ones are the so-
cial changes following the economic reforms, the rise of oppo-
sition movements, foreign ( especially American) influence, and 
the willingness of the Chinese Nationalist party's leadership to 
initiate political reforms. Democratization has also been associ-
ated with rising Taiwanese nationalism. Since democracy and 
nationalism are not necessarily equivalent in every country, the 
5 Aborigines have been marginalized in the power struggle due to their small 




interesting interdependence between Taiwanese nationalism and 
democratization is a phenomenon worth exploring. 
The importance of Taiwan's democratization in the world 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, 
it seems democratization has become an almost irresistible trend 
in the world. However, there are still some strong communist or 
authoritarian regimes like China. 
Taiwan's democratization was noteworthy for its peaceful 
transition. Although its model may not be applicable to every 
country, as circumstances are different in each society, doing a 
case study of Taiwan may still be beneficial in providing direc-
tions and insights into the democratization of other nations. Es-
pecially in a country with a similar culture like China, Taiwan's 
experience may offer strategies and methods to use in order to 
open the political participation and contestation opportunities in 
a politically conservative regime. 
The significance of Taiwan's democratization to Taiwan's people 
The success of Taiwan in transforming from an authoritari-
an regime to a democracy is also significant to its citizens. The 
process furnishes them with a chance which their ancestors had 
aspired to but never been granted, that is, to say whatever they 
wish to say and do whatever they wish to do as long as they do 
not violate laws.6 The dream to be their own masters was further 
assured by the direct presidential election in 1996 even under 
6 Here by the term "law", I mean constitution and laws with popular consent, 
not those the government may manipulate as the KMT did when Taiwan 
still had an authoritarian regime. In fact, they used "laws" to torture political 
dissidents and silence Taiwanese before liberalization and democratization 
took place in Taiwan. 
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the shadow of China's military threat. 
The first direct presidential election of Taiwan in 1996 en-
tered the world spotlight because of China's missile tests at the 
same time. China's military threat did achieve part of its goal of 
preventing the growth of Taiwanese nationalism by affecting the 
election result. Taiwan's largest opposition party, the Democ-
ratic Progressive Party, lost the election partly because its can-
didate, Dr. Peng Ming-min, has been well-known for his strong 
advocacy of Taiwanese independence. On the other hand, how-
ever, electors in Taiwan still said no to China by voting in a 
landslide for the KMT candidate whom the PRC condemned 
most, Lee Teng-hui. The election was a milestone for democra-
cy in Taiwan because for the first time in Taiwan's history, its 
people could choose the leader who best represents the whole 
country. It partially fulfilled the dream of the Taiwanese to make 
decisions for themselves. 
For those who are not familiar with Taiwan's history, 
China's military action may have been puzzling. They may not 
understand how a country could use its military power to inter-
vene in another nation's election.7 However, Taiwan's develop-
ments have been deeply influenced by powers beyond the island, 
especially China, Japan and the United States; the crisis in 1996 
was only a demonstration of the strong belief held by the major-
ity of Chinese in the PRC and quite a few residents in Taiwan 
that Taiwan is an integral part of China. 
However, the definition of "China" varies even among tho-
se who think Taiwan is only a part of China. "China" may mean 
the People's Republic of China (PRC), ruled by the Chinese 
communist party to Mainland Chinese and most foreigners. To 
7 Taiwan is a nation or at least a political entity with sovereignty although 
some, especially Chinese, may not agree it is a nation. 
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some, especially some of the residents of Taiwan, "China" is the 
synonym of the Republic of China on Taiwan (R.O.C.). To oth-
ers, "China" means neither of these. It is only a concept that 
comprises mainland China and Taiwan so neither side is entitled 
to claim that it solely represents the whole, because each is only 
part of it. 
On the other hand, the crisis also revealed to us that not 
every citizen in Taiwan accepts the belief that Taiwan is only 
part of China. Although they will not deny that the majority of 
them do have Chinese lineage, a large number of them are not 
convinced that simply because of the common ancestry, they 
have to identify themselves as Chinese instead of Taiwanese. To 
many of them, Taiwan is their home, and their country. They 
may have affection toward the Chinese in the PRC. However, 
this does not mean they have to reunite with the PRC. To the 
contrary, they wish to have a distinct identity, and sovereignty 
of their own. 
Thesis structure 
The principal focus of this research is to analyze why na-
tionalism and democratization were so closely related in Taiwan. 
As a result, various theories about nationalism and democracy 
will be discussed, and the connection between the two will be 
examined. The modern political history of Taiwan will be used 
to refine theories concerning our understanding of the link be-
tween nationalism and democracy. 
The development of a national identity in Taiwan will also 
be another imp01iant issue discussed in this thesis. The remain-
ing chapters are outlined as follows: 
6 
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In chapter 2, the relationship between colonialism, nation-
alism and democracy will be examined. It is apparent that the 
colonial legacy did create the sense of belonging to an "imag-
ined community" through which nationalism was fomly estab-
lished. In fact, one factor that created the different identity be-
tween Taiwanese and Mainlanders was their different colonial 
experiences. While Taiwanese were under 50 years of Japanese 
colonial rule, China was never colonized, although it suffered 
from aggressive foreign threats and wars. Colonial regimes also 
produced a new kind of elite who by mastering the language of 
the foreign ruling class were able to acquire values such as de-
mocracy, self-determination and nationalism to oppose the colo-
nial administration. This chapter will also encompass a review 
of relevant literatures to build a more comprehensive model to 
explain why nationalism and democracy reinforced each other in 
countries like Taiwan. 
In chapter 3, I will discuss a series of significant political 
movements under Japanese rule that shaped the theme of Tai-
wan's progress to a democracy. This transition involved a mutu-
al reliance between Taiwanese nationalism and democratization. 
The precondition of Taiwanese nationalism, Taiwanese con-
sciousness, did not occur until Japanese colonization from 1895 
to 1945. The Home Rule movement during this period was the 
first Taiwanese elite movement that demanded both democracy 
and self-rule. 
Chapter 4 will deal with the short period during 1945 to 
194 7 because it was the turning point for Taiwanese to develop 
a national identity separate from Mainland Chinese. Although 
the Home rule movement mentioned in chapter 3 failed, the 
same elite group kept up their struggle after the Chinese Nation-
alist Party, then the ruling party of China, took over Taiwan. 
7 
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However, their efforts were unsuccessful again, and an island-
wide Taiwanese uprising from the 28th February in 1947 brought 
a massacre which eliminated almost all the Taiwanese elite who 
had Japanese education. It also divided the ethnically Chinese 
community into two groups: Mainlanders and Taiwanese. 
After discussing Japanese colonial rule and the KMT' s 
takeover in chapters 3 and 4 respectively, chapter 5 will turn to 
the KMT's early coercive rule in Taiwan between 1950 and 
1970. The KMT's severe suppression of political dissidents 
during these two decades hindered nearly all democratic and na-
tionalist movements led by the Taiwanese until the 1970s. The 
long political darkness from the 1950s only saw a small number 
of courageous emigrant Chinese elite like Lei Chen who dared 
to challenge the dictatorial regime on Taiwan. The majority 
population in Taiwan was silenced due to the risk of imprison-
ment, torture, and loss of life. 
Chapter 6 will discuss the changes in the domestic and in-
ternational environment from the 1970s that induced democrati-
zation of Taiwan and the rise of its first opposition party, the 
Democracy Progressive Party (DPP). It will explain how the 
demographic and socio-economic changes following the 
economic take-off in Taiwan, such as the aging of life te1m 
mainlander representatives of Taiwan "elected" organs, and the 
higher education and literacy rate of Taiwan's inhabitants, accel-
erated the process of democratization and the spread of Tai-
wanese nationalism. Other social changes such as increasing 
disposable income and the development of communications may 
also have encouraged the process since Taiwanese could travel 
abroad and learn different values from overseas. Chapter 6 will 
also give us an idea of how international events, for instance, the 
end of the Cold War, the normalization of the relationship be-
8 
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tween the U.S.A and the PRC, and people's power in the Philip-
pines inspired the Taiwanese political dissidents to seek more 
concessions from the authoritarian government and to promote 
Taiwanese nationalism. 
At the end, chapter 7 will conclude this thesis by exploring 
democratization, the development of nationalism and their rela-
tionship based on the Taiwan case. 
Chapter 2 will lead us to the main body of this thesis by 
discussing relevant theories on democracy, democratization, 
colonialism and nationalism. 
9 
Chapter Two 
Colonialism, Nationalism and Democracy 
Introduction 
People all around the world nowadays tend to take it for 
granted that the globe is divided into different nations. However, 
while researchers like Kohn and Smith believe that we can trace 
the idea of nation to early human history (Kohn, 1945,p.3; p.19; 
Smith, 1986,pp.ll-12), it is generally believed that nationalism 
was an unfamiliar ideology which did not become widely 
accepted until the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth 
centuries (Kedourie, 1994,p 1 ). 
Almost at the same time that nationalism established its 
prevalence, the concept of democracy also began to grow, firstly 
in Europe and then throughout the world. Inspired by these two 
political cunents, the American and the French Revolutions 
expressed both nationalist and democratic aspirations. But why 
are nationalism and democracy so closely con-elated, as in the 
two revolutions? Many scholars believe their common central 
notion, popular sovereignty, provides a powerful linkage. 
On the other hand, the success of European nationalist 
movements also encouraged them to engage in competitive 
colonialism in Asia and Africa at the cost of native people in 
these countries. Later, in order to save administrative 
expenditure, colonial governments made Western style 
education accessible to locals. Unintentionally, their education 
created a new kind of elite who were able to lead their own 
nationalist movements against the colonial regimes. In fact, the 
colonial legacy shaped the development of nationalism in Asian 
Colonialism, Nationalism and Democracy 11 
and African countries. 
It appears from this short discussion that nationalism may 
be closely connected with both democracy and colonialism. This 
is exactly the case in Taiwan. This chapter will provide a 
theoretical framework for discussing the relationship between 
nationalism, colonialism, and democracy by exploring major 
relevant theories on the three. 
Definitions of nation 
We can not discuss nationalism without firstly an analysis 
of the meaning of nation, the central concept of nationalism. Yet, 
this is not an easy task. Many social scientists, such as Max 
Weber and Anthony Smith, have proposed different definitions 
of the concept. However, to this date no consensus has been 
found on this issue. 
Although there are no universally held criteria on judging 
whether a group of people is or is not a nation, we may still 
summarize the commonly used definitions to formulate an 
acceptable hypothesis for further exploration. The most often 
mentioned elements can be categorized as concrete and 
sentimental. Authors may have both concrete and sentimental 
factors in their definitions. 
Concrete elements of a nation 
Stalin is a well-lmown writer among those who define 
nation m terms of concrete factors. He believes a common 
language, ten-itory, economic life, psychological make-up 
(national character) "manifested in a common culture" are all 
essential to each nation (in Hutchinsion and Smith, 1994,p.20). 
Kohn8 holds a similar view but common descent, a political 
8 Kohn's criteria include common descent, language, territory, political entity, 
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entity and a living and corporate will (to form a nation) are also 
important to him (Kohn, 1945,p.14). A survey of the literature 
indicates that a common myth of descent, culture, a political 
entity, shared history and territory are the most frequently 
mentioned concrete factors so they will be discussed in detail 
here. 
1. Common myth of descent 
The process of nation-building 1s almost impossible 
without some myths. Myths are hard to prove but persuasive. 
They inspire people and give them reasons to create their own 
nation. A common myth of descent is one of the most 
widespread myths. Other myths may emphasize the superiority 
of a nation. For instance, Jews believed they were God's chosen 
people so they never gave up the hope to build their nation no 
matter how difficult the mission was. Since the belief of having 
a common ancestry is very helpful in creating a sense of 
belonging, it is understandable that many nationalists have 
cultivated among their potential fellow-members the myth of 
common ancestry in order to solicit support for forming a new 
nation. 
On the other hand, however, as many nations have multiple 
ethnic groups within their borders, emphasis on common 
ancestry or kinship may easily divide them. In addition, 
improvements in transportation have enabled people to migrate 
freely, so the ideal that a single ethnic group composes a nation 
is practically unattainable in today's world. Consequently, a 
common myth of descent should be a supplementary but not an 
indispensable factor to define a nation. 
Sometimes other features such as common culture, beliefs, 
or history may substitute for the myth of common descent. For 
customs and traditions, and religion (1945,p.14). 
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instance, American citizens may not share the same descent, but 
they do hold strong beliefs in democracy, freedom, and their 
constitution. The importance of common culture and shared 
history will be discussed below. 
2. Culture 
Some definitions of nationalism, such as German theories, 
were known for their emphasis on cultural aspects. Influenced 
by theories of Herder and Fichte, this type of cultural 
nationalism stressed the significance of a distinctive culture 
(Smith, l 97 l ,pp.180-182). Cultural nationalism also believed 
that every nation had its own unique national character that can 
be seen in its folk music, art, and literature. Since language was 
the means of expression, it was viewed as an essential element 
to define a nation (Alter, 1994,p.43; Kohn, 1945,pp.428-230). 
However, the argument loses its validity easily. Although 
we see nations like Japan where a single and unique language is 
spoken, people may establish different nation-states even though 
they share a common language. The fact that the citizens of the 
United States and the United Kingdom speak English but have 
separate nationalities is a convincing example of this point. 
On the other hand, people of the same nation may speak 
different languages but still consider one another as fellow 
citizens. Switzerland is a typical example where three official 
languages (German, Italian, and French) are spoken. Therefore, 
although each nation tends to have one common language, (such 
as China whose people may not speak mutually comprehensible 
languages or dialects, but have a common official language for 
communication among fellow-members with a different dialect 
background), common language should not be an indispensable 
requirement of a nation. 
Similar logic applies to other cultural traits like religion or 
custom and tradition. Although sharing religion and customs 
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helps to solidify a nation, we still see examples are abundant 
where people are able to coexist harmoniously within one nation 
even though they may come from different religious groups, 
practice different customs or cany out different traditions. 
3. Political entity I state 
Trying to answer the question of what a nation is, Max 
Weber once claimed that "a nation is a community which 
normally tends to produce a state of its own"(in Hutchinson and 
Smith, 1994,p.25). His view represents a common assumption 
that a nation has to or at least tends to be coterminous with a 
state. But is a state essential for a nation? 
Generally speaking, having an independent state does grant 
a nation better chances to enjoy citizen rights and political 
freedom. Not every nation, however, has the ability or will to 
establish its own state. This does not deprive them of the sense 
of nation. Examples· of nations without their own states were 
abundant especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century when colonialism was very prevalent. At that time, 
foreign powers dominated the state in many Asian nations. The 
PLO is another example of a nation without a state. These 
examples demonstrate one clear conclusion: although building a 
state may be one of the goals of nationalism, possessing a state 
itself should not define a nation. 
If a common myth of descent, shared culture and a political 
entity are not ultimately decisive in forming every nation, then 
what are the essentials of a nation? While the above factors 
seem to facilitate the creation of a nation, other elements seem 
to be crucial for a nation to develop. These factors will be 
discussed below. 
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4. Shared history 
Shared history is another widely cited criterion. Renan 
(1990) holds that historical memories are important for a nation. 
But for him, common suffering is more powerful than happiness 
in creating the solidarity within a nation. He wrote: "suffering in 
common unifies more than joy does. Where national memories 
are concerned, grieves are of more value than triumphs, for they 
impose duties, and require a common effort" (Renan, 1990,p.19). 
Normally due to their experiences of common suffering, a 
community determines to have their own nation instead of being 
dominated by foreign powers. Shared history enables every 
member to identify with their nation and their countrymen and 
prepare to sacrifice everything to consolidate the nation. 
However, it is difficult to say accurately how long that common 
history must have lasted in order to create a nation. 
In addition to shared history, shared symbols or traditions 
may also be significant in shaping a nation. Although some of 
them may have been invented intentionally, as Hobsbawm has 
suggested (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983,p.1), traditions do 
associate members of each nation with the past and the history 
of their nations. Symbols such as a national flag and an anthem 
also provide them objects to identify with their nations. 
5. Territory 
Kohn (1945), Smith (1986) and Stalin (in Hutchinson and 
Smith, 1994) all consider territory as an important element of 
each nation. They believe without physically owning a territory, 
no community is entitled to be called a nation. 
What is the significance of the national territory? James 
Anderson's opinion may help to answer this question. To him, 
territory is important to each nation because 
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. . . territory is the receptacle of the past in the present. The 
nation's unique history is embodied in the nation's unique 
piece of territory- its 'homeland', the primeval land of its 
ancestors, older than any state, the same land which saw its 
greatest moments, perhaps its mythical origins. The time has 
passed but the space is still there (James Anderson, 1986, p.24). 
In other words, the territory is meaningful in its connection 
with a nation's past. It has historical significance to each nation 
because it helps to create a sense of community. Human beings, 
as Kohn has argued, tend to identify with the land where they 
were born and grew up. They may also relate to people from the 
same land with strong emotional attachment (Kohn, 1945, pp.4-
5). This sentiment may not necessarily convert into their love 
towards their nation and countrymen easily. But once it does, it 
motivates people to willingly sacrifice or even die for their 
nation. 
We can conclude that two concrete elements are essential 
in each nation: shared history and territory.9 Other elements, 
such as a common myth of descent, culture (language, custom, 
and tradition) and a state may also be impm1ant but not every 
nation has these characteristics. 
Sentimental elements of a nation 
After discussing some major and widely accepted concrete 
criteria of nation creation and examining their validity, it should 
be helpful to explore the opinions of those who define nations in 
terms of sentiment to look at the concept from a different angle. 
We will discuss the will to form a nation first, then Benedict 
Anderson's theory will be explored because it has made great 
contributions in this aspect. 
9 The PLO had no territory for decades nor did the Jews before 1945.But they 
did, however, have a homeland that they were emotionally attached to. 
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1. The will to form a nation/national consciousness 
Kohn argued that"[ n ]ationality is formed by the decision to 
form a nationality" (Kohn, 1945,p. l 5).He believes factors 
mentioned earlier may have existed for a very long time before a 
nation 1s born. What transformed these factors into 
preconditions for the birth of a nation, however, was " the 
awakening of national consciousness" (Kohn, 1945,p.16). In 
other words, the will to form a nation helps to explain the 
creation of each nation. 
Renan (1990) took a similar position although he used a 
slightly different phrase. He argued " consent, the desire to live 
together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one 
has received in an undivided form" (Renan, 1990,p.19) as one of 
the foundation of a nation. He further claimed "[t]he wish of 
nations is, all in all, the sole legitimate criterion, the one to 
which one must always return" (Renan, 1990,p.20). 
2. Nation as an Imagined community 
In his book Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson 
asserts that a nation is "an imagined political community-and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1991,p6). 
According to him, a nation is imagined because no one can 
know every member of their nation. They know only those with 
whom they associate personally. He is also convinced that a 
nation is imagined as limited because no matter how large a 
nation is, it always has its boundary limitations. In his opinion, a 
nation is also imagined as sovereign for its birth in an age when 
Enlightenment and Revolution dissolved previous dynastic 
legitimacy. 10Furthe1more, a nation is imagined as a community 
10 Before the concept of nation was widely accepted, sovereignty was 
believed to belong to rulers. Furthermore, rulers' right to rule was divine and 
could not be challenged because it was said to be granted by God. When 
nationalism emerged, however, rulers lost their legitimacy and the nation 
become the supreme sovereignty. 
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as its every member has a sense of solidarity, so they believe in 
the companionship among them (1991, p7). 
Anderson describes a nation as an imagined community. In 
other words, members of a nation aquire a sense of community. 
But where does the sense of community come from? Anderson's 
own answer to this is a process discussed below, but we may 
expect from previous discussion of concrete factors of a nation 
that territ01y, hist01y, myth and different aspects of culture may 
all play vital roles in it; the weight of each factor and their 
combination varies with each nation. 
Anderson believes "the convergence of capitalism and print 
technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the 
possibility of a new form of imagined community" (Anderson, 
1991,p.46). He describes how the birth of administrative 
vernaculars had gradually developed in the influence of the 
Reformation in Europe. Together with the thrust of capitalism 
for a larger audience for the printing industry, they helped bring 
about the rise of national consciousness and the creation of an 
imagined community (1991,pp.37-46). 
What happened in colonized nations is another variant. 
European colonialism resulted in the emergence of the creole 
class, the Europeans born in colonies. Their birth in colonies 
usually restrained them from working for the colonial central 
government in Europe. Since their promotion was limited within 
the border of the colony of their birth and since they had no 
racial difference from their Europe-born counterparts, it is 
understandable that they concluded that they suffered 
discrimination because of their birthplace. Thus, they identified 
people within the colonies instead of Europeans from their 
theoretically mother countries as their nationals. On their way 
of pilgrimage 11, the road to promotion, they also met travelling-
11 By pilgrimage, Anderson means the route colony-born colonial bureaucrats 
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compamons who shared their life experiences although they 
might be Creoles, Eurasians, Eurafricans, or Euramericans. 
Their sense of community gradually grew due to this kind of 
interaction within a colony (Anderson, 1991, pp.47-65). 
Moreover, European or Japanese colonial regimes provided 
western style education to the natives. The language of the 
colonial regime became the communication tool between the 
local elite from different dialect backgrounds (Anderson, 1991, 
pp.121-123). Modern inventions such as newspapers also 
enlarged the sense of community (Anderson, 1991,p.134). How 
the nation as an imagined community grew in colonized nations 
will be discussed in more detail in a later section when we 
explore how colonialism helped the spread and development of 
nationalism. Meanwhile, Anthony Smith's theory can also 
provide us with insights in understanding nations. 
Territorial nations and ethnic nations 
According to Anthony Smith (1986), nations can be 
divided into two types: territorial and ethnic nations. He argues, 
Western European nations were territorial nations while nations 
in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe were ethnic ones (Smith, 
1986,pp135-149). 
In Smith's opinion, the concept of territorial nation can not 
be conceived without a sovereign statehood. It has a defined 
boundary, and members within its jurisdiction all follow the 
same legal code and have uniform rights and obligations. 
Citizenship and common culture are also important elements of 
a territorial nation. By common culture, he means "shared 
meanings and values, common myths and symbols" (Smith, 
took when they sought promotions in their career. They were assigned from 
one place to another so they traveled like pilgrims at different stages of their 
lives. But unlike their European counterparts, the summit of their career was 
normally the capital of the colony, not the capital of their mother country. 
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1986,p135). 
In a territorial nation, a common shared myth and shared 
memories create a common 'civil religion'. Through the help of 
common language and state education, the civil religion is 
passed on to the masses. As a result, the solidarity of citizenship 
can be reinforced (Smith, 1986, p.136). 
On the other hand, Smith believes ethnic nations were 
formed on the basis of pre-existing ethnic ties (Smith, 
1986,p.137). To him, assumed common origins and descent are 
essential to an ethnic nation. In addition, customs and dialects 
are as important in ethnic nations as the legal codes and 
institutions are in territorial nations (Smith, 1986,p.13 7). 
Smith's classification is useful in defining a nation but has 
its own deficiency. For instance, it is not always easy to 
segregate precisely between ethic nations and te1ritorial nations. 
Most of the time, both types can coexist within a given 
territorial boundary. 
In other words, when nationalism began to grow in each 
nation, the elite normally had to appeal to primordial attachment 
such as kinship, religion, language, customs (sometimes even 
'race') to create a nation because their fellows still did not hold 
strong national consciousness. Once a nation is constructed 
successfully, however, those elements become less crucial 
although they still determine to some extent whether a nation is 
cohesive or inclined to disintegrate. In addition, territorial 
elements like citizenship and law may play a more significant 
role than their primordial counterparts once a nation is created. 
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A proposed definition of nation 
After analyzing all elements mentioned above, we may find 
that no single factor is solely adequate in establishing a nation. 
To sum up, we may say a nation is an imagined community with 
an association with a specific tenitory. It tends to have its own 
state or sovereignty or at least seeks to obtain some control over 
its own community. People within it share a common history. 
The sense of the community may come from territory, history, 
myth of origin, and different aspects of culture or various 
combinations of these. 
In different nations, the weight of any single characteristic 
varies. For instance, religion has never been a dominant feature 
in Taiwan. However, it may be very powerful in countries where 
religion plays an impmiant role in daily life such as Indonesia. 
In Taiwan's case, etlmic and territorial elements never separate 
themselves completely in modern history. One may only argue 
that time changes their relative importance. In the earliest stage 
of Taiwan's nation formation, ethnic ties like kinship, language 
and shared history were definitely far more important. However, 
as time went by, territorial elements gradually increased in 
impmiance and added new meanings to the notion of a 
Taiwanese nation. 
Nationalism 
If we look at various definitions of nationalism, we will 
find that the concept has been defined as an ideology, a political 
movement, or both according to different social scientists. Alter, 
for instance, claims that nationalism is " both an ideology and a 
political movement which holds the nation and the sovereign 
nation-state to be crucial indwelling values, and which manages 
to mobilize the political will of a people or a large section of a 
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population" (Alter, 1994, p4). 
We may not necessarily agree with all of this, but his 
definition illustrates a very significant feature of nationalism, 
that is, it is both an ideology and a political movement. They are 
inte1iwined and hard to separate but it is useful to divide them 
for the convenience of discussion. As a political movement, 
nationalism aims to realize a desire for nationhood. As an 
ideology, nationalism provides a theoretical foundation for 
people to attain the political goals of nationalist movements. 
Desire for nationhood 
Motivated by their faith in nationalism, nationalists 
everywhere devote their lives to that cause. Their goal may be to 
unite various smaller political entities into a nation as German 
nationalists did, to separate their nation from an existing 
sovereignty as Quebec nationalists attempted, or to rescue their 
nation from foreign domination as did nations in Asia and 
Africa. Sometimes they even try to achieve several goals at the 
same time through nationalism. Whatever their goal, however, 
they all need support from their fellow people. Therefore, 
nationalism is employed as a political movement for mobilizing 
people. 
Whatever their approaches or objectives are, most 
nationalists have something in common: they yearn for their 
own nationhood. They believe that the nation should command 
the supreme loyalty of everyone within it and that every member 
of the nation relies for their welfare on its fortune. They think 
the distinction between rulers and the ruled is unjust because 
every member of the nation should have equal rights and 
responsibilities. As a result, citizenship and popular sovereignty 
are important elements in nationalism. And achieving and 
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guaranteeing them become the goals of nationalist movements. 
Among those who define nationalism as both a political 
movement and an ideology, John Breuilly's opinion is a 
representative one. He argues that nationalism is " political 
movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying 
such actions with nationalist arguments"(1982,p.3).By 
nationalist arguments, he means three assertions: "(a) There 
exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; (b) [t]he 
interest and values of this nation take priority over all other 
interests and values; (c) [t]he nation must be as independent as 
possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political 
sovereignty"(l 982,p.3 ). 
The ultimate goal of almost all nationalist movements is to 
create a nation that is congruent with the state. Nationalism, as 
Gellner has suggested, is "primarily a political principle which 
holds that the -political and the national unit should be 
congruent" (Gellner, 1983,pl). Armstrong considers nationalism 
to be "[t]he right of individuals to choose the state to which they 
belong, that is, to establish territorial political structures 
corresponding to their consciousness of group identity" 
(1983,p.4). 
The mobilizing power of nationalism was prevalent firstly 
in the American and French Revolutions. Before nationalism 
appeared as a widely held idea, the masses in every European 
state had neither interest nor power in politics. They did not care 
even if their rulers were a "foreigner". They were more inclined 
to accept the condition that their societies were divided into two 
classes: the rulers and the ruled. However, nationalism broke the 
class barrier and transformed the whole population into citizens 
and made "possible the political and cultural integration of the 
mass into the nation" (Kohn, 1945,p.20). Nevertheless, every 
nation is different in its popular mobilization. In broad terms, 
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mobilization may come from the "bottom-up" or from state 
sponsorship (Mann, 1990,p.45). 
We always see conflicting interests in each nationalist 
movement. On the one hand, there is the class with the vested 
interest, the oppressor. (No matter whether they are a privileged 
class such as the monarch and nobility in the French Revolution 
or a colonial regime.) On the other hand, there is the oppressed 
class, the people who want to create a nation under which every 
member is treated equally as in the third Estate in the French 
Revolution or those colonized natives. That is one of the reasons 
why nationalism can mobilize people with different 
backgrounds to join nationalist movements because they see the 
hope to change their unpleasant life condition. However, the 
power of nationalism in mobilization also derives from its 
ideological base which emphasizes a sense of community and 
equality. We shall discuss them in the next section. 
Nationalism as an ideology 
Kohn emphasizes the ideological aspect of nationalism 
when he defines it as 
a state of mind, permeating the large majority of people and 
claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-
state as the source of all creative cultural energy and of 
economic well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore 
due to his nationality, as his own life is supposedly rooted in 
and made possible by its welfare (Kohn, 1945,p.6). 
Nationalism, as an ideology, popularized itself in North 
America and Europe at its emergence. Later through the efforts 
of elite in developing countries with the hope of bringing 
political changes into their countries, it expanded its influence in 
Asia, Africa and even the whole world. But why was 
nationalism so popular particularly among intelligentsia? And 
how can it posses such an irresistible appeal so it seems to have 
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dominated the historical arena since the nineteenth century? 
(Smith, 1971,p.30). 
As mentioned earlier, one of the explanations is its ability 
to mobilize people. However, we also need to discuss its 
ideological components to answer these questions. The 
ideological elements of nationalism include three themes: 
national self-determination,popular sovereignty, and citizenship. 
Because popular sovereignty and citizenship are closely related, 
they will be discussed together. 
I. National self-determination 
The conviction of revolutionary Europeans that human 
beings possessed inalienable natural rights was hard to prove 
philosophically but Kedourie claimed that Kant's philosophy 
provided a satisfactory theoretical basis and helped the 
development of nationalism (Kedourie, 1994, pp.12-13). 
In Kedourie's interpretation, Kant made it very clear that 
morality could be separated from scientific knowledge. It is 
dominated by a different law from that which governs 
appearances. Therefore, "[m]orality is the outcome of obedience 
to a universal law which is to be found within ourselves, not in 
the world of appearances." This assumption was contrary to the 
common belief in senses in the early 18th century (Kedourie, 
1994,pp.13-14). 
Due to his argument that human beings decide the standard 
of morality, Kant added a new meaning to freedom. He believed 
that only when a man "obeys the law of morality from that 
which he finds within himself, and not in the external world" 
can he be called free (Kedourie, 1994,p.15). In other words, a 
person is free as long as his or her mind and will is free. 
Furthermore, "[t]he end of man was to determine himself as a 
free being, self-ruling and self-moved"(Kedourie, 1994,p.18). 
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This doctrine, as a result, encouraged young Europeans to 
put their convictions into practice. Therefore, for instance, a 
student society, the Burschenschat was established to work for 
unity and democracy in Germany (Kedourie, 1994,p.19). 
Kant also supported the idea that every state should be 
republican since it could express the autonomous will of its 
citizens (Kedourie, 1994,p.20). Since "[t]he only legitimate 
limits are self-imposed limits"(Kedourie, 1994,p23), self-
determination became a supreme good. And the national self-
determination, one aspect of nationalism, also became attractive 
to many Europeans. 
Although one may argue that approving individual self-
determination need not necessarily have any connection with 
national self-determination, the desire to govern oneself can be 
easily turned into "the demand for individual consent to 
government" and then "has regularly been translatecl into self-
govermnent for people and hence for nations" (Canavan, 
1996,p.9). What is really meant, however, by national self-
determination? Mill explains this in his famous passage: 
It is, in general, a necessary condition of free institutions that 
the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with 
those of nationality .... where the sentiment of nationality exists 
in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the 
members of the nationality under the same government, and a 
government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the 
question of government ought to be decided by the governed, 
One hardly knows what any division of the human race should 
be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various 
collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate 
themselves (Quoted in Smith, 1971,p.9). 
In other words, national self-determination means that a 
nation is entitled to have their own government, determine their 
destiny themselves and possess the right to associate themselves 
with whomever they wish. But how can this principle be put into 
practice in reality? Popular sovereignty and citizenship are the 
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key to this question. 
2. Popular sovereignty and citizenship 
The common legitimacy for European monarchy to rule 
was justified by the divine right of kings, through annexation, or 
marriage between European kingdoms before the eighteenth 
century (James Anderson, 1986,p.22; Guibernau, 1996,p.52). 
However, after nationalism began to grow, it changed the 
political order in Europe by challenging this rationale. Instead of 
accepting the legitimate right to rule from God and above, 
nationalism signified the principle of popular sovereignty by 
turning subjects of each kingdom into citizens of each nation. 
Therefore, the right to rule should be confirmed by the ruled. 
Furthermore, foreign rulers became unacceptable (Birch, 
1993,pp.15-16). 
The doctrine of popular sovereignty, which motivated 
revolutionaries of the French and the American revolutions and 
later nationalists in other countries, was indicated vigorously in 
Locke's and Rousseau's writings (Adams, 1965,p.l 74). They 
both believed in the concept of social contract in which the 
government was viewed as "the outcome of a contract freely 
made, a consent voluntarily given" by the people. Namely, the 
government had to legitimize itself by popular consent (Hayes, 
1949,p.23; Guibernau, 1996,pp.52-53). 
But their political thinking posed a question, that is, who 
should be included in the people? Although they did not 
provide satisfactory answers themselves, it is understandable 
that nationalists naturally equated the people with their nation 
when they applied the theories of these two famous political 
philosophers to support their nationalist yearnings. The well-
known document of the French Revolution, The Declaration of 
the rights of man and of the citizen, for instance, outlined the 
principle by claiming "the principle of all sovereignty resides 
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eventually in the nation. Nobody [,]or [any] individual[,]may 
exercise authority which does not proceed directly from the 
nation" (Quoted in Hayes, 1949,p.35). As a result, the nation 
became the lawful origin of the practice of sovereignty. And 
defining the membership of each nation, in other words, 
deciding who could participate in the exercise of sovereignty, 
also turned into an essential issue so the concept of citizenship 
evolved. 
The notion of citizenship was influential in the promotion 
of nationalism because it enabled members of each nation to 
shift their loyalty from a King to their nation. It involved a 
process that " the nation, personified through symbols and 
rituals which symbolically recreate a sense of the 'people', 
became the focus of a new kind of attachment" (Gibemau, 
1996,p.55). Brubaker (1992,p.35) argues that the French 
Revolution invented modern national citizenship. After the 
revolution, France was no longer the possession of any king. It 
belonged to every French citizen. The Revolution "created a 
class of person [,French citizens,] enjoying common rights, 
bound by common obligations, formally equal before the law". 
It substituted a common law of privilege (Brubaker, 1992,p.39). 
As a consequence of their position as citizens, French were 
also allowed to participate in government affairs (Brubaker, 
1992,p.41 ). This connection with democracy will be explored in 
greater detail when the relationship between nationalism and 
democracy is discussed. The French ideals of citizenship also 
became the model for neighboring Europeans nations and the 
world. 
We also see a sense of community and equality from the 
concept of citizenship. By having citizenship, every citizen has 
an imagined community, the nation, to identity themselves with. 
They acquire the sense of community from the membership of a 
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nation. Since every citizen has equal rights and responsibilities 
before the law within the nation, equality surely is one of the 
crucial elements of citizenship. 
To sum up, national self-determination means a group of 
people who possess citizenship of a nation makes decisions for 
themselves by exercising sovereignty in their nation. One way to 
put popular sovereignty and national self-determination into 
practice, of course, is to have democracy. We shall discuss what 
democracy is in a later section. Meanwhile, since colonialism 
stimulated the growth of nationalism in colonized nations and 
since Taiwan was colonized, let us explore the relationship 
between colonialism and nationalism first. 
Colonialism and Nationalism 
The close correlation between colonialism and nationalism 
presented itself in two aspects: First, European and later 
Japanese colonialism were motivated in part by nationalist 
sentiments of eagerness to create a glorious empire. Second, 
colonial regimes inadve1tently bolstered the maturation of 
nationalism in their colonies because of the communication, 
transportation and educational infrastructure they brought with 
their colonialism. Since Taiwan has never colonized any nation, 
only the second aspect will be discussed in this section. 
No matter whether they chose to rule indirectly as the 
Dutch did in Indonesia at the beginning of their colonial rule or 
directly as the Japanese did in Taiwan and Korea, it was 
unavoidable for the colonial government to appoint locals who 
were willing to co-operate in governing the colony. As a 
consequence, they started providing western style12 colonial 
education in the hope that it might create a new group of 
12 In Japan's case, it included the Japanese interpretation of western 
civilization in its colonial education. 
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bilingual locals who would loyally help them rule the colonial 
tenitory (Anderson, 1991,p.115). 
Colonial governments' education policies did achieve some 
success in creating a new group of local elite. What these 
colonial regimes did not expect, however, was how effectively 
their education was used in equipping local elite to lead their 
nationalist movements to challenge colonialism, instead of 
having the desired consequences. Colonialism was contributive 
to the growth of anti-colonial nationalism in the following 
aspects: 
First, the common educational experiences contributed to a 
sense of community for people from different places within the 
colony. They may come from different dialect or religious 
groups but the language taught at colonial schools became their 
means of communication and broke down the barrier between 
them (Anderson, 1991,pp.121-123; p.133). 
In fact, colonial government policies even reinforced their 
sense of community. For instance, the Dutch referred to all 
Indonesians as in/anders although they may have had different 
dialects. To colonial regimes, all inlanders were "equally 
contemptible, no matter what ethnolingustic group or class they 
came from" (Anderston, 1991,p.122). As a result of being 
treated as colonized subjects in the same way and having 
common educational experiences such as uniform textbooks, 
standardized diplomas and teaching ce1iificates, it was easy for 
native people to imagine a nation in their minds and identify 
with people within their nation. Their national consciousness 
may also have been aroused when they learned the geography of 
their nation and saw it on the map in classrooms (Anderson, 
1991,pp.121-122). Fmihermore, people they met at school also 
became the subjects of the imagination of a national brotherhood, 
so the imagined community was gradually created. 
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Second, on their way to further study and in finding a job, 
they ( especially those who got very good western style 
education) started to realize that they were discriminated against 
because the colonial regime had a policy of favoring its own 
countrymen. Educated native elite also painfully recognized that 
even if they had better qualifications than those colonizers who 
were in charge, they got less pay for the same job or even lost 
jobs to those less qualified colonizers. Due to the awareness, 
they were dissatisfied with the colonial regime and filled with 
bitter feeling. They came to believe that only creating their own 
nations could solve the problem of discrimination, so nationalist 
sentiments grew (Kahin, 1952,pp.48-49; p.53). 
Third, because they were able to read m the colonial 
language, they could learn Western thinking like nationalism 
and comprehend works by people like Locke and Rousseau 
either directly in English or by translation into other European 
languages or Japanese. These Western political thoughts 
broadened their minds and inspired their nationalist struggle 
(Anderson, 1991,p.116; Kahin, 1952,pp.49-50). Their familiarity 
with histories of the colonial mother country not only made 
therri wonder why they themselves could not become 
independent from foreign influence, but also encouraged them to 
think it was possible to have their own nation as their colonial 
master had achieved (Kahin, 1952,p.49). 
Fourth, the emergence of the new elite as a result of the 
colonial government's education also provided leadership for 
nationalist movements. In Indonesia, for instance, one of the 
reasons why nationalism could not grow before the new elite led 
the movement was that the Indonesian aristocracy refused to 
support it. The Indonesian aristocracy benefited from Dutch 
colonialism because the Dutch allowed them to exploit even 
more than they had before from their people, so it was 
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understandable that they saw no need to oppose the colonial 
regime (Kahin, 1952,p.41). As a consequence of the lack of 
leadership, the Indonesian masses could not relate their 
deteriorated life condition to colonialism. Once new local elite 
started to lead the movement and educate their people, however, 
the masses were easily mobilized and their quick response made 
the growth of nationalist movements possible. 
In addition, colonial regimes also unintentionally nourished 
nationalism by introducing some novel inventions such as the 
railway, printing, and radio. These inventions were all helpful in 
spreading nationalist sentiments in these colonies. Before 
transportation innovations like the railway, steamships and 
motors enabled people to move easier, the majority of people in 
these colonies tended to stay in their small villages all their life. 
But these inventions made human movement easier and 
encouraged them to start working in big cities. On their trip to 
and from big cities, they met their countrymen and began to 
develop the sense of community. Furthermore, since new ideas 
normally began to ripen in urban areas, they could learn novel 
concepts like nationalism and introduce them when they 
returned to their hometown. As a result, transportation 
improvements helped the development of nationalism in 
colonized countries (Anderson, 1991,p.115; Kahin, 1952,p.42). 
Printing and radio broadcasting were also important in 
stimulating the expansion of nationalism. Colonial regimes' 
policies to introduce western style education created a larger 
literate population. As more and more people were able to learn 
new ideas by reading them, the advancement in printing made 
ideas like nationalism more available to the educated people and 
helped it to extend its appeal. Since not everyone was able to 
read, however, printing did have its limit in spreading nationalist 
ideas. Radio, as a result, became a significant supplementary 
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tool for nationalists to manipulate. With the help of the radio, 
they could also attract the masses who were illiterate or from 
various dialect backgrounds (Anderson, 1991,p.135; Kahin, 
1952,p.41 ). 
In sum, colonialism was influential in the development of 
nationalism in colonized nations in several ways. 1. It instituted 
western-style education for the colonized thereby creating a new 
elite group; by learning and reading western ideas such as 
democracy and nationalism made available by their colonial 
education, they became leaders of nationalist movements. 2. The 
languages promoted by colonial regimes became the means of 
communications which diminished the language barriers within 
nations. 3. The common experiences of discrimination in areas 
like education and employment reinforced the sense of 
community among the colonized. 4. Colonial regimes 
introduced modern inventions, such as printing and railways. 
These bolstered the spread of nationalism. 
Democracy 
Compared to nationalism, democracy is less controversial 
as far as definition is concerned. Democratic theorists have more 
consensus on what it is meant by democracy than their 
nationalist colleagues do on nationalism. Before we explore the 
elements of democracy, however, it should be useful to trace the 
evolution of the notion of democracy. 
The term democracy was derived from the Greek words 
demos (people) and kratia(rule or authority). As a consequence, 
it means rule by the people in Greek. It is essential, 
consequently, to clarify the meaning of rule and the people. 
Since the notion of rule and the people are crucial in democracy, 
major controversies, as a result, were over the essence of these 
two terms. Theorists disagree with one another on the form of 
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rule. Some prefer direct rule; others accept the legitimacy of 
indirect rule, or representative democracy. 
Theories of democracy were originally only for small city-
states, as they had in ancient Athens. As nation-state replaced 
city-state as a popular government form, nevertheless, 
democratic principles began to be applied to larger communities, 
that is to nations. Since direct democracy seemed no longer 
possible as a result of the larger population and the size of each 
state, representative democracy has gradually become a 
synonym of democracy. The idea of democracy has become so 
widespread that even countries like China, which is not a 
democracy in reality, use terms like people's democratic 
dictatorship to mobilize people and justify their regimes. 
Disagreement also occurred among political theorists on 
the issue of who should be the people in a democracy (Bogdanor, 
1987,p.166). In ancient Greece, only free men whose parents 
were Athenian citizens were permitted to participate in public 
affairs. Women and slaves were deprived of the right to take part 
in politics. Even in countries which are known for their 
democratic achievement such as the United Kingdom, the 
United States and France, some disadvantaged groups, for 
instance, women, poor people or blacks were prevented from 
having their voices heard in politics for some time until 
universal suffrage became a reality. As universal suffrage 
becomes a widely accepted principle, however, the meaning of 
the people is no longer controversial. The people has been 
identified with adult population in each democracy regardless of 
their gender and race although people like children and 
criminals are still prohibited from participating in the ruling 
process. 13 
13 Immigrant and people of an ethnic group born abroad, however, are 
sometimes still in an ambiguous position because of nationalism. 
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The popularity of democracy is in fact a modern 
phenomenon. Although the first example of democracy existed 
as early as in ancient Athens, it was not a highly regarded 
political system for some 2500 years until the political writings 
of philosophers like Locke and Rousseau were widely read and 
accepted14(Duncan, 1983,p.13). Locke's political theories were 
based on his conviction of inalienable human rights (life, liberty, 
and property in particular). He argued that government is 
established to guarantee these rights, so people can overthrow it 
when it does not fulfill its function. Although the "people" he 
referred to was a narrow group, namely, men with certain 
property, his theory was expanded by later democrats to apply to 
a larger population. And democracy was advocated by those 
democrats because it was believed to be the political system that 
can best protect people's rights. 
The new interpretation of Locke's view was clearly 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident. That all men are 
created equal that they are endowed by their creator with 
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty & the 
pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments 
are instituted among men, deriving their just power from the 
consent of the governed, that whenever any form of 
government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of 
the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
government, laying its foundation on such principles and 
organizing its power in such form , as to them shail seem most 
likely to effect their safety and happiness.(Quoted in Becker, 
1961,p.8). 
Even though the American and French revolutionists 
accepted Locke and Rousseau's democratic philosophy, they 
inherited the traditional disbelief in democracy from Greek 
philosophers. James Madison, for instance, wrote in his book 
14 We see this clearly, for instance, from Plato's disapproval of democracy in 
his writing. 
Colonialism/ Nationalism and Democracy 36 
The Federalist that "democracies have ever been found 
incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property, 
and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been 
violent in their deaths" (Quoted in Birch, 1993,p.45). They 
viewed what they created in America and France as republics 
instead of democracies. However, these two nations have been 
considered as democracies in the modern sense since their 
creation. Furthermore, they inspired later democratic 
movements in other countries. 
The meaning of democracy has shifted from direct rule by 
citizens to rule through indirect representation. What is its 
current meaning then? According to Holden (1988,p.5), 
democracy is " a political system in which the whole people, 
positively or negatively, make, and are entitled to make, the 
basic determining decisions on important matters of public 
policy". To the question what the concrete substances of 
democracy are, Dahl's interpretation provided very good 
answers. He argued that political equality, popular sovereignty 
and rule by majority have been the essential elements of 
democracy since ancient Greece (1956, p.34). He gave us an 
example when he quoted Aristotle's Politics: 
The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally 
from the equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law 
in that state directs; that the poor shall be lodged with either of 
these, but that both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as 
some persons suppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy; 
but as the people are in the majority, and what they vote is law, 
it follows that such a state must be a democracy (Quoted in 
Dahl, 1956,p.34) 
What he meant by political equality, popular sovereignty 
and rule by majority can be further explained as follows: 
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Political Equality 
Political equality has been considered as an important value 
m democracies since the American and French revolutions. 
Theorists like Macu even argued that asking for equality was the 
main reason for the breakout of the American Revolution 
(Breuilly,1982,p.5). The French revolutionaries also emphasized 
equality as one of their three goals. 
The demands for equality resulted from the revolutionaries' 
common belief in universal human rights. We see this strong 
conviction in the political writings of both revolutions. The 
Declaration of Rights by the Philadelphia Congress of 1771, for 
instance, proclaimed: 
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and 
have ce1tain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a 
state of society they cannot, by any compact, derive or divest 
their posterity: namely, the enjoyment of libe1ty, with the 
means of acquiring and possessing property and pursuing and 
obtaining happiness"(Quoted in Birch, 1993,p. l 16). 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen also 
expressed a similar view when it declared that "the purpose of 
all political association is the conservation of the natural and 
inalienable rights of man: these rights are liberty, property, 
security, and resistance to oppression" (Quoted in Birch, 
1993,p.119). 
In other words, both revolutions promoted democracy 
because their activists believed every human being was born 
equal with universal rights and governments had to protect these 
rights. In other to guarantee their own rights, each individual is 
encouraged to participate in politics. In addition, governments 
also have to treat each of their citizens impartially. 
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Popular sovereignty 
Popular sovereignty is another crucial ingredient of a 
democracy. Birch (1993,p.49) believes the founding fathers of 
the United States shared a common belief in popular sovereignty. 
Among them, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, for instance, 
affirmed that: 
in our own governments, the supreme, absolute, and 
uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our 
constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are 
superior to our constitutions .... In giving a definition of what I 
meant by a democracy ... I termed it, that government in which 
the people retain the supreme power (Quoted in Birch, 
1993,p.49). 
James Wilson's words acknowledged that the principle of 
popular sovereignty is fundamental in a democracy. Namely, 
sovereignty belongs to its citizens. Governments have to make 
decisions on the basis of their citizens' approval. Citizens 
practice sovereignty by participating in public affairs such as 
voting for their favorite representatives and joining political 
parties or pressure groups. 15 But how can popular sovereignty be 
realized in practice? Majority rule is the generally accepted 
principle. 
Majority rule 
Majority rule is one of the important principles in 
practicing democracy. To answer the question of why the 
majority should rule, we may start with Aristotle's justification. 
He thinks majority rule is good because it improves the quality 
of decision making. In his opinion, each individual's ability and 
knowledge is limited but they can help one another to make a 
wiser common decision by sharing their information and 
experience through discussion and debate (Spitz, 1984,pp.149-
15 Of course, this is the ideal condition of the practice of a democracy. In 
practice, not every democratic theorist agrees with this view-point because 
they consider it too idealistic. 
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150). 
Ernest Barker repeated and expanded Aristotle's view in 
his comment on majority rnle: 
The majority will, when discussion is finished and the final 
vote is taken, have assumed a new quality. It will not, indeed, 
have become the agreed and active will. But it ... can become 
something of the nature of the will of all .. when it has thus 
attained a conduct or substance which does justice to the whole 
of the community .... (Quoted in Spitz, 1984,p.150). 
Put in another way, Barker believes the final result of 
majority rule will produce a generally acceptable policy. 
Although the decision may still be wrong, it is the best possible 
option we can hope for within human beings' limited capacity 
(Spitz, 1984,p.151). 
Majority rule is also championed because it may decrease 
"the feeling of alienation among the citizenship". Discussion 
and debate before voting enable people to be aware of the fact 
that other points of view do exist and improve their mutual 
understanding. They recognize other people's rights as citizens 
like themselves. As a consequence, it helps to "build a 
consciousness of community" (Spitz, 1984,p. l 51 ). 
Hans Kelson also advocated majority rule because of his 
belief that it guarantees political freedom the most effectively, as 
it restrained the freedom of the fewest numbers of individuals 16 • 
Since political freedom means agreement between the 
individual will and the collective will expressed in the social 
order, it is the principle of simple majority which secures the 
highest degree of political freedom that is possible within 
society (Quoted in Spitz, 1984,p.159). 
On the other hand, however, majority rule does have its 
drawbacks. For instance, that Hitler was elected by the principle 
of majority rule is a commonly cited example to show the fact 
16 Richard Wollheim shared similar view although he argued for majority rule 
because it "best safeguards equal right". i.e., it frustrated rights of fewer 
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that the majority may make terrible mistakes. 17 We have to admit 
that majority rule is not perfect due to the potential dangers and 
problems in it. People rarely agree with one another on every 
issue. Since we all come from different backgrounds and have 
different values and ideas, it is obviously impossible to reach a 
consensus all the time. Because the ideal unanimous condition 
when we make public decisions is usually unattainable, we have 
no other option but to adopt the second best choice- deciding 
policies regarding public affairs when the majority of the group 
agree. 
After discussing major principles of democracy, we may 
turn to the issue of how we can evaluate democracy in practice. 
In another book, Polyarachy, Dahl also contributes his 
definition of democracy. He argues democracy is " a political 
system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being 
completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens" 
(Dahl, 1971,p.2). Consequently, he believes a government can 
only be democratic if its political system provides all full 
citizens unimpaired oppo1iunities to "formulate their 
preferences", to "signify their preferences to their fellow citizens 
and the government by individual and collective action" and to 
"have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the 
government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of 
the content or source of the preference" (Dahl, 1971,p.2). 
Generally speaking, democracy in our time is widely 
considered as a political system that has these following 
characteristics: 18 1. universal suffrage. 2. right to run for public 
office. 3. the right of political leaders to compete publicly for 
people "without endangering the rights of all"(Spitz, 1984,p.160). 
17 Other possible problems of majority rule include, for example, that it may 
endow too much power to the majority so it may create majority tyranny that 
is unfair to those who are of the hopeless minority. The majority may also 
always be the same group, rather than, as some theorists predicted, that the 
composition of a majority group is flexible. 
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support. 4. free and fair (normally secret) elections. 5. the right 
of all citizens to form autonomous political parties. 6. the right 
to form other political associations. 7. the existence of 
alternative sources of information independent of the control 
both of the government and of one another. 8. institutions that 
ensure the peaceful departure of government leaders who lose 
elections, and their peaceful replacement by the winners 
(Bogdanor, 1987,p.167). 
According to Dahl (1971), the above characteristics of 
democracy can be summarized into two dimensions: public 
contestation and the right to patiicipate (in elections and 
[holding] office) (Dahl, 1971,pp.5-6). 
Democratization 
As previously mentioned, the principle of democracy has 
been popular since the American and French revolutions so even 
undemocratic regimes claimed to be democratic. Although the 
rapid democratization in East Europe seems to demonstrate the 
appeal of democracy, not all undemocratic regimes have 
transformed into democracies. 
Why democratization happens in some countries but not in 
others has been a research topic for some time. Various possible 
factors have been suggested. For instance, the importance of 
voluntary associations, a strong bourgeoisie, mass 
communications, a certain level of per capita income, literacy, 
and urbanization .... (Wachman, 1994,pp.35-36). 
Summarizing major democratization theories, two mam 
factors have been frequently proposed in explaining democratic 
transition. They are structural changes and the political elite's 
role. Among the literature, Hungtington's Third Wave provides 
a very good framework to explain the democratization processes 
18 Dahl's criteria are very similar (Dahl, 1971,p.3). 
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in the 1970s and 1980s, especially those that occuned in Asian 
and African countries. 
Based on Hungtington and other scholars' arguments, this 
thesis will argue that structural changes (such as literacy rates 
and economic growth), legitimacy crises, the political elite's 
patronage and external influences are the four main factors that 
stimulate democratization in Taiwan. 
Structural changes 
In 1959, Seymour M. Lispet pioneered the research on the 
correlation between economic development and democracy. In 
his article, he suggested that economic progress would provide a 
better chance for democracy to develop. 
Many scholars, for instance, Daniel Lerner (1958) and 
Barrington Moore (1966), shared similar views. It has been 
commonly argued that economic development creates a middle 
class and sectors over which governments have less control. 
Economic development also brings better education, higher 
living standards, and higher literacy rates. When people can read 
and can live better lives, they expect more from their 
government. As a consequence, they also want to have more 
freedom and fewer government restraints (Hungtington, 
1991,p.45; pp.59-72). 
On the other hand, however, economic development itself 
may not always guarantee democracy as Lipset found in his 
research. Both Dahl (1971) and Hungtington (1991) argued it is 
the higher literacy rate as well as better communication and 
education that accompanies economic development, not 
economic development itself, that increases the possibility of a 
regime's democratization. 
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Furthermore, people's higher expectations of the 
government do not necessarily bring them more freedom and 
result in democratization of their country if the ruling elite 
refuses to pay attention to their demands. Why were leaders of 
authoritarian regimes willing to initiate "the third wave" 
democratization, to use Huntington's phrase, which happened in 
some thirty countries in the 1970s and 1980s? Legitimacy 
crises, political elite's patronage and external influences are all 
possible reasons. 
Legitimacy crises 
Some authoritarian regimes may base their legitimacy 
partly on foreign support, especially that of the United States. 
When the Cold War with the Soviet Union ended, the American 
government no longer supported some of its authoritarian allies. 
Consequently, the legitimacy of these regimes was also curtailed. 
Facing legitimacy crisis either due to the loss of domestic or 
foreign support, the regime may be forced to consider political 
reforms in order to regain legitimacy, so democratization 
became possible in these countries (Hungtington, l 991,p45; 
pp.85-100). For example, U.S. policies beginning in the 
seventies toward the promotion of human rights and democracy 
in other countries promoted the idea of democracy. Gorbachev's 
political reforms in t..lJ.e late 1980s and his decision to relax 
political control over East Europe helps to explain why 
democratization could happen in the Soviet Union and East 
European countries (Hungtington, 1991,p45; pp.85-100). 
By the 1970s and 1980s, many authoritarian regimes faced 
legitimacy crises as a result of the economic difficulties 
following the oil shocks of 1973-7 4 and 1978-79 .Furthermore, 
their previous economic success raised living and education 
standards, and greatly expanded the urban middle class in many 
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countries as previously discussed. These all increased the 
pressure on these regimes to rebuild their legitimacy by 
introducing political reforms (Hungtinton, 1991,p.45; pp.46-58) 
Political elites' patronage 
Although structural changes are possibly helpful in 
explaining democratization, they cannot be fully responsible for 
regime transition. Political actors are probably at least equally 
important in the democratization process. 
Danwart A. Rustow (1970), O'Donnell (1986), Giuseppe 
Di Palma (1990) and Adam Przeworski (1991) assume political 
elites' role in democratization is crucial. Two groups of political 
elite are major actors in any country's democratic transition: the 
ruling elite and the opposition elite. 
In the opinion of these scholars, it is political actors who 
decide the prospect of democracy, not structural changes. They 
believe democratization occurs when the ruling elite and the 
opposition elite negotiate and compromise with each other. 
On the other hand, changes within the ruling elite and 
government may also influence the possibility of democratic 
transition. The changes may occur in two aspects. First, the 
same leader may change his attitude toward democracy from 
opposed to supportive, although the reasons for the attitude 
change may vary from person to person. Second, the change 
may occur as a result of leadership succession. Because of 
human beings' mortality, when a leader gets old or dies, an 
authoritarian regime may face some dramatic changes. For 
instance, if the successor has pro-democracy ideas or is willing 
to unde1iake political reforms, the prospect of democracy may 
be brighter as a result (Hungtington, 1991,pp.106-108; pp.315-
316). 
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External influences 
Foreign actors can also be influential in other countries' 
democratization process for two reasons. First, as we have 
discussed, the polices of superpowers like the United States and 
the Soviet Union may push democratization to occur in other 
countries. This occurred when superpowers withdraw their 
support for a ce1iain authoritarian regime because it created the 
regime's legitimacy crisis. Second, a country's democratization 
may have a "snow-balling" or demonstration effect in another 
country's democratization. In fact, East Europe's 
democratization wave in the 1980s was an illustrating example 
of this "snow-balling" effect (Huntington, 1991,p.46; pp.100-
108). 
In sum, there are four mam types of factors that may 
nourish democratization to occur in certain countries: structural 
changes (such as literacy rate and economic growth), legitimacy 
crises, the political elite's patronage and external influences. 
Democracy, Democratization and Nationalism 
After discussing nationalism, democracy, and 
democratization separately, we now can turn to the issue of how 
nationalism is connected with democracy and democratization. 
As mentioned earlier, nationalism has two characteristics: on the 
one hand, it is an ideology; on the other hand, it can be also a 
political movement. Therefore, we will discuss the ideological 
aspect of nationalism when we link it with the concept of 
democracy. The political movement aspects of both nationalism 
and democracy will also be explored when we try to see whether 
there may be common forces that can push both nationalism as a 
political movement and democratization to develop in certain 
countries. While the first task concerns the ideological linkage 
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between nationalism and democracy, the second task will 
discuss their conelation in real politics. We shall start with the 
association between nationalism and democracy first. 
Common elements of Nationalism and Democracy 
Nationalist movements are not always democratic at the 
same time. It is very clear, however, that nationalism and 
democracy were intimately correlated when they both became 
increasingly popular in Europe in the late eighteenth and the 
early nineteenth centuries. Michael Mann (1990,p.45) even 
claimed that "modern nationalism is a product of the drive 
toward democracy. Aggressive nationalism [ which is normally 
undemocratic and puts one nation's welfare above those of other 
nations] is a perverted form of that drive". 
Hayes (1949) had a similar opinion when he argued 
nationalism and democracy were both derived from European's 
humanitarianist thinking when they attempted to solve political 
problems of their times. We see their combination first in the 
American Revolution and then in the French Revolution when a 
nation was created and subjects of a monarch were transformed 
into citizens of a nation. His persuasive justification was 
depicted in his remark on the French Revolution: 
All citizens, ... , were equally to be endowed with individual 
liberties and with national obligations. Government was to be 
by all and for all; it was to be democratic and national. For 
political democracy and humanitarian nationalism [the earliest 
form of nationalism that advocated nationalist claim of a nation 
but also respected that of other nations] were born together in 
France; they were twins; they were different but simultaneous 
offspring of the same humanitarian parentage (Hayes, 
1949,p.36). 
The correlation between nationalism and democracy is 
mainly from their philosophical similarity. As discussed earlier, 
both of them emphasize popular sovereignty, equality, and 
liberty. Furthermore, the ability of nationalism to mobilize 
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members from different classes and backgrounds makes it a 
favored partner of democratic movements. Since nationalism 
and democracy both oppose privilege and oppression, they may 
strengthen each other when political movements are launched in 
both their names. In other words, nationalism is normally 
tactically utilized to expand the possibility of success of 
democratic movements, as Shafter has argued: 
popular nationalism was .. . pmt of the general movement 
toward republicanism and democracy, of the movement against 
monarchical, aristocratic, and clerical domination. The national 
idea and the nation-state became the instruments through which 
men could obtain liberty and pursue happiness (Shafer, 
1955,p. l l 5). 
Popular sovereignty is assuredly the major principle that 
associated democracy and nationalism. It means citizens of a 
nation can decide their public policies concerning domestic or 
international affairs themselves by democratic means. Members 
of a nation are entitled to participate in the ruling process as a 
result of their citizenship. Because of their citizen status, they 
are granted protection, rights, and equality before law through 
their nation. As a consequence, it also reinforces them to 
identify with their nation. John Stuart Mill once explained how 
nationalism can endorse the goal of democracy to accomplish 
liberty: " Representative government best ensures freedom, and 
if such a government is to function, the citizens must be able to 
decide with whom they would like to associate, hence the right 
of self-determination, and that of nationality"(Quoted in 
Kedourie, 1994, p.127). 
In addition to the fact that nationalism and democracy have 
common elements (e.g. popular sovereignty, liberty, and equality) 
philosophically, political movements in many countries also 
combined them to enlarge the appeal of these movements. 
Eastern Europe where democracy advocates employed 
nationalism as a weapon to oppose the foreign influence of the 
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Soviet Union was a recent illustration of the tendency 
(Diamond & Plattner, 1993, p.x). 
We also see many political movements with both 
nationalist and democratic goals in many other countries in their 
struggle for independence from their previous colonial regime. 
They normally acted in the name of self-determination. To 
people of these countries, "[w]e the people (i.e., the nation) will 
decide our own fate; we will observe only those rules that we 
ourselves set up; and we will allow nobody-whether absolute 
monarch, usurper, or foreign power- to rule us without our 
consent" (Diamond & Plattner, 1993,p.9). The American 
Revolution and the French Revolution both illustrated the claim, 
although while the f01mer intended to seek independence from a 
colonial empire, the latter aimed at overthrowing a domestic 
dictatorship. 19 
Take the French Revolution as an example. We see the 
combination of democracy and nationalism in Declaration of the 
Rights of Citizens and Man: "the principle of all sovereignty lies 
essentially in the nation. Nobody, no individual can exercise 
authority unless it comes expressly from this source .... Law is 
the expression of the General will. All citizens have the right to 
contribute to its formation, either personally or through their 
representatives"(Quoted in Jenkins, 1990,p.13). 
In other words, the revolution demanded both civil equality 
and political representation. As Sieye, a famous French 
intellectual who actively participated in the revolution, believed: 
"Like civil rights, political rights derive from a person's equality 
as a citizen" (Quoted in Brubaker, 1992,p.40). The revolution 
reinterpreted the concept of citizenship20 and transformed 
19 Jenkins (1990) believed the success of the French revolution was due to its 
mixture of both nationalism and democracy. 
20 The origin of the concept of citizenship can be traced to ancient Athens but 
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political rights into civil rights (Brubaker, 1992,p.43). 
Although nationalism and democracy can intensify each 
other through their common philosophical origins and power to 
mobilize, sometimes nationalism may be manipulated by state 
leaders to oppose democracy. This may partly result from the 
fact that while both nationalism and democracy share some 
common essences such as popular sovereignty, nationalism 
basically emphasizes the idea of a group of citizens with a 
shared goal to glorify and solidify their nation, while democracy 
pays more attention to citizens as individuals with inalienable 
rights. Therefore, sometimes nationalism and democracy may 
contradict each other at those times when the nation as a 
community of citizens does not coexist with democratic 
practices that focus on a group of individuals who cherish their 
personal freedom and rights. 
After discussing the philosophical correlation between 
nationalism and democracy, we shall discuss common possible 
forces for nationalism and democratization in the next section. 
Common dynamics that promote 
nationalism and democratization 
Earlier discussions reveal to us that structural changes, 
legitimacy crises, the political elite's patronage and external 
influences may encourage the emergence of democratization. 
We also see education, the development of a new elite and 
modern inventions motivated nationalism. What is the 
connection between them? 
If we categorize them, education, the development of elite 
and modern inventions are structural changes. Both nationalist 
movements and demands for democratization require leadership 
because they both need to mobilize the masses to reach their 
the French revolution gave it its current modern meaning that includes a 
wider community of people as citizens. 
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goals. As far as leadership is concerned, we often see an overlap 
between these two types of movements. Leaders of both 
nationalist and democratic movements are mostly from the 
intellectual group. Benefiting from their ability to absorb 
knowledge, they can comprehend sophisticated philosophical 
ideas such as nationalism and democracy and lead the masses to 
achieve nationhood and democratization. 
But what makes them decide to promote nationalism and 
democracy? Partly it is out of self-interest, although they may 
also care about public welfare. Normally it is because the 
intellectuals feel disappointed to be prevented from participating 
in the ruling process, although they have good education. The 
restraints on their political participation may come from a 
domestic dictatorship or an alien colonial regime. In the former 
case, to expand their chances of political participation involves 
only democratic movements, since the rulers belong to the same 
nation. In the latter case, however, both nationalist and 
democratic movements are required to expel colonialism and to 
build a stable democracy. 
Modern inventions such as printing (newspapers, 
magazines, and books) help the growth of both nationalist and 
democratic movements. Intellectuals use them to expand the 
appeals of their political movements. But they do have their 
limits because their audiences, especially for printing, are 
mainly the literate group. Therefore, the prevalence of education 
and higher literacy rates can stimulate the popularity of 
nationalist and democratic movements because they create a 
larger audience for them. 
Although legitimacy crises and external influences are not 
included in the list of dynamics of nationalism, they may also be 
significant in the development of nationalism. In fact, the 
American and French revolutions happened because the 
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legitimacy of both French and British governments were no 
longer accepted by people. This demonstrates that a legitimacy 
crisis may result in the desire for nation-building. 
Political elite's patronage may also be crucial. The 
opposition elite, as mentioned earlier, plays an important part in 
pushing the ruling group to reform and accept democratic or 
nationalist movements. On the other hand, the ruling group's 
attitude toward nationalism and democracy, whether it 
suppresses, tolerates, or supports them, determines the 
development of nationalism and democracy. In addition, 
external influences are also meaningful to nationalism. For 
instance, the success of the American and French revolutions 
did exert a powerful influence on other nations. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have discussed imp01iant concepts: 
nation, nationalism, colonialism, democracy, and 
democratization. Connections between nationalism and 
colonialism as well as nationalism and democratization were 
also explored. The task of the rest of the thesis will be to apply 
the theoretical framework of chapter 2 to evaluate the validity of 
the arguments of the major authors mentioned in this chapter. 
We shall summarize this chapter to provide a framework for 
following chapters. 
A nation has both concrete and sentimental elements. The 
essential concrete elements include shared history and territory. 
Other concrete elements such as a common myth of descent and 
culture are helpful but not necessary for every nation. As for 
sentimental elements, the concept of the imagined community 
for a nation is fundamental. 
Nationalism is both a political movement and an ideology. 
As a political movement, the goal of nationalism is to attain 
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nationhood so the separation between rulers and the ruled can be 
broken. Ideologically, on the other hand, nationalism has three 
crucial elements: national self-determination, popular 
sovereignty, and citizenship. 
Democracy has three essential elements: political equality, 
popular sovereignty, and rule by majority. Its real practice can be 
summarized into two dimensions, as Dahl suggested, 
contestation and participation. 
From my intensive research, I will argue in this thesis that 
the development of Taiwanese nationalism had two noteworthy 
features that have a wider, comparative and theoretical 
significance. First, although Taiwanese nationalism emerged as 
a result of decades of colonial rule, it did not occur as strongly 
as its counterparts in countries such as Indonesia. Furthermore, 
Taiwanese most dramatic anti-colonial nationalist movement, 
the 228 Incident, was not against the previous colonizers, the 
Japanese, but against the newly arrived group, the Chinese. 
Although Chinese proclaimed that Taiwanese were their 
compatriots, their discriminative polices were similar to those a 
colonial regime would adopt to rule a colony. In other words, 
what matters to the development of nationalism is, in fact, 
shared history and common suffering rather than common blood. 
Second, what stimulated Taiwan's democratization in the 
1970s-90s also inspired Taiwanese nationalism. Furthermore, 
although less influential, those factors could also be seen during 
the Japanese colonial era. I will test whether structural changes, 
the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy 
crises were the common forces that impelled the development of 




The µiodern history of Taiwan was deeply influenced by 
historical events occurring in China and Japan. We cannot 
understand how Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwanese's 
demand for democracy happened in Taiwan, as a consequence, 
without mentioning the legacy of Japanese colonization and the 
influence of the Chinese Nationalist Party's rule. In this chapter, 
we will see how Japanese colonialism aroused Taiwanese 
sentiment. And we will discuss how Japanese colonial rule 
turned Taiwanese into an ethnic group distinct from their 
Chinese cousins. 
Unlike countries such as Indonesia, Taiwanese nationalism 
was not so strong as to push Taiwanese to seek independence 
and nation-building. On the other hand, however, the close 
correlation between democratic demands and national sentiment 
began to occur during the era of Japanese rule and has continued 
to develop since then. 
In this chapter, we shall also see whether structural changes, 
the political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy 
crises stimulated the growth of pro-democratic and nationalist 
political movements in Taiwan during the colonial period. 
Before Japanese rule 
Taiwan's early history was filled with foreign colonization. 
Dutch, Chinese and Japanese all tried to utilize the island's 
natural resources and location so Taiwan was influenced by 
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these three foreign powers. Consequently, Taiwan's colonial 
experience gradually shaped Taiwanese to believe in their 
common histo1y and to develop a unique identity. Nationalist 
sentiment, however, did not appear in Taiwan before the island 
was colonized by the Japanese beginning in 1895. To provide 
some background information, therefore, this section will 
discuss what kind of identity Taiwanese had before Japanese 
ruled the island from two dimensions: shared territory and 
shared histmy. 
Shared territory 
Taiwan's early history is still unclear. Although aborigines 
ofMalayo-Polynesian descent lived on the island before Chinese 
settlers landed on Taiwan in large numbers, there is no detailed 
record of their lives (Gold, 1986,p.23; Long, 1991,p.3; Shih, 
1996,pp.18-19; Wu, 1995,p.15). In addition, even though both 
China and Japan were influential in Taiwan's development, 
Taiwan was independent from both powers for centuries. 
Besides China and Japan, other colonial powers such as the 
Netherlands and Spain also intended to exploit the island. 
In 1624,the Dutch successfully occupied Taiwan with their 
military conquest (Tseng, 1997,p.22; Long, 1991,p.27). Before 
the Dutch conquered Taiwan, there were only a few Chinese 
fishers, traders or pirates who visited Taiwan casually. Very few 
of them settled on the island (Shih, 1996,p.29). The Dutch, 
however, noticed Taiwan's excellent geographical location and 
intended to increase the productivity of Taiwan. They began to 
encourage Mainland Chinese to migrate to Taiwan (Tseng, 
1997,p.36). Because of Dutch encouragement, Chinese gradually 
established them in Taiwan. Taiwan's Chinese population 
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increased. Furthermore, Taiwan slowly became a new shared 
territ01y for those Chinese migrants. 
In 1662, Taiwan's first Chinese regime was established 
when Koxinga and his troops expelled the Dutch (Gold, 
1986,p.24; Tseng, 1997,p.36; Wu, 1995,p.21). Many soldiers 
and ordinary people who either looked for a better life or hated 
the new Ching regime in Mainland China followed Koxinga to 
the island. The purpose of Koxinga in leading numerous Chinese 
to Taiwan was to use the island as a base to recover China for 
the Ming dynasty. 
Koxinga's conquest of Taiwan attracted Chinese migration 
to Taiwan. Thus, by the seventeenth century Chinese settlers, 
disaffected with the Ching government, began to cross as a 
steady flow of migrants to Taiwan. They settled primarily in the 
southern part but gradually spread throughout the western plain 
and into the north. Most of them came from Fukien and 
Kwangtung provinces, directly opposite on the Mainland. 
Encountering aboriginal farmers in the best coastal lands, they 
organized themselves into bands and gradually expelled the 
aboriginals from the fe1iile plain into the poor mountainous area. 
Koxinga's eff01is to recover the Ming dynasty, however, 
failed two generations later when his grandson surrendered 
Taiwan in 1683 to China's last dynasty, Ching (Chang, 
1995,p.43; Gold, 1986,p.25; Tseng, 1997,p.47; Tsurumi, 
1977,p.6). Even though Ching was China's first dynasty to 
officially rule Taiwan, it still ruled only a pati of Taiwan. And it 
also repeated the traditional prejudice toward Taiwan in the 
history of China; that is, it considered the island as an uncultured 
area that was not worth careful rule or migration. The dynasty 
set several limits to isolate the island. For instance, Mainland 
Chinese were prohibited from migrating to Taiwan. Furthermore, 
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Taiwanese were not allowed to serve in the Ching army (Chang, 
1995,p.44; Chen, 1996,pp.135-136). The Ching dynasty's harsh 
laws, however, did not stop Chinese from migrating to Taiwan, 
so Taiwan's Chinese population increased dramatically during 
the Ching dynasty (Chang, 1995,p.45; Chen, 1996,p.141). 
We shall discuss the development of education and the 
bureaucracy in Taiwan to see how the island became a shared 
tenitory of Taiwanese that distinguished itself from China and 
Japan. 
I. Education 
Koxinga built the first Chinese regime in Taiwan. Chinese 
culture did not have a great impact on Taiwan's population, 
however, until Koxinga's son, Cheng Ching, established the first 
Chinese schools on the island. When Koxinga's family ruled 
Taiwan, bureaucrats either graduated from these official schools 
or inherited their family positions. 
The Ching dynasty basically continued the educational 
policy of Koxinga's family. It set up public schools in Taiwan to 
teach traditional Chinese classics such as Confucius' The Four 
Books. In other words, before Japanese rule the island, most of 
Taiwan's literate population only had traditional Chinese 
education, similar to their counterparts in Mainland China. 
2. Bureaucracy 
As mentioned above, Taiwan's educated population had a 
similar education to those in Mainland China before Japanese 
rule. The Taiwanese, however, had difficulty entering the power 
circle of China. During the Koxinga family's rule, Taiwan's 
bureaucrats were limited to Taiwan. As Koxinga only ruled 
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Taiwan, the Taiwanese never had the opportunity to serve in 
China. 
Then Taiwan was surrendered to the Ching dynasty. Ching 
did not allow Taiwanese to rule themselves. Instead, 
bureaucrats were sent from Mainland China. Although there 
were still official schools for Taiwanese who dreamed to serve 
in the Ching dynasty, none of them got high-ranking positions 
during the dynasty (Chang, 1995,p.44). 
Shared history 
Taiwanese's belief in a common history was based on their 
common experiences of colonization from different foreign 
powers. As mentioned in an earlier section, the Dutch, Chinese, 
and Japanese ruled Taiwan during different periods. Although 
they governed differently, Taiwanese never gained equal footing 
in their land. Consequently, Taiwan's history was a series of 
struggles to counter colonizers. 
Before Japanese arrived on the island, the population of 
Taiwan was composed of three groups: Fukiennese, Hokka, and 
Aborigines. Conflicts were frequent between these three groups. 
Although both Fukienese and Hokka groups had Chinese 
ancestry, rivalry was common before Japanese administration. 
Even within the Fokkienese and Hokka group, conflict and 
killing happened regularly between them when there were 
quaiTels between people from different villages of F ol<lden or 
K wantung provinces. 
There were two mam reasons for the intergroup rivalry 
between Chinese settlers. First, communication problems 
occurred because they spoke mutually incomprehensible 
Chinese dialects. The second major reason was economic. 
Chinese migrants competed for land and water. Furthermore, 
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because the Ching government was never competent enough to 
protect Taiwan's population, they sought help from their kinship 
groups or from people from the same town or province (Chen, 
1996,p.183). 
Furthermore, as a result of the weakness of the Ching 
administration, Taiwan's residents did not have the idea of 
"imagined community" before the Japanese arrived. Instead, 
they only had local identity which separated the three mam 
groups, even though they had a shared history. 
Under Japanese colonization 
After discussing Taiwanese's early identity, we will cover 
Japanese colonial rule and its impact on the identity of the 
Taiwanese from four aspects: structural changes, political elite's 
role, external influences and legitimacy crisis 
Structural changes 
The Japanese introduced modern inventions and new style 
education into Taiwan during their colonization. Therefore, 
Taiwan was transformed into a more economically developed 
society. As a result of the transformation, Taiwanese had a better 
idea of democracy and nationalism. The first group of the 
Taiwanese new elite also emerged in this period. 
l. New inventions- transportation and communication 
Taiwan lacked an island-wide transport and communication 
network before the Japanese anived. This impeded the 
emergence of an imagined community. The Japanese endeavor 
to expand and introduce new inventions to Taiwan, therefore, 
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provided the preconditions for the growth of Taiwanese 
nationalism. 
Under Japanese administration, railways and roads were 
augmented. Take railways as an example. The Ching dynasty 
built Taiwan's first railway from Taipei to Keelung (28.6 km) by 
1891 (Chang et al, 1970b,p.96). But it was Japanese colonial 
regime which completed a rough network of Taiwan's railways 
(Chang et al, 1970b,p.97). The Japanese expanded the scale of 
railways in Taiwan from 60 miles under Ching rule by 1893 to 
534 miles by 1929 (The Government-General of Taiwan, 
1929,p.40). The average nwnber of passengers per day also 
increased from 1,080 persons in 1899 to 12,740 persons in 1912 
(Chang et al, l 970b,p.134). There were no modern roads in 
Taiwan under Ching rule. By 1929,the Japanese built 15,017 
kilometers of roads and 468 kilometers of highways (The 
Government-General of Taiwan, 1929 ,pp.43-44 ). 
Japanese also introduced modern inventions such as 
telephones, radio to Taiwanese and improved the telegraph 
network (Chang et al, 1970c, p.352-357, p.360, p.362, pp.379-
380). For example, the Japanese colonial government 
established Taiwan's first broadcasting station in 1928 (The 
Govermnent-General of Taiwan, 1929,p.34). Taiwan had five 
broadcasting stations before the KMT ruled the island. By July 
1944, there were 97,541 radios (Chang et al, 1970b,p.223). Like 
newspapers, broadcasting was manipulated by the Japanese 
colonial government to promote its colonialism. The Taiwanese 
listeners increased from 1,507 persons in 191821 to 44,050 
persons in 1944 (Chang et al, 1970c,p.363). The first telephone 
was installed in 1897. The number of households which owned 
21 Before Taiwan had its own broadcasting station, residents in Taiwan 
listened to programs from Japan. 
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telephones also grew from 5,365 in 1917 to 23,219 in 1944 
(Chang et al, 1970c,p.360-362). 
Taiwan's first newspaper was published in 1896, the next 
year after the Japanese colonized the island (Chang et al, 
1970b,p.176; Chang, 1981,p.15). To prevent the threat 
newspapers may create for its dictatorial regime, the Japanese 
colonial government put newspapers printed in Taiwan under 
strict censorship. Therefore, any demand for Taiwan 
independence, criticism against the regime or praise of 
nationalist movements was harshly punished (Chang et al, 
1970b,p.176, p.186; Chang, 1981,p.15). 
The main language Taiwan's newspapers used under 
Japanese rule was Japanese, although Chinese was allowed in 
part of the newspaper's content in the beginning. After 1937, 
however, Chinese was no longer tolerated in any publication, so 
Japanese became the only approved language (Chang et al, 
l 970b,p.177). 
Under Japanese restrictions, newspapers in Taiwan were 
used mainly as a means for Japanese propaganda. And most of 
their editors were Japanese. In addition, their contents were 
limited to promoting Japanese colonial policies and diminishing 
Taiwanese national consciousness (Chang et al, 1970b,p.176). 
Therefore, although there was six newspapers by 1944, 
newspapers were used to diminish Taiwanese national sentiment 
and to promote colonial policies (Chang et al, 1970b,p.176). 
Although transportation and communications did improve a 
lot during Japanese rule, we can see from these figures that those 
who had access to these inventions were still a minority. In 
addition, these new inventions were monopolized by the 
Japanese. Therefore, it was very difficult for the Taiwanese elite 
to spread nationalist and democratic ideas by utilizing these 
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inventions. On the other hand, however, these inventions might 
help the growth of an "imagined community", as Anderson 
argued. Because of these inventions, the Taiwanese could, for 
instance, meet and talk to people from different places and read 
the same newspapers. This might result in a sense of solidarity. 
2. Education 
Before Japanese ruled the island, as indicated earlier, 
Taiwan only had some traditional Chinese schools in which 
Confucian classics such as The Four Books were taught (Lee, 
1964,pp.l 7-23). These schools prepared Taiwanese to pass civil 
service examinations in China, so they trained a minority group 
of Taiwanese elite with traditional Chinese education. After the 
Japanese controlled Taiwan, they introduced a new style of 
education to replace the traditional Chinese education aiming for 
imperial examinations in China. Therefore, a new group of 
Taiwanese elite emerged. This group of new Taiwanese 
intellectuals gradually replaced the traditional elite and became 
the leaders of Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements 
under Japanese rule. Although they thought and spoke like 
Japanese, they were the leaders of anti-colonial movements 
(Tsurumi, 1977,pp.177-176). 
The goal of Japanese colonial education in Taiwan was 
originally to train qualified labor, to cultivate loyal subjects of 
the Japanese emperor, and to teach Taiwanese the Japanese 
language. Therefore, they focused mainly on the elementary and 
vocational schools in the early years of their rule. Then the first 
civilian governor-general, Den Kinjiro, increased the number of 
schools in the 1920s for the Taiwanese and opened the door of 
schools for the Japanese children to some outstanding 
Taiwanese students (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,pp.23-24). 
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Taiwan's educational system was divided into four levels 
under Japanese rule: elementary schools, middle schools, high 
schools, and a university. Although Japanese proclaimed that 
they would treat Taiwanese equally, discrimination that favored 
Japanese did exist under their colonial rule. Separate schools for 
Japanese and Taiwanese was an obvious example of the fact that 
Japanese enjoyed some privileges. 
Take elementary e.ducation as an example. While Taiwanese 
children enrolled in common schools, Japanese children studied 
at primaiy schools. Primaiy schools were superior to common 
schools. In 1938, for instance, the colonial government spent 
about fifty yen on each primary school's Japanese students but 
only twenty five on common school's Taiwanese students (Chi, 
1985,p.228). 
Japanese students also composed the largest group in 
Taiwan schools from middle schools to university, although they 
were only a minority group of Taiwan's whole population. For 
instance, Taiwan had 14 public and private middle schools in 
1938.Although only 5.4 percent of the population were Japanese, 
65.8 percent of those who studied at middle schools were 
Japanese (Chi, 1985,p.231 ). In the same year, while 157 
Japanese students (69%) studied at Taiwan's only university, 
Taihoku Imperial University, only 70 Taiwanese students (31 % ) 
enrolled (Tsurumi, 1977,p.254). 
Taiwanese children accepted Japanese-style education 
during the occupation. In some respects, the objective of 
reshaping Taiwanese to think of the1nselves as Japanese was 
achieved successfully among Taiwanese children. A Taiwanese 
told Tsurumi: 
I remember one really bad fight I had with a Japanese boy at 
primary school. Did I fight him! He called me changoro [ a 
derogatory Japanese term for a Chinese] and I pounded him. I 
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was so mad. I was not mad because changoro was an insulting 
name for a Taiwanese or a Chinese to be called. I was mad 
because I was no changoro. I was every bit as Japanese as he 
was! Or so I thought at the time (Quoted in Tsurumi, 1977, 
p.157). 
Nevertheless, the education system also reminded some 
Taiwanese of the fact that they were another ethnic community. 
The Taiwanese had to work harder than the Japanese to attain 
higher education after they finished elementary education. 
Furthermore, some schools were mainly reserved to Japanese 
students and only a few remarkably bright Taiwanese students 
got the opportunities to enter (Mendel, 1970,p.21). Even if they 
got in, they started to recognize partial treatment, which favored 
Japanese students, and the anti-Taiwanese prejudice among their 
Japanese teachers and classmates. Tsurumi portrayed the 
discriminatory condition: 
One primary school graduate remembered that during his last 
few months in primary school his father had surprised him with 
the remark that he would soon be attending Taihoku Second 
Middle School if he successfully passed the entrance 
examinations. He had inquired why he should not be sent to 
Taihoku First Middle School. After all, he knew he was a top 
student and everyone knew that Taihoku First was the best. His 
father's blunt reply that Taiwanese boys went to the Second 
Middle School and not to the First gave him a rude shock. This 
was the first time in his life, he said, that he realized that he was 
Taiwanese and not Japanese (Tsurumi, 1977,pp.157-158). 
Another informant recalled that after he went to the 
Taihoku Second Middle School he realized that Japanese 
students in his class did not have to pass the entrance 
examinations as he and Taiwanese boys had to. Therefore, 
Japanese boys who were not intelligent enough to attend the 
school which was reserved to the Japanese, the First Middle 
School, were able to study at the Taiwanese school simply 
because they were Japanese. At the same time, equally bright or 
brighter Taiwanese boys were excluded through the examination 
system (Tsurumi, 1977,p.158). 
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Fifty years of Japanese colonial rule from 1895,however, 
did improve Taiwanese's standard of education. The rate of 
literacy in Japanese of the Taiwanese increased from 1 percent 
in 1905 to 12 percent in 1930 to 27 percent in 1940 (Ho, 
1978,p.33). But colonial education did not dramatically change 
Taiwan's social structure. Agriculture was still the biggest 
economic sector in Taiwan. In 1908, it accounted for 73.14 
percent of Taiwan's employed population. At the same time, 
only 6.44 percent of Taiwanese worked in the industrial sector 
(Shih, 1996,p.73). By the end of Japanese rule in 1934, the 
percentage of industry workers had a slight increase to 7.54 
percent but agriculture still comprised the largest number of 
Taiwanese workers (71.42 %)(Shih, 1996,p.87). In other words, 
Taiwan at this stage was not industrialized enough to have a 
large middle class. 
As Kahin and Anderson observed in Indonesia's case, 
Taiwanese's common experiences of discrimination at school 
and at work might have stimulated them to have a stronger 
sentiment to identify with one another and build their own 
imagined community. The colonial language, Japanese, also 
became a means of communication between different dialect 
groups in Taiwan. The improvement in communication and 
transportation might also have stimulated them to think that they 
belonged to the same community, so an imagined community 
gradually emerged. 
Political elite's patronage 
Under Japanese rule, there was an obvious phenomenon: 
while the opposition elite was mainly composed of Taiwanese, 
the ruling elite was almost all Japanese. The Taiwanese 
opposition elite did not have the power to negotiate with the 
Japanese colonial regime. 
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Japanese colonial education did not change Taiwanese's 
subordinate position since the Ching dynasty. Under Japanese 
colonization, Taiwan's governors and their subordinates were 
Japanese. The Japanese government did not appoint Taiwanese 
as high-ranking officials until 1926.Besides, although numerous 
Taiwanese had good education and qualifications, only fifteen of 
them served as high-ranking executive and judicial officials 
between 1926 and 1945. Even for those Taiwanese who were 
able to work with Japanese, their chances for promotion were 
limited (Wu, 1986,p. l 89). 
The most significant and apparent change in the ruling 
group that happened under Japanese colonization was the 
replacement of Mainland Chinese officials by Japanese 
bureaucrats. These Japanese officials were mainly soldiers. 
Although these Japanese rulers may differ in the degree of 
discrimination and suppression against the Taiwanese, they were 
all faithful in carrying out policies that would benefit their 
mother country at the cost of Taiwanese freedom and Taiwan's 
democracy. As a result, there were very few changes in the 
ruling elite during Japanese rule. 
During fifty years of Japanese colonization, Japanese 
governors and their subordinates continued similar policies. 
They maintained Japanese privileges. They suppressed the 
Taiwanese demand for democracy and any political movement 
with nationalist sentiments. They censored newspapers and 
manipulated education to keep Taiwanese under control. 
We can cite one example to see the Japanese colonial 
government's hostility against Taiwanese nationalist and 
democratic movements. On February 28, 1921, the Japanese 
colonial governor-general, Den Kenjiro, appeared before the 
Petition Committee of the House of Peers. He argued that 
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Taiwanese petitions for a local parliament were in fact 
advocating independence when he presented the following 
statement: 
The aim of Japanese rule in Formosa[Taiwan] was not to make 
the island into a self governing entity with legislative and 
financial autonomy, such as the one we see in various 
autonomous colonies of England. Rather, by elevating the 
cultural standard ofFormosans[Taiwanese] to that of Japanese, 
it purports to convert the island into an area to which the 
Japanese constitution may eventually be extended.... The 
Formosan demand for a separate legislature, therefore, is 
incompatible with the basic policy of Japan. It is nothing more 
than a scheme to transform the island into an independent 
country not dissimilar to England's Australia or Canada .... 
(Quoted in Chen, 1972, p.487). 
Therefore, under Japanese colonial government, Taiwanese 
political movements, either national or democratic, were 
discouraged, sometimes even prohibited, by all means. 
Consequently, it is understandable that Taiwanese nationalist 
and democratic movement could not win enough popular 
support under Japanese rule. Therefore, on the one hand, the 
Taiwanese opposition elite was unable to ask the Japanese 
government yield to their nationalist and democratic demands. 
On the other hand, the Japanese ruling elite did not have the will 
or see the need to welcome Taiwanese nationalist and 
democratic activities. As a consequence, under Japanese colonial 
rule, both nationalism and democracy did not gain a powerful 
influence in Taiwan. 
External influences 
During Japanese administration, Taiwanese nationalist and 
democratic movements were influenced by events from three 
nations: China, Korea, and Japan. By the 1920s, the limited 
access to higher education could not meet Taiwanese demand so 
the colonial government was forced to permit Taiwanese 
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students to seek higher education in Japan (Tsurumi, 
1977 ,p.177). This policy had a significant impact on the 
development of Taiwanese nationalism and also stimulated 
Taiwanese demands for democracy because ideas like 
democracy, liberalism and socialism were popular in 1920's 
Japan. Woodrow Wilson's self-determination for nations was 
also influential to Taiwanese students in Japan who cared about 
Taiwan's future (Tsurumi, 1977,p. l 78). 
Encountering patriotic Chinese and Korean students and 
learning about events in these two countries also motivated 
Taiwanese students in Japan to think about the future of their 
homeland22(Tsurumi, 1977, p.179). Furthermore, Japan's 
domestic political atmosphere also encouraged Taiwanese's 
aspiration for democracy and home rule. The so-called Taisho 
democracy of the 1920's in Japan influenced many Taiwanese 
who came to Tokyo. 
Legitimacy crises 
The Japanese colonial government was the first island-wide 
government established in Taiwan. Ever since they began ruling 
Taiwan, the Japanese had always claimed that they would like to 
assimilate Taiwanese and give Taiwanese equal treatment. 
However, unjust policies resulted in Taiwanese resentment and 
the regime's legitimacy crisis. Accordingly, during Japanese 
administration, Taiwanese developed an ethnic awareness 
although the colonial regime aimed at transforming Taiwanese 
into faithful subordinates of the Japanese empire. 
22 1919's March First Independence Movement in Korea and the later brutal 
suppression and China's May Fourth Movement touched Japanese liberals 
and social reformers, not to mention Taiwanese who experienced similar 
conditions (Tsurwni, 1977 ,p.179). 
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Taiwanese realized they were discriminated against because 
Japanese, as previously shown, enjoyed better education and 
employment. Japanese discrimination against Taiwanese 
occurred also in economic opportunities, political participation, 
and in judicial decisions. 
Economically, Taiwanese faced discrimination in several 
ways. For instance, they were not provided with equal 
opportunities. Japanese got more pay even if they performed the 
same task as Taiwanese. Japanese also dominated better paying 
positions even when Taiwanese were as well or better qualified. 
Under Japanese rule, Taiwanese were more likely to be in 
clerical rather than decision-making positions (Tsurumi, 
1977,p.159). Furthermore, the Japanese were given a privileged 
position in the economic structure. They monopolized the highly 
commercialized and industrialized processing sector. The 
Taiwanese had little choice but to engage in the primary sector 
activity of handicraft, agriculture, forestry, and fishing (Lai, 
Myers & Wei, 1991,p.23; Gold, 1986,p.39). 
The same rule applied to political participation. Top posts 
at all levels of government were in Japanese hands. Only a few 
Japanese-trained Taiwanese were appointed village headman 
later in the occupation (Gold, 1986,p.135). 
What was even worse to Taiwanese was the colonial Law 
No.63 that gave the Japanese governor-general unlimited power 
to do whatever he considered necessa1y to govern Taiwan. 
Because of this law, colonial courts were set up in Taiwan. Since 
the courts only bound Taiwanese, the Japanese had judicial 
privileges over Taiwanese in Taiwan (Lai, Myers & Wei, 
1991,p.23). A different judiciary system meant that if the interest 
of the Taiwanese contradicted that of the Japanese, Taiwanese 
interests were sacrificed. 
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In response to Japanese's discrimination, a series of 
attempts to get equal treatment from the Japanese occurred 
under Japanese rule. Consequently, Taiwanese's first wave of 
pro-democracy political movements, the Horne Rule movement, 
occurred under Japanese occupation. Although nationalist 
sentiment was not very obvious in the movement, it did 
demonstrate that Taiwanese consciousness, an important 
element of Taiwanese nationalism, gradually developed under 
Japanese rule. Consequently, we need to discuss the Horne rule 
movement in order to understand the evolution of Taiwanese 
demands for democracy and nationalism in Taiwan. 
Although these political movements demonstrated the 
legitimacy crisis of the Japanese colonial regime, they were 
never powerful enough to threaten the regime. Nationalist and 
democratic movements under Japanese rule were not successful 
in gaining their demands. We shall discuss these movements in 
detail in the next section. 
Political Movements 
Because of the discriminations against them mentioned 
earlier, Taiwanese endeavored to win equality, self-rule, and 
democracy by supporting the so-called Horne Rule movement. 
Strictly speaking, the movement was not a single movement. It 
was composed of several events carried out by several 
Taiwanese associations with common goals: to win Taiwanese 
equal rights from the Japanese colonial government and to rule 
Taiwan by Taiwanese. The movement was first launched when 
the Assimilation society was established in 1914.23 
23 1914 might be meaningful because it was one generation after occupation 
and the third year after China became a republic. In other words, Taiwan's 
new Japanese-educated elite emerged and the movement might have been 
influenced by Chinese nationalism. 
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1. The Assimilation Society 
With the hope that elimination of Law No. 63 could give 
them equal rights before the law, the Assimilation Society, led 
by a member of the Taiwanese elite, Lin Hsien-tang24, was 
formed in 1914 in the name of promotion of equal treatment 
between Taiwanese and Japanese, and full assimilation of 
Taiwanese (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.22; Mendel, 1970,p.22). 
They urged that Japanese laws should be applied to Taiwanese. 
They appealed to the Japanese Diet by submitting several 
petitions. 
Although we do not see clear nationalist sentiment since 
they were still willing to stay within Japan's empire, Lin Hsien-
tang personally might have thought of the possibility of gaining 
Taiwanese self-rule and democracy by reuniting with China. He 
was forced to give up the hope to reunite with China when two 
Chinese nationalists, Liang Chi-chao and Tai Chi-tao advised 
him that Taiwan should seek democracy and self-rule by 
following "a path within the colonial framework" because China 
was too weak to provide any substantial help (Gold, 1986,p.42; 
Mendel, 1970,p.22). 
Even though a well-known Japanese politician, Itagaki 
Taisuke, was invited to be the leader of the Assimilation Society, 
the society did not succeed as a result of strong opposition from 
Japanese, especially those who lived in Taiwan. 
2. New People's Society 
In March 1920, Taiwanese students in Japan created 
another Taiwanese political association, the New People's 
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Society, in Tokyo. They published a magazine trying to educate 
Taiwanese at home and consolidate their support against 
Japanese discrimination (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.24; Tsurumi, 
1977,p.180). But the society was split when some of its 
members disagreed on the proposal of one of them, Lin Ch'eng-
lu, that Taiwan should have its own parliament. Lin argued it 
was not enough to have Japanese law applying to Taiwanese 
because they were different people with different cultural 
characteristics from the Japanese ( Lai, Myers & Wei, 
1991,p.243; Tsurumi,1977,p.185). We may say this was one of 
the first wave of pro-democracy demands in Taiwan. Lin's 
remark also demonstrated that he definitely had a Taiwanese 
consciousness. 
Lin was a graduate of Japan's Meiji University (Shih, 
1996,p.206; Tsurumi, 1977,p.185). His proposal was nationalist 
oriented. The proposal showed that he believed Taiwanese were 
a different ethnic group from Japanese, so Taiwanese needed a 
separate parliament to rule themselves. In fact, the demand for a 
separate parliament also implied his eagerness for Taiwanese 
self-determination on issues within the island. Therefore, it was 
the first Taiwanese political proposal that aimed for democracy 
and nationalism. Lin's educational background also confirmed 
Anderson and Kahin's observation, that is, leaders of colonial 
nationalism normally got good colonial educations. 
In November 1920, when the forty-fourth Diet decided to 
retain Law No. 63 with only minor revisions, the movement for 
abolition of the Law became a lost cause. Therefore, New 
People's society was forced to adopt Lin's proposal because it 
became the only feasible alternative. From then on, creating a 
24 Lin was a stubborn nationalist. He refused to speak Japanese all his life 
although he was appointed to several important posts under the Japanese 
colonial administration. 
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Taiwan parliament became the goal of thousands of Taiwanese. 
Between 1921 and 1934, there were fifteen petitions submitted 
to the Diet asking for the creation of a Taiwanese parliament (Li, 
1996,p.57). In 1923, the more active members of the New 
People's Society created the League for the Establishment of a 
Taiwanese Parliament. The League gradually replaced the 
Society although the latter was never officially dissolved. 
3. The League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese 
Parliament 
The League aimed at having a legislative body popularly 
elected by all residents of the island regardless of race. They 
hoped to have a legislature functioning as a miniature Diet, with 
the power to enact laws and to approve the budget of the 
governor-general. If their goal had been accepted, it would have 
turned Taiwan into a federated state of Japan. Consequently, the 
Japanese residents on the island were annoyed because they 
viewed the demand as a step preliminary to creating an 
independent Taiwan. But the aspiration of the League attracted 
widespread support from native intellectuals and middle class 
people such as teachers and doctors. Many influential liberal 
Japanese, both in and out of the Diet also encouraged and 
assisted the movement. Therefore, with this support, the 
movement was able to survive for fifteen years, although 
stringent police control was always present (Chen, 1972, p.484). 
According to Chen (1972), three themes were the main 
concern of the fifteen petitions submitted by the League. First, 
they argued that the Japanese constitution clearly recognized the 
separation of power between the executive and the legislature, 
but in Taiwan the governor-general exercised both powers 
contrary to the fundamental principle of government. Second, 
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many laws enacted by the Imperial Diet were either inadequate 
or incapable of dealing with conditions peculiar to Taiwan. A 
special legislature consisting of the elected representatives of the 
populace of the island was needed to enact laws tailored to their 
needs. Finally, the island had enjoyed financial independence 
since Japan discontinued its subsidy. The Taiwanese demand for 
a voice in the formulation of the colonial budget, therefore, was 
justified (Chen, 1972,p.484). 
In order to avoid the charge that they were trying to 
advocate a "secessionist goal", every petition emphasized that 
the island would remain under the legislative authority of the 
Diet for matters of common legal concern to all territories within 
the Japanese Empire, and that the Taiwanese aspiration for a 
parliament was as legitimate as the universal suffrage advocated 
by the people in Japan in the 1920's. Petitions usually also 
reaffirmed Taiwanese loyalty to the Japanese government and 
claimed that granting them the opportunity to participate in the 
legitimate political process of government would enhance rather 
than "diminish their good will toward the Japanese" (Chen, 1972, 
p.484). 
To convince the Japanese government that the League had 
wide support on the issue of creating a separate parliament in 
Taiwan, the League collected signatures of the Taiwanese. The 
number of signatures of the fifteen petitions can be seen in Table 
3 .1. Considering the population of the island was approximate 
three million, a few thousand signatures may seem not 
convincing that the League had popular suppmt. Taking into 
account the threat that signing a petition would divulge their 
identity and expose themselves to possible police retaliation and 
harassment by Japanese residents, however, the support was 
Japanese Colonialism 74 
significant (Chen, 1972,pp.484-485; Lai, Myers & Wei, 
1991,p.24). 
Table 3 .1 Petitions and Number of signatures Submitted to the Japanese 
Diet By the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament 





1922 512 10th, 1929 1,932 
3rd 
' 
1923 278 11th, 1930 1,314 
4th 
' 
1924 71 Ii\ 1931 1,380 
5th, 1924 233 13tl1, 1932 2,684 
6tl' 
' 
1925 782 14th, 1933 1,859 
ih 
' 




Source: Chen, 1972, p.485, Table I. 
Table 3.2 Division by Educational Background of Non-students Who signed 
one or more of the Fifteen Petitions 
Education Numbers of Signatures Percentage 
College 1,139 6.6% 
High School 1,074 6.1% 
Elementary 6,810 39.5% 
Elementaiy-equivalent 3,831 22.2% 
Illiterate 4,380 25.4% 
Unknown 28 0.2% 
TOTAL 17,262 100.0% 
Source: Chen, 1972, p.485, Table II. 
We can see from Table 3.2, 74.4 percent of those who 
signed petitions got at least elementary or equivalent education. 
In other words, those who had stronger political consciousness 
were themselves the products of Japanese colonial education25 . 
The League, with the cooperation of the Taiwan Cultural 
Association, also attempted with some success to develop a 
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mass movement to support its goal. A series of circuit lectures 
was organized in the native language by these two associations. 
Many Taiwanese students in Japanese universities also devoted 
time to the cause by serving as speakers. And Taiwanese 
welcomed these lectures with regular attendance. Taiwanese 
support was also demonstrated in their enthusiastic farewells to 
the League delegates for Tokyo for the presentation of petitions. 
On February 2, 1925, for instance, thousands of well wishers 
were eyewitnesses in Keelung harbor to greet their leaders 
carrying the sixth petition to the Diet (Chen, 1972, pp.485-486). 
The Japanese colonial authorities were in a dilemma when 
the League demand to establish a parliament confronted its 
colonial rule. The governor-general found it difficult to forbid 
the movement, because the League proclaimed a legitimate goal 
and resorted only to lawful tactics. On the other hand, however, 
since he was the protector of the interests of the Japanese 
residents, who were vastly outnumbered by the natives, he could 
not allow a parliament based on popular election. In addition, he 
feared that if he permitted the movement to grow it might 
develop into a massive full-fledged nationalistic movement 
supported not only by intellectuals but by other segments of the 
population, because the League's demand was imbued with a 
strong tinge of national consciousness. Consequently, the 
colonial regime adopted positive countermeasures. 
The Japanese colonial government adopted three types of 
countermeasures: conciliation, coercion, and police repression. 
From 1921, the governor-general started to appoint some 
Taiwanese of "high scholarship and experience" to the 
Consultative Council that previously consisted solely of high 
ranking Japanese officials. But since the Council continued to 
25Taiwan's population was approximately three million so those who signed 
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remain an advisory organ, this window dressing did not appease 
Taiwanese. 
With ineffectual conciliation, the Japanese began to resort 
to coercion. Those who were directly involved in or in sympathy 
with the movement were dismissed from their posts in local 
government, public schools and Japanese firms. The Bank of 
Taiwan also stopped loans to those Taiwanese who were 
considered "politically undesirable" (Chen, 1972,p.487; Lai, 
Myers & Wei, 1991,p.24; Tsurumi, 1977,pp.187-190). But 
coercive actions from the colonial regime only radicalized the 
movement. Skeptical about the chances that Japanese could be 
persuaded to grant Taiwanese a separate legislature, the more 
radical elements of the League decided to win the support of 
labor and the peasantry. Consequently, the League was split due 
to its factionalism. 
4. The Taiwan Cultural Association 
From 1927 to the early 1930's, the rivalry between 
supporters of the movement to create a parliament in Taiwan 
was so intense that different factions formed their own 
organizations. Major associations during this period were the 
Taiwan Cultural Association, the People's Party, and the League 
for the Attainment ofLocai Autonomy. 
The Taiwan Cultural Association was established in 
October 1921 by Chiang Wei-shui, a physician in Taipei (Li, 
1996,p.34; Mendel, 1970,p.23; Tsurumi, 1977,p.192). It is 
believed to have been the most significant organization in the 
development of Taiwanese nationalism under Japanese rule. In 
order to operate inside the island, however, the Association 
petitions were around 0.54 percent of the whole population. 
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declared its only aim was to promote native culture. Chiang once 
stated: 
Formosans are charged with the responsibility to be the 
catalysts for Sino-Japanese friendship, a sine qua non for the 
harmony of Asian people. The harmony of Asian peoples, in 
turn, is a sine qua non for world peace, the greatest aspiration 
of mankind .... To fulfill this historic mission, we need talent. It 
is to the cultivation of such human talent that this Association is 
dedicated. However, Formosans are presently suffering from a 
disease. Without curing it, the cultivation of talent is not 
possible .... According to my diagnosis, the disease is the result 
of mental malnutrition. The only cure lies in taking more 
mental nourishment. The cultural movement is the only therapy 
(Quoted in Chen, 1972, pp. 489-490). 
It seems that Chiang shared Itagaki's26 idea of forming a 
Sino-Japanese alliance against white imperialism. It was said, 
however, that the real aim of the Association was to awaken 
Taiwanese national consciousness and to develop a political 
atmosphere favorable to the ultimate enforcement of the 
principle of self-determination. Chiang was trying to use Sino-
Japanese friendship as an excuse so the Association could 
devote itself to the development of native culture at a time when 
the Japanese colonial regime was appealing to all possible 
means to achieve the goal of the cultural assimilation of 
Taiwanese (Chen, 1972, p.490). 
Before the Association was taken over by leftists, it had 
sponsored several summer schools and night schools that taught 
subjects such as Chinese language, literature, Chinese history, 
and geography and European intellectual history. it also 
26 Itagaki, as mentioned earlier, was a liberal Japanese who participated in the 
formation of Taiwan's first political association under Japanese rule, the 
Assimilation Society, which aimed at assimilating Taiwanese and granting 
them equal rights to Japanese. 
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sponsored a round of circuit plays and Chinese opera "in the 
native tongue" (Chen, 1972, p.490; Li, 1996, p.35; 
Tsurumi, 1977,pp.197-198). 
The Association also contributed to the home rule 
movement due to its close cooperation with the League for the 
Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament. Because the League 
could not establish its headquarters on the island as a result of 
the colonial authority's disapproval, the Association was very 
helpful in collecting signatures for the League to continue its 
petition campaign to influence the Diet (Chen, 1972, p.490; 
Tsurumi, 1977,p.192). 
During World War I, Taiwan's industry expanded due to 
the flow of Japanese private capital into the island. 
Consequently, disputes between the Japanese-controlled 
factories and native labor became increasingly frequent. 
Meanwhile, the Association also attracted more and more 
members of students from high schools and colleges. And the 
demands within the Association to mobilize the peasantry 
against the Japanese became increasingly popular. Therefore, its 
more moderate and conservative elder members withdrew from 
the Association when more radical youths took control of the 
organization in January 1927 (Fix, 1993,pp.27-28). 
5. People's party 
After withdrawal from the Association, the moderate 
members, including Chiang Wei-shui and Tsai Pei-huo decided 
to form another organization. As a consequence, the People's 
Party was formed in July 1927. They declared the Party's goal 
was to establish democracy, to develop a fair economic system, 
and to eliminate social inequities (Chen, 1972, p.491; Fix, 
1993,p.28; Tsurumi, 1977,p.192). 
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By 1927, eight petitions to create a parliament in the island 
had failed. And Japanese Premier Wakatasuki in 1926 also 
rejected the notion of creating a separate legislature on the island 
when he claimed that Taiwanese were not ready for home rule 
because their cultural standard was not as high as that of the 
Japanese (Chen, 1972, p.489; p.492). Realizing the dream to 
have a separate legislature might be unattainable, Taiwanese 
began to feel that local autonomy with elected councils might be 
acceptable. Therefore, the Party presented a petition for the 
refmm to create autonomy at the local level to the governor-
general in April 1928. It cited examples of the British in India 
and the Americans in the Philippines, and urged Japanese in 
Taiwan to allow local autonomy. The petition was still in vain 
due to the fact that Japanese were afraid they would lose their 
privileged status if they allowed popular elections based on 
universal suffrage, since they were outnumbered by the 
Taiwanese. 
But the People's Party was divided over the issue of 
whether they should take an active part in the labor movement. 
Tsai Pei-huo and his followers did not welcome the idea of 
involvement in the labor movement for fear that it may invite 
police repression and hinder the party's goal to promote local 
autonomy. But the activist group, led by Chiang Wei-shui, 
believed that support from labor was essential for their 
movement to succeed. 
6. The League for the Attainment of Local Autonomy 
Concerned about the prospect of total suppression, on 
August 17, 1930, Tsai and other moderate elements of the Party 
formed another organization, the League for the Attainment of 
Local Autonomy (Fix, 1993,p.26; Li, 1996,p.58). To deny that 
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the League had any interest in class conflict or any nationalist 
aspirations, it included several Japanese and wealthy native 
merchants generally considered collaborators of the government-
general (Fix, 1993,p.32). It also conducted all meetings in 
Japanese. Responding to the formation of the new League, the 
People's Party amended its original platfo1m so as to distinguish 
itself from its rival group, and began to claim it was a political 
party of workers and farmers representing the interests of the 
people without property. But the radical transformation caused 
suppress10n from the colonial regime and the party was 
dissolved. 
As a result of the People's Party's dissolution, the League 
for the Attainment of Local Autonomy became the only political 
organization remaining on the island. But the League did not 
win popular support because it was considered "at best an 
organization of landlords and wealthy merchants and at worst a 
Japanese puppet willing to compromise principles for personal 
gain" by many Taiwanese. Consequently, its several attempts to 
enlarge its support to boarder segments of society were 
unsuccessful between 1932 and 1934. The League spent most 
time with the officials of the government-general trying to 
persuade them to accept the idea of universal suffrage and 
popularly elected councils (Chen, 1972, p.493). 
Their efforts were without much success, although in 
October 1934 the governor-general revealed that he would 
initiate reforms to promote local autonomy in the following year. 
The reform program irritated the Taiwanese because it still 
favored the Japanese residents. 
First, all but provincial and municipal councils were to be 
advisory organs (meaning that their decisions would not be 
binding.) The chief colonial administrator would be either ex 
officio the speaker who could dissolve the council at will or 
with the approval of his superior. Second, only one half of the 
members of each council were to be elected, the other half 
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appointed by the governor-general or provincial governor- a 
restriction which all but insured the Japanese domination of the 
councils. Finally, the franchise would be restricted to those who, 
among other things, had paid annual property and household 
taxes of five yen (Chen, 1972,p.494). 
Because the Japanese paid much more tax per person, in the 
election of 1935, fewer Taiwanese (28,952) than Japanese 
(30,969) were qualified to vote (Chen, 1972, p.494). 
Since the sole purpose of the League was fulfilled, it was 
advised to disband. The outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident in Manchuria that climaxed in militarism and anti-
Chinese sentiment forced the League to comply with the 
"advice". This put an end to Taiwanese political movements 
under Japanese rule. 
To summarize the goals of the six organizations, two of 
them, the Assimilation Society and the New People's Society, 
attempted to attain the goal of equality with the Japanese. Three 
of them, the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese 
Parliament, the People's Party and the League for the 
Attainment of Local Autonomy, wished to have some kind of 
home rule. While the former advocated creation of a 
representative body, the latter two intended to improve the 
existing system of local autonomy. The other one, the Taiwan 
Cultural Association, although officially it claimed not to 
commit itself to any particular political goal, in fact gave its 
behind-the-scenes support to the cause of a Taiwanese 
Parliament (Chen, 1972,p.495). 
Second, the leaders of the organizations usually overlapped. 
The well-known Lin Hsien-tang was the real or at least honorary 
leader for all six organizations. Tsai Pe-huo also joined all of 
them. Chaing Wei-shui, the founder of the Cultural Association, 
also pa1ticipated in the formation of the People's Party and 
actively devoted himself to the movement to establish a 
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parliament in Taiwan. Except Lin Hsien-tang, who was a rich 
landlord with traditional Chinese education, leaders of these 
organizations normally were new elite who got very good 
colonial educations. For instance, Tasi pei-huo was a teacher 
who graduated from Tokyo Normal school; Chaing Wei-shui 
was a physician who graduated from Taipei medical school 
(Shih, 1996,p.206; p.210). 
Although nationalism was never an evident slogan in these 
political associations (this was probably due to the fear of 
Japanese suppression), we can see Taiwanese nationalist 
aspirations from, for instance, Lin Ch'eng-lu's proposal of 
creating a parliament for Taiwanese. When Chiang Wei-shui 
established the Taiwan Cultural Association in October 1921, he 
was in fact t1ying to preserve Chinese culture and maintain 
Taiwanese identity27• Both Lin and Chiang and many Taiwanese 
of their times endeavored to seek democracy and nationalism 
through these political associations, although their nationalist 
aims were obscured, which probably was due to their concern of 
colonial repression. 
Furthermore, these political organizations never challenged 
the Japanese government's right to rule Taiwan. They admitted 
Japan's state sovereignty in Taiwan so they never publicly 
demanded the right of national seif-determination of the 
Taiwanese. But they did ask for democracy and hoped they 
might gain self-determination by democratic means. There was 
only limited competition between these organizations because 
most of the time, they never coexisted. Besides, they were never 
able to compete with the Japanese in the political sphere. 
Political participation during Japanese administration was also 
restricted since members of these organizations only composed a 
Japanese Colonialism 83 
minority of Taiwan's population. Besides, they were not 
powerful m forcing the Japanese government to grant the 
Taiwanese equal rights. 
Changing Identity 
During its rule over Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, the 
Japanese attempted to transform Taiwanese into loyal subjects 
who identified themselves with the empire. The goal was only 
paitly achieved. Although the Japanese promoted Japanese 
language, the Taiwanese elite organized some poet societies to 
maintain their Chinese heritage. 
Unlike nationalists m other colonies, Taiwanese 
nationalists had two routes to choose when they considered the 
future of their homeland, and undertook political struggle 
against the Japanese colonial regime: complete independence 
from Japan and China, or reunion with China. 
As Japanese introduced Western-style education to the 
island, a new type of intellectuals emerged in Taiwan in the 
1910s and 1920s (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.l 7). Since their 
educational achievement and social status were mainly due to 
Japanese colonialism, they naturally were less emotionally 
attached to Chinese culture and the Chinese nation than the 
traditional Taiwanese elite with Chinese education who had 
enjoyed prestige and wealth under the Ching dynasty (Lai, 
Myers & Wei, l 99 l ,pp.17-18). Members of both groups, 
however, had more or less emotional attachment with China as 
most Taiwanese of their time did (Clark, 1967,p.64). 
Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements under 
Japanese rule were very moderate considering the fact that they 
27 During Japanese colonial rule, Taiwanese drew distinction against Japanese. 
They did not yet clearly distinguished themselves from Chinese in their minds. 
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only asked for self-rule, for local autonomy under the Japanese 
empire, without calling for independence or self-determination. 
This changed when the KMT ruled Taiwan from 1945. 
Even though the Japanese tried to "assimilate" Chinese, 
their Japanization policies were not very successful. For instance, 
Taiwanese still kept their traditional folk religion and 
entertainment. In addition, although the colonial government 
prohibited Taiwanese from speaking local dialects, Taiwanese 
spoke Japanese in public but spoke Taiwanese at home. In other 
words, Japanese colonial rule did not turn Taiwanese into 
Japanese. On the other hand, however, fifty years of colonialism 
did transform Taiwanese into "non-Chinese", which made them 
distinct from Chinese on the mainland (Geoffroy, 1997,p.38) 
Conclusion 
If we compare Indonesia's colonial experience as described 
by Kahin and Anderson with that of the Taiwanese, we will see 
some resemblances and some divergences. First, Taiwanese also 
developed their sense of community due to the colonial regime's 
policies as their Indonesian counterparts did. Under Japanese 
rule, Japanese became the common language of different dialect 
groups of Taiwanese. The trend was clearly demonstrated in the 
228 Incident of 1947 so we will discuss it more in the next 
chapter. Furthermore, the way Japanese equally discriminated 
against them regardless which dialect group they belonged to 
also strengthened Taiwanese's sense of community because they 
suffered common humiliations and deprivations. 
Second, unlike Indonesians under Dutch rule who eagerly 
intended to build an independent nation-state, however, 
Taiwanese under Japanese colonial rule did not enthusiastically 
seek independence nor to build their own nation-state. 
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Taiwanese nationalist movements before 1949 were satisfied to 
stay within the Japanese empire as long as the Japanese 
government granted them self-rule and democracy. We should 
not assume, however, that Taiwanese nationalists had no 
emotional attachment to China. In fact, two well-known 
Taiwanese national movement leaders, Lin Hsien-tang and 
Chiang Wei-shui, at least emotionally wished to reunite with 
China. It was China's vulnerability that prevented them from 
seeking the support of China. In other words, under Japanese 
rule, Taiwanese were ambiguous about their national identity. 
Many of them did not distinguish themselves from Mainland 
Chinese. 
Third, Japanese education was influential in Taiwanese 
demands for democracy and nationalism. Japanese colonial 
education also trained a new elite in Taiwan as Dutch colonial 
education cultivated Indonesia's new elite. The ability of these 
Taiwanese elite to read classics on democracy, self-
determination and nationalism in Japanese or other foreign 
languages such as English nourished their skills and confidence 
in promoting democracy and nationalism. 
Fourth, the Japanese colonial regime also delivered new 
inventions such as railways, printing, and radios. Although the 
Taiwanese elite could not use these inventions to spread their 
nationalist ideas as widely as their Indonesian counterparts 
because of the Japanese monopoly and censorship, these 
inventions might have helped the growth of an imagined 
community in Taiwan because Taiwanese could travel, 
communicate, and meet each other much easier. 
In sum, although the Taiwanese elite learned Western ideas 
like democracy and nationalism from Japan, they had difficulty 
mobilizing mass support for several reasons: First, the literacy 
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rate was still low and the newspapers as well as broadcasting 
were controlled by the Japanese. Second, the Japanese were 
hostile to both nationalist and democratic movements so they 
suppressed them. In addition, the Japanese colonial government 
never faced a severe legitimacy crisis so they did not have the 
need to yield to the Taiwanese elite's demands. To put it another 
way, external influences were important in Taiwan under 
Japanese rule, although nationalist and democratic movements 
did not succeed due to the lack of either significant structural 
changes or major changes within the ruling group, the inability 
of the opposition elite to bargain with the ruling group and the 
lack of serious legitimacy crises. 
On the other hand, however, the Taiwanese common 
colonial experience, especially at schools and at work did create 
the preconditions of nationalism. That is, the imagined 
community gradually emerged as a result of colonial education 
and new inventions. Furthermore, structural changes, the 
political elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy 
crises did play some role in launching Taiwan' earliest 
nationalist and democratic movements during the era of 
Japanese rule although these forces were not mature enough to 
motivate political movements to succeed. 
Chapter Four 
Identity during the transitional period 
between Japan and the ROC 
In Chapter 3, we have seen fifty years of Japanese rule 
molded Taiwanese into a different ethnic group from the 
Japanese. As mentioned earlier, however, Taiwanese themselves 
did not yet distinguish themselves clearly from Mainland 
Chinese. It was when the Taiwanese staited to have personal 
experiences of living with mainland Chinese from 1945 that 
Taiwanese began to seek independence from China and to build 
their own nation. The years between 1945 to 1947 were crucial 
because many Taiwanese were transformed from pro-Chinese to 
anti-Chinese. Taiwanese national consciousness also became 
apparent during this period so we will discuss relevant 
developments in this chapter to provide backgrmmd information 
for subsequent chapters. As a result, the focus will be on the 
changing attitude of the Taiwanese toward China, the Chinese 
and the KMT government, largely due to the 228 Incident. 
Before we discuss the Chinese government's takeover in 
1945, let us briefly describe the Japanese colonial government's 
mobilization in Taiwan during World War II. 
Mobilization by the colonial regime 
During World War II, Taiwan was used to support 
Japanese imperialism. Many Japanese soldiers departed from 
Taiwan on their way to invade China, the Philippines and South 
East Asia. To ensure Taiwanese would support the war, the 
Japanese colonial government carried out a series of policies 
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that aimed at transforming Taiwanese into loyal subjects of the 
Japanese emperor (Chang, 1995,p.84; Chen, 1996,p.367). 
The Japanese attempted to completely replace Chinese 
culture by Japanese culture so they began to forbid Taiwanese 
from studying Chinese or speaking Taiwanese dialects. The 
Japanese also stopped offering Chinese courses at Taiwan's 
schools. In addition, the govemment no longer allowed 
newspapers to print partly in Chinese (Chang, 1995,p.82; Chen, 
1996,p.368; Gold, 1986,p.44; Hsieh, 1996,p.49). 
As the war to invade China became increasingly heated, the 
Japanese colonial regime was more devoted to eliminating the 
influences of Chinese culture in Taiwan. Therefore, Chinese 
style temples were destroyed. The Taiwanese were prohibited 
from wearing Chinese style clothes and from celebrating the 
Chinese New Year. By 1940, the colonial government began to 
ask the Taiwanese to adopt Japanese names and abandon their 
original Chinese names (Chang, 1995,p.82; Chen, 1996,pp.368-
369; Gold, 1986,p.44; Hsieh, 1996,p.49; Li, 1996,p.81 ). 
Although the Japanese wartime mobilization was supported 
by a few Taiwanese, it caused much more resentment among 
Taiwan's local population (Geoffroy, 1997,p.37). Instead of 
diminishing Taiwanese's national identity, the mobilization 
stimulated the growth of Taiwanese consciousness. In addition, 
anti-Japanese sentiment became more widespread around the 
island although the Taiwanese dared not openly challenge the 
colonial policies (Shih, 1996,p.98). 
Chinese take-over 
After 50 year of Japanese colonization, Taiwan was 
returned to China in 1945. Originally Taiwanese saw it as a 
chance for them to gain democracy and dignity. However, the 
Chinese nationalist government and Chinese from the mainland 
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disappointed them. The KMT' s early rule did not have 
significant differences to Taiwan's population from the previous 
Japanese regime. To most of them, there was only one 
difference: Chinese took the places of Japanese and became 
their new masters. 
Taiwanese were described as sincerely welcoming their 
Chinese compatriots and as enthusiastically expecting Taiwan's 
return to China (Chen, 1996,pp.397-398; Wakabayashi, 
1997,p.68; Wu, 1995,pp.16-17). This is well illustrated in the 
following spectator's remark: 
From across Taiwan, the old and the young, women and men, 
had converged on Taipei and Keelung. Hordes of people had 
come, living in hotels and crowding the homes of relatives and 
friends. No hotel vacancies could be found, and even the inns 
in the cities' outskirts were filled with a week before the troops 
were to arrive. Every day and night, people lined up on the fifth 
floor of the Keelung Harbor Service Office, or climbed to the 
top of the hills on Sheliao Island to look out over the waves 
rushing in from the Pacific, wondering all the while when the 
troop ships from the mother country would arrive. Upon seeing 
a troop ship, crowds began to set off firecrackers and wave the 
national flag. Line after line of people clapped and cheered. 
This crazy swirl of welcoming cries rent the sky, and it seemed 
as if the earth shook. ... Never had the Taiwanese assembled in 
such a way to greet military troops. At that time, even the 
poorest villagers had come to build a great decorative way to 
welcome the soldiers as they passed through. Throngs of 
people slaughtered pigs and fowl to feed the weary warriors. In 
one very poor village, it seems, 300 farms had slaughtered 500 
pigs to welcome the officials and troops (Quoted in Lai, Myers 
& Wei, 1991,pp.47-48). 
But the high expectations of their fatherland were shattered 
when they had many unpleasant encounters with the 
Mainlanders. Moreover, their slight understanding of the 
condition of China disillusioned them. They were disappointed 
at the fact that the equal treatment in education, political 
participation, employment, jurisdiction and economic freedom 
that they had longed for but were unable to get during the 
Japanese administration were still unattainable under KMT rule. 
Furthermore, some inequitable policies of the Chinese KMT 
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government also increased the tension between Taiwanese and 
Chinese. Their conflict was so severe that once it did erupt, it 
was too serious to solve. From then on, frustration and disgust 
occupied many of their minds so much that they started feeling 
regret to have thought that uniting with China would bring them 
better lives. Many refused to view themselves as Chinese any 
longer. A small incident on the 27th of February 1947 worsened 
their conflict with mainland Chinese when it turned into an 
island-wide uprising on the next day, and resulted in a massacre 
of Taiwanese by Chinese soldiers. 28This incident unexpectedly 
influenced Taiwan's politics for the coming decades. The details 
of the incident and the consequent Taiwanese bitterness will be 
discussed later. 
Although both the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party 
claimed communists played an important part in the uprising, 
those Taiwanese who dominated the resolution committee29 of 
the uprising were supporters of the KMT (Lai, Myers & Wei, 
1991,p.138). Furthermore, while Japanese education may have 
alienated the Taiwanese from their Chinese origins, Japanese 
propaganda was not responsible for the conflict, as most anti-
KMT Taiwanese in the uprising were the most stubborn anti-
Japanese activists (Geoffroy, 1997,p.36). Consequently, to 
understand how a small accident could trigger an island-wide 
rebellion, we have to trace deeper roots of Taiwanese 
resentment, grievance and hatred against mainland Chinese from 
1945.Before we explore the reasons for the uprising, however, 
let us first understand what happened on 27 February 1947. 
228 Incident 
On February 27, 1947, a poor forty-year-old Taiwanese 
28 The event has been remembered as the 228 Incident. 
29 A committee was set up by the Taiwanese to solve the problems causing by 
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widow, Lin Chiang-mai, was beaten by Monopoly Bureau 
agents, who disregarded her begging, when she refused to hand 
over contraband cigarettes and struggled to get her money and 
cigarettes back. Several Taiwanese passersby tried to protect her, 
and one of them was shot accidentally by one of the agents. His 
subsequent death enraged the Taiwanese crowd. They reported 
to a nearby police station and demanded the KMT government 
execute the agent who killed the passerby (Cohen, 1991,p.11; 
Gold, 1986,p.50; Li, 1996,p.264; Long, 1991,p.54; Mendel, 
1970,p.31; Shih, 1996,pp.221-222). 
The spread of the news attracted six or seven hundred 
people to the Police Bureau. The Taiwanese wanted the killer 
executed and demanded the KMT government hand all agents 
involved in the incident over to them. The KMT' s promise to 
investigate and to punish these agents after an investigation 
could not satisfy the Taiwanese crowd. And the incident 
mobilized an island-wide anti-KMT political movement from 
the next day. 
It was obvious that the incident was only a catalyst. The 
true reason behind the Taiwanese's gathering and protest was 
that they believed they had suffered too long ever since the 
KMT government ruled Taiwan. And their hatred was deep-
rooted already. We can see this point from the fact that some of 
the young people of the crowd shouted, "The Taiwanese want 
revenge now!". They even announced that" [a]nyone who does 
not come out and assemble is not real Taiwanese!" (Quoted in 
Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.105; Shih, 1996,p.223) 
The angry crowd even captured the office of Taiwan Hsin-
sheng-pao (The Taiwan New Life Daily). They demanded the 
paper report the incident. Meanwhile, as the crowd continued 
their protest, more Taiwanese joined their action when they 
the 228 incident. 
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became aware of the incident (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.105; 
Shih, 1996,p.222). 
We can also see Taiwanese's resentment toward China 
from the fact that they even removed characters for "China" 
(Chung-kuo) from signs on the China Hotel and the Bank of 
China and replaced them with a Japanese banner reading 
"Down with Military Tyranny." on February 28 1947.They also 
beat two officials of the Monopoly Bureau to death (Lai, Myers 
& Wei, 1991,p.105). 
As the crowd marched, they finally occupied the Taiwan 
Radio Station and broadcast to the Taiwanese people, asking 
them to gather at the New Park and to join their march to the 
headquarters of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive 
Office. By that time Taiwan had about 100,000 radio sets so the 
broadcast was influential (Chang, 1995,p.127; Lai, Myers & 
Wei, 1991,p.106; Mendel, 1970,p.32; Shih, 1996,p.226; 
Wakabayashi, 1997,p.73). 
The situation became worse when Taiwanese began to ask 
questions of passersby in Japanese30, and to beat and curse 
Mainlanders who could not speak Japanese (Chang, 
1995,pp.127-128; Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.106; Mendel, 
1970,p.32; Shih, 1996,p.225). Their anger had become so severe 
that they hated everything related to China and Chinese. As a 
consequence, some innocent Chinese were beaten severely or 
even killed as Wang K' ang, a Shanghai journalist, described31 
30 It was said they would ask passersby first in Taiwanese. If the person 
couldn't speak Taiwanese, they would ask questions again in Japanese or ask 
people to sing the Japanese national anthem. This was because Taiwanese 
was not the only dialect of Taiwanese people. By the time the KMT took over 
Taiwan, the majority of Taiwanese could speak Japanese regardless of their 
dialect background. Therefore, Taiwanese used Japanese to distinguish their 
fellows from Mainland Chinese since the majority of the latter group could 
not speak Japanese. 
31 It is believed, however, generally speaking, Taiwanese did not beat or kill 
Mainlanders indiscriminately. The majority of the Mainlanders who were 
attacked were people like corrupt civil servants whom Taiwanese hated 
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(Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.106): 
Some Mainlanders were beaten on the head, and blood flowed; 
some had fallen to the ground and were gasping for breath. Just 
at that same moment, a passenger train had disgorged its 
passengers. Some of them, Mainlanders, had just emerged from 
the railway station only to be beaten severely; many were 
wounded and others killed. They never knew why they were 
attacked. there were two military men dressed in their uniforms 
strolling hand in hand down the street. They were quickly 
surrounded by Taiwanese, who used their fists and rocks to 
beat them. They were bleeding severely and groaning in pain, 
and the crowd still continued to beat them (Quoted in Lai, 
Myers & Wei, 1991,pp.106-107). 
The broadcasts also induced people in the nearby cities of 
Keelung and Pan-ch'iao to violence. They believed Taiwan's 
problems were all the Mainlanders' fault. They shouted "rice is 
expensive because the Mainlanders are eating all of it. The 
Mainlanders have only come to cheat us, and we are now worse 
off!" (Quoted in Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.107; Shih, 
1996,p.226). 
Taiwanese eagerness for self-rule and democracy also 
reveals itself in their slogans like "Let Taiwan rule itself!" 
"Let's Have a New Democracy!" and "The Taiwanese should 
immediately rise up, struggling for their bread and fight for 
freedom and democracy!" (Chang, 1995,p.130; Lai, Myers & 
Wei, 1991,p.106; p.110) When they controlled Taipei's city 
radio station, they also urged Taiwanese to attack corrupt 
official by making broadcasts:" The provincial government's 
corrupt officials and underlings are all in it together with the 
military police and local officials. They allow our rice to be sent 
although some not so rational Taiwanese did kill some innocent Mainlanders. 
Fmthermore, it was reported that many Taiwanese protected innocent 
Mainlanders from danger. 
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abroad, so that the people do not have enough grain and are 
dying of starvation. Since we are dying of starvation, why not 
rise up and survive?" (Quoted in Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,p.107; 
Shih, 1996,p.226). 
As Taiwanese were mobilized to join the rebellion, the 
animosity, frustration, and bitterness of the Taiwanese towards 
the Mainlanders that had increased in the year and a half since 
the KMT came to Taiwan were released in the revolt. The 
violence continued for two weeks until a Resolution Committee 
was set up by Taiwanese elite and government officials who 
attempted to find a solution and retain social peace and order. 
They filled the vacuum left by Mainlanders who fled as a result 
of the violence. They fmmed a Resolution Committee and held 
daily mass meetings to listen to popular complaints and 
demands (Chang, 1995,pp.128-136; Cohen, 1991,p.11; Lai, 
Myers & Wei, 1991,p.135; Shih, 1996,pp.231-232). Since the 
whole island was controlled by the Taiwanese, the 
Administrator-General of Taiwan, Chen-I, agreed to receive the 
Committees' suggestions of reforms by March 10 and promised 
not to bring more troops into Taiwan (Mendal, 1970,p.32; Gold, 
1986,p.51). 
Nevertheless, Chen broke his promises soon when more 
than 13,000 soldiers were sent from the mainland, beginning on 
March 8, to suppress the rebellion. Thousands of people were 
killed during the slaughter carried out by Chinese troops. Most 
of them were potential Taiwanese political leaders such as 
students, doctors, newspaper editors, lawyers, the Resolution 
Committee members and anyone who was considered involving 
in the uprising (Chang, 1995,p.145; Cohen, 1991,p.12; Gold, 
1986,p.51; Lin, 1996,pp.92-93; Long, 1991,p.54) Many 
innocent civilians were also murdered. Numerous Taiwanese 
were compelled to take refuge in Japan and Hong Kong ( Cohen, 
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1991,p.12; Mendel, 1970,p.37) .The cruelty of the KMT army 
infuriated the Taiwanese, some of them even transferred their 
hate toward the KMT to all Mainlanders and they determined to 
build up an independent Taiwanese nation (Chang, 1995,p.154; 
Lai, Myers & Wei ,1991,pp.183-193). 
But how could a small incident arouse such a large scale 
rebellion? To answer this question, we have to know how KMT 
rule and the cultural conflict with Mainlanders affected 
Taiwanese life after 1945. 
KMT rule between 1945 to 1947 
During the Second World War, Taiwan had lost many of its 
agriculture and industrial foundations due to the American 
bombings. As a consequence, inflation became a problem when 
agriculture and industrial production declined, and when Taiwan 
lost its connection to Japan, its major economic partner, after the 
war was over. When Chen-I, Taiwan's first Chinese Governor-
General, arrived in Taiwan, he energetically started putting 
Taiwan's agricultural and industrial sectors under the KMT 
government's control. This move, in addition to his many other 
economic policies, worsened the inflation problem. 
Chen-I also allowed Mainland Chinese to take all important 
posts left by the Japanese. He justified this policy by claiming 
that Taiwanese did not have required skills and could not speak 
Mandarin. But it was not convincing to the Taiwanese, because 
they found the government was full of unqualified Chinese who 
had relatives in high positions. Furthermore, some Japanese still 
kept their jobs although they spoke no Mandarin. Therefore, 
Taiwanese were annoyed by the unfair treatment (Geoffroy, 
1997,p.45-46). 
Chen-I's unwillingness to speak Japanese also affected his 
rule. Although he was a fluent Japanese speaker, Chen refused 
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to speak Japanese, the language spoken by most Taiwanese in 
addition to their mother tongues, during his administration of 
Taiwan. Although his decision might be a posture of national 
pride, it hindered him from communicating with Taiwanese 
people and from learning their needs, since he could not speak 
the local dialect. The significance of the language issue will be 
discussed later when we talk about the language barrier between 
Taiwanese and Mainlanders. His extraordinary loyalty to his 
subordinates also posed another problem. Because he never 
dismissed them even if they were reported to be corrupt, some 
inefficient and greedy officials kept working in the government. 
And their misbehavior angered Taiwanese. 
Misbehavior of the Mainlander civil servants and soldiers 
After 50 years of Japanese rule, Taiwanese were used to the 
efficiency and discipline of the Japanese bureaucracy and 
soldiers, although they hated the discriminative policies and 
harsh rule. As a consequence, it was unendurable when they 
realized the KMT' s bureaucracy and troops were not as highly 
trained and disciplined as their Japanese counterparts. 
Peng Ming-min, a well-known Taiwanese nationalist, 
recalled how his father described the disappointment and shame 
Taiwanese felt when they first saw KMT troops landing in 
Taiwan: 
The ship docked, the gangways were lowered, and ·off came the 
troops of China, the victors. The first man to appear was a 
bedraggled fellow who looked and behaved more like a coolie 
than a soldier, walking off with a carrying pole across his 
shoulder, from which was suspended his umbrella, sleeping 
mat, cooking pot, and cup. Others like him followed, some 
with shoes, some without. Few had guns. With no attempt to 
maintain order or discipline, they pushed off the ship, glad to 
be on firm land, but hesitant to face the Japanese lined up and 
saluting smartly on both sides. My father wondered what the 
Japanese could possibly think. He had never felt so ashamed in 
his life. Using a Japanese expression, he said, " If there had 
been a hole nearby, I would have crawled in!" (Quoted in 
Wachman, 1994,p.94). 
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The KMT army's abuse of ordinary civilians, such as 
refusing to pay bills and even stealing, and the government's 
corruption also irritated the Taiwanese. Taiwanese had been so 
used to the safety and order, which the Japanese colonial 
government supplied, that they could not tolerate the chaos that 
the Chinese Nationalist government had brought them. What 
tormented them most was that the culture of their fatherland to 
which they had aspired was verified to be a backward culture in 
their eyes: 
We all took up flags and went to welcome them [the KMT] ... 
President Chiang has come to take over Taiwan! That was 
really how we felt entering the embrace of our fatherland. But 
although we genuinely accepted the mainland takeover, we 
immediately began to sense the conflict of culture. Moreover, 
the conflict of culture was extremely intense. It was discovered 
that the Japanese culture which we had originally loathed was, 
as compared to the culture of our fatherland, a strong culture, 
superior culture. And the culture of the rulers[the KMT] is a 
worthless, inferior kind of barbaric culture.... That kind of 
conflict was extremely intense and transformed us from the 
heights of identification to the height of hostility (Quoted in 
Wachman, 1994,p.95). 
The residents of Taiwan did not comprehend, nevertheless, 
their compatriots from the mainland had suffered from the 
continuous calamities of war and the decline of their country 
ever since the middle of the Ching dynasty (from 1839)32• The 
Mainlanders could not afford to have relatively well-off and 
dignified lives such as the Taiwanese. Furthermore, they were 
unaware that the unstable conditions in Mainland China after 
World War II had finished would trigger a renewal of the civil 
32 In 1839, the Ching dynasty signed China's first unequal treaty with the 
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war in 194 7. This impeded the Chinese government from 
meeting their expectations. On the other hand, those 
Mainlanders also failed to understand the grievances of the 
Taiwanese, who were colonized and oppressed by another nation. 
Amazed at the prosperity of Taiwan compared with China, they 
utilized Taiwan's resources without paying attention to 
Taiwanese feelings (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,pp.49-51). 
In addition, attitudes toward the Japanese also kept them 
apart. Ever since the first Sino-Japanese War from 1894 to 1895, 
Japan had been one of the worst enemies of China. Japan's 
aggressive ambition hurt Chinese even worse when it formally 
invaded China in 1931. The Chinese remembered the 
humiliation and pain such as brutal and violent torture and rape 
by the Japanese with bittemess33 • Their aversion to Japanese was 
so strong that they hated anything that had something to do with 
Japan.On the other hand, however, Taiwanese did not have such 
bitterness toward Japanese. Although they did hate Japanese for 
their harsh rule and discrimination, they had been Japanized to 
consciously or unconsciously be accustomed to the Japanese life 
style. Furthermore, the Japanese ·colonial government's endless 
effort to eliminate Chinese influence from Taiwanese also 
molded them to be more like Japanese than Chinese. And this 
was intolerable and incomprehensible for those Chinese 
Mainlanders. Therefore, they viewed Taiwanese more like 
enemies or traitors than brothers and sisters, and their hatred 
toward Japan also hindered them from harmoniously coexisting 
with the Taiwanese. 34 
Great Britain. The treaty signified the beginning of the Ching's decline. 
33 The rape of Nanking was one of the most well-known examples of 
Japanese cruel torture towards the innocent Chinese civilians, especially 
women. 
34 Those Mainland Chinese forgot the fact that Taiwanese did not choose to 
be colonized by the Japanese. It was China's Ching dynasty that gave Taiwan 
up. After fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, it was quite natural for the 
Taiwanese to be more like Japanese than Chinese. 
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Language barriers also created mutual misunderstanding 
and bitterness. Since most Taiwanese could not speak Mandarin, 
and most Mainlanders spoke neither local dialects nor Japanese, 
the language problem created misunderstanding and even 
conflict among them.35 We may see how communication 
problems occurred due to the lack of a common language 
between Chinese and Taiwanese from this example: 
Most Taiwanese could not understand Mandarin very well. 
One day, a military officer who had been wounded arrived at 
the National Taiwan University hospital. The doctor informed 
him that his wound was not serious. The doctor's pronunciation 
was not very clear in Mandarin. The military officer thought 
the doctor had insulted him by saying, " You are a traitor." As 
a result, the officer beat the doctor, and the soldier who had 
brought the officer in even joined in the beating. This matter 
was brought before the police for judgment, and both parties 
realized that language misunderstanding had been the cause of 
the violence. The doctor had said,"Ni-te ping hen ch'ing" 
[Your illness is not serious], and the officer had mistaken that 
to mean " Ni shih Han-chien"[ You are a traitor] (Quoted in 
Lai,Myers & Wei, 1991,p.94). 
Chen-I's language policy also annoyed Taiwanese. He 
asked Taiwanese to learn Chinese and forbade them to use 
Japanese or local dialects. It was estimated that seventy percent 
of Taiwan's population spoke Japanese at that time so the policy 
was in fact depriving them of their rights "to express their 
opinions on public occasions, to receive information, and even 
to discuss problems"(Quoted in Geoffroy, 1997,p.40). Many 
Taiwanese writers also had to give up their writing since they 
could not write in Chinese. They felt Chinese forced them to 
35 China has many dialects because almost all of its provinces have their own 
dialects. While some are similar, some are very different. Both Mandarin and 
Taiwanese dialects were local dialects of different provinces in China. While 
Mandarin was the dialect of China's capital in the north, Beijing, before it 
became the official language of all Chinese, the dialect spoken by the 
majority of Taiwanese was derived from the dialect of a southern province of 
China, Fukien. These two dialects are mutually incomprehensible. 
Identity during the Transitional period 100 
learn another language just as Japanese had done. Some of them 
even had the feeling that they were colonized again; the only 
difference was that this time, the master was Chinese instead of 
Japanese. 
The conflict between Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese 
When Chen-I, Taiwan's first Chinese Governor-General, 
and his subordinates arrived in Taiwan, Taiwan's economic 
development had been far more advanced than any province in 
China. The living standard of Taiwanese was also higher than 
anywhere in China (Lin, 1996,p.78; Wu, 1995,p.l 7). But those 
Chinese officials did not view Taiwan as a liberated territory, 
instead, they saw it as a conquered land, so they c_onsidered 
Taiwan's resources and properties as their war trophies (Chang, 
1995,p.112; Lin, 1996,p.78). They kept telling Taiwanese that 
Taiwan's population should thank Chinese who sacrificed their 
lives and fought for eight years in the anti-Japanese war so 
Taiwanese could be liberated from brutal Japanese colonialism. 
They even jeered and abused Taiwanese by calling them 
disgraceful names such as "subjugated slaves", which caused the 
Taiwanese considerable resentment, and looked down upon 
them because Taiwanese thought and lived like Japanese (Chang, 
1995,p.112; Shih, 1996,pp.217-218). 
Under these circumstances, Taiwanese identity gradually 
changed They started to doubt that Mainland Chinese sincerely 
saw them as countrymen. A famous Taiwanese elite, Lin Mao-
Sheng, illustrated Taiwanese's disappointment and disillusion 
when he talked to his son: 
They Chinese constantly say we [Taiwanese] are [their] 
compatriots, but in fact, they treat us even worse than the 
Japanese did. They occupy all government posts, power and 
profit They treat Taiwanese as if [we are] tools and slaves. 
They think Taiwanese are inferior (Quoted in Li, 1996,p.226). 
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The Chinese's hatred toward Japan was understandable 
because the Japanese ambition to annex China had tormented 
China's population for a long time. But their antipathy toward 
Japanese culture was irrational. Because they hated Japanese, 
generally speaking, Mainland Chinese tended to overlook 
Japanese's better-developed political, economic and social 
achievements. Many of them still considered Japan as a 
backward country that benefited a lot from learning the 
civilization of ancient China. After Japan surrendered at the end 
of the Second World War, many Chinese also transferred their 
animosity toward the Japanese to the Taiwanese, because they 
noticed Taiwanese were too much like Japanese after 50 years 
colonial experience under the Japanese empire. 
Because they suffered tortures and humiliations from the 
Japanese and they were proud of their past heritage, Chinese had 
feelings of both inferiority and self-conceit when they faced 
Japanese. After Japan lost the war, many Chinese sought 
vengeance to make up for the loss of their self-esteem from 
Japan's aggression. When Taiwan was returned to China, some 
Chinese vented their anger on Taiwanese instead of Japanese. 
Therefore, Taiwanese became the scapegoats of Japanese 
colonialism, although they were also its victims. This was one 
reason for the hostility between Taiwanese and Chinese. In other 
words, Chinese discriminative policies as well as their many 
wrongdoings and their massacre of Taiwanese after the 228 
Incident were partly due to this contradictory attitude toward the 
Japanese (Chiang, 1995,p.61). 
Moreover, because they regarded Taiwan as a colonized 
land, Chinese discriminated against the Taiwanese politically 
and economically. Many American watchers believed when the 
Second World War was over, most Taiwanese happily 
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celebrated the end of Japanese colonial rule. Many Taiwanese, 
as mentioned earlier, were also delighted to see Taiwan return to 
the embrace of their fatherland, China. They believed they 
would no longer be second-class citizens, as they had been 
under Japanese rule, so they could get equality and dignity. But 
although Chinese called Taiwanese fellow counflymen after they 
took over Taiwan, they did not trust Taiwanese. In addition, 
Taiwanese, especially those who were rich or well-educated, 
were considered as collaborators of Japanese coloni~lism and 
became targets of blackmail and purges (Lin, 1996,p.81). 
Furthermore, the Chinese controlled the police and secret 
police. They were partial toward those Chinese who committed 
crimes by pressuring judges. Under Japanese rule, Taiwanese 
were not granted equal judicial rights as Japanese but the court 
was generally trusted by Taiwan's population. However, 
Taiwanese confidence in the courts was shattered when those 
Mainland Chinese arrived and abused the courts. Although there 
were many Taiwanese lawyers and judges, the courts were 
afraid to charge Chinese, so Taiwanese no longer trusted the 
courts and were no longer willing to solve their grievances and 
disputes through legal means. Mendel (1970,pp.29-30) depicted 
the condition in the following words: 
Formosans learned not to trust the couits for any redress of 
grievances against mainlander officials because, even though 
many lawyers and judges were Formosan, the police and secret 
police were controlled by Chen Yi36• Many mainlander-run 
economic syndicates had their own independent armed police 
to enforce blaclanail, bribery, and squeeze. When one native 
Formosan dared to bring charges in a county cou1t against a 
mainlander policeman who had beaten him, the Formosan 
judge, as well as court aides sent to arrest the accused 
policeman, were themselves removed from office, beaten, and 
presumably killed. 
36 Chen Yi is another way to spell Chen-I's name in English. 
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As American observers witnessed, post-war Taiwan was 
separated into two classes after the KMT controlled the island: 
the ruling Chinese and the ruled Taiwanese. Chen-I's 
government was like a new colonial regime. What was even 
worse to the Taiwanese was, however, that Chen's regime was 
more repressive, more corrupt, more unfair and paid less 
attention to people's welfare than the Japanese colonial 
government (Lin, 1996,p.81; Wu, 1995,p.l 7). 
Under fifty years of Japanese colonial rule, the Taiwanese 
were deeply influenced by Japanese culture in every aspect such 
as food, clothing, residence and transportation. These had 
distinguished them from Chinese in language and life style. 
Fmihermore, many well-educated Taiwanese, either indirectly 
through Japan or directly through other Western countries, were 
enlightened by modern Western ideas like nationalism and 
democracy. Since Taiwan was a small island with a good 
transportation system, foreign cultures could easily affect 
Taiwan's population. Because Japanese devoted much effort to 
upgrade Taiwanese's educational level, Taiwanese were 
generally better educated than Chinese. Their life style was 
incomprehensible to those Chinese soldiers, many of whom 
were from poor farmer families from inner China and were 
illiterate. But Chinese considered themselves as rulers when 
they landed in Taiwan and were determined to "re-educate" 
Taiwanese and to eliminate the "evil influence" of Japanese 
culture on Taiwanese without considering their own relative 
backwardness compared to Taiwanese. Therefore, the Chinese's 
ignorant and insulting attitude and behavior was humiliating, 
hateful and unbearable to the Taiwanese. These all angered and 
annoyed the Taiwanese (Chang, 1995,pp.96-97, pp.112-117; Lin, 
1996,pp.83-84). 
Because of their somewhat better education resulting from 
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Japanese colonialism, Taiwanese were less inclined to tolerate 
Chinese domination than the masses in China, who were mainly 
illiterate farmers. Taiwanese knew how to express their anger 
and dissatisfaction and criticized government officials in 
newspapers for their corrupt misconduct (Lin, 1996,p.82). This 
was unimaginable for those corrupt officials who were used to 
extorting the powerless Chinese masses who could not counter-
attack, but had to swallow their grievances. Kerr's remark 
confirmed this when he uttered: "To neutral observers, it was 
apparent that the men from the mainland were amazed and 
baffled to find these despised 'colonials' insistent on their rights 
before law. These were not the docile, illiterate peasants and 
coolies they had been accustomed to exploiting on the 
mainland" (Quoted in Mendel, 1970,p.30). 
Chen-I's regime also annoyed Taiwan's population when it 
claimed that the constitution of the Republic of China, which 
had been put into effect on December 25,1947 in China, would 
not be implemented in Taiwan until December 1949.This 
disappointed the Taiwanese because they believed unless they 
could elect their representatives at every level of government as 
the constitution authorized, they were not fully protected (Chang, 
1995,p.124; Lin, 1996,p.82). 
In sum, the reasons for Taiwanese disharmony with 
Chinese was the fact that their economic development, social 
structure and educational standards were too different. While 
China was still mainly an agricultural and feudal society, 
Taiwan was on the road to become a modern industrial society 
by 1945, due to Japan's fifty-year colonial domination. 
Furthermore, Japanese colonial rule shaped the Taiwanese into a 
different ethnic group from Mainlanders. Although Taiwanese 
sincerely wish to be part of the Chinese nation, after two years 
of discrimination and mistreatment from the Chinese, they had 
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lost faith in Mainlanders and the KMT government. As a result, 
the Taiwanese no longer considered themselves as Chinese. And 
Taiwanese's changing attitude in their national identity resulted 
in the 228 Incident and the subsequent development of 
Taiwanese nationalism. 
Changing Identity 
Taiwanese opposition movements against the KMT 
resulted from the massacre by the KMT's troops after the 228 
Incident. Thousands of people were killed during the slaughter. 
As mentioned earlier, most of them were potential Taiwanese 
political leaders such as students, doctors, newspaper editors, 
lawyers, and anyone who was considered involved in the 
uprising (Gold, 1986,pSl; Wu, 1995,p.17). Some innocent 
civilians were also murdered. Numerous luckier Taiwanese elite 
were compelled to take refuge in Japan and Hong Kong (Cohen, 
1991,p12). The cruelty of the Chinese Nationalist army 
infuriated the Taiwanese, and some of them began striving for 
independence (Lai, Myers & Wei, 1991,pp.183-193). In 
consequence, the Taiwanese independence movement closely 
correlates to Taiwan's opposition movement from then on. 
The KMT's early corrupt rule between 1945 and 1947 and 
the Mainlanders' misbehavior were the most important reasons 
for the 228 Incident. By 1947, the Taiwanese had been so 
disappointed at the Chinese takeover that their "Chinese" 
national identity was under threat. The KMT's harsh repression 
of the 228 Incident sharply reinforced the changes of the identity 
of some Taiwanese, especially the elite. Their disappointment at 
the KMT and the Mainland Chinese resulted in the desire for a 
separate nationhood. Consequently, they began to promote the 
idea thatTaiwanese were not Chinese so they should have their 
own nation instead of being ruled by the KMT. 
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We can cite one example to see the change of identity of 
the Taiwanese.Thomas Liao was a well-known figure of the first 
generation Taiwanese nationalists. Before 1947, he was in fact 
an enthusiastic Chinese nationalist. He believed China should 
have a federal system and every province should have self-rule. 
If not for his disgust at the KMT government's corruption and 
inefficiency and the mistreatment of Taiwanese, he would not 
have become a pro-independence Taiwanese activist 
( Geoffroy,1997,p.56; Hsieh,1996,p.60). 
Nevertheless, Liao did not promote Taiwanese 
independence until he was accused of stining up the 228 
Incident, although he did not participate in it. After the 228 
incident, Liao and his followers established the Formosan 
People's League, and appealed a few times to the United 
Nations for temporarily putting Taiwan under its trusteeship and 
to decide Taiwan's future by a plebiscite (Geoffroy, 1997,p.57; 
Hsieh Li-fa, 1996,p.61). 
Conclusion 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, although Taiwanese 
thought they were a distinct group from the Japanese, their 
nationalist sentiment was still unclear under Japanese rule. In 
other words, the Taiwanese did not clearly distinguish 
themselves from the Chinese identity. Their attitude changed 
sharply when they came into conflict with Mainland Chinese 
from 1945. And the uprising on February 28, 1947 dramatically 
intensified Taiwanese identity and pushed them down the road 
to seeking independence from China and to fulfilling their 
dream of democracy. The conflict between Taiwanese and 
Chinese from 1945 when China took over Taiwan was mainly 
due to their different life experience since 1895. As shown 
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earlier in chapter 2, shared history plays a significant role in the 
formation of a nation. After 50 years of separation, Chinese and 
Taiwanese had become significantly different in their thinking 
and attitudes. They also had very little mutual understanding. 
Consequently, the antagonism was hard to avoid once they met 
each other. 
The uprising of Febmary 28, 1947 was a significant event 
m Taiwan. It demonstrated Taiwanese eagerness to seek 
democracy and self-rule. Its tragic ending left a scar in Taiwan's 
political development. It also convinced many Taiwanese that 
they could rely on nobody else, even Chinese, to have 
democracy and freedom of their own. And from then on, many 
of them have striven to have their own nation. However, as a 
consequence of the KMT' s coercive and authoritarian ruling 
style, Taiwanese were forced to hide their bitterness and became 
indifferent to politics. On the other hand, of course, the fact that 
the KMT introduced polices that enticed the Taiwanese to 
concentrate on making money may also help explain the 
Taiwanese apathy to politics. Before conditions allowed them to 
be active in politics, only a few liberal Chinese and Taiwanese 
dissidents dared to challenge the notorious regime. This will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Chapter Five 
Under the KMT 
After the 228 Incident, we see two decades without major 
political movements in Taiwan, until the 1970s. The Taiwanese 
did not openly challenge the KMT's legitimacy. They endured 
the KMT's suppression of local dissidents. In this chapter, we 
will answer the question of why the nationalist and democratic 
movements were unable to threaten the authoritarian regime 
during these two decades. To answer the question, we will 
discuss the KMT's early rule from the following aspects: 
structural changes, the political elite 's patronage, external 
influences and legitimacy crises. 
Structural changes 
Due to their close relations with China's landlords in the 
past, the KMT failed to carry out land reforms in China which 
would harm the landlord's interests (Ferdinand,1996,p.39). 
However, after they lost the civil war in China and retreated to 
Taiwan, the KMT learned from their failure in China and 
realized that land reforms must be undertaken in Taiwan if they 
were to win the support of peasants. Land reforms would also 
diminish the economic base of Taiwan's landowners to prevent 
them from challenging the regime ( Berman, 1990,p.296; Chang, 
1991, p.2; Ferdinand, 1996, p.39; Jacobs, 1991, p.11; Long, 
1991, p.77). Consequently, a series of agricultural reforms 
between 1949 and 1953 which laid the reliable foundation of 
later industrial development was adopted. The reforms were 
very successful in rural areas and the KMT got tremendous 
patronage from residents of the countryside, especially peasants 
( Chang, 1991, pp2-3; Ferdinand, 1996, p.39). 
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At this stage, Taiwan was still basically an agriculture 
society. In 1952, 35.9 percent of Taiwan's population worked in 
agriculture but only 18.0 percent in industry (Tien,1989,p.25). In 
education, literacy rates increased continuously from 56.0 
percent in 1950, to 72.9 percent in 1960 to 84.7 percent in 1969 
(Chan & Clark, 1992,pp.165-166). 
The progress in communication begun by the Japanese was 
advanced under the KMT' s rule. The number of newspapers and 
broadcasting stations increased. Before the KMT abolished 
Martial Law in 1987, 31 newspapers had existed in Taiwan 
since 1961. Broadcasting stations increased from 5 under 
Japanese rule to 33 before 1987 (Chan & Clark, 1992,p.170; 
Chi,1996,pp.125-126; Tien,1989,pp.196-197). As a result of 
Martial Law, however, this growth had very little impact on 
either nationalist or democratic movements because these 
communication media were strictly owned or controlled by the 
KMT and were under severe censorship. They were only 
allowed to promote propaganda of the regime. Education was 
even more influential in the effort of thought control by the 
regime so we shall mention it in more detail. 
Ever since Chen-I set up the regime in Taiwan, the KMT 
had indoctrinated the Taiwanese with Chinese nationalism. 
From elementary schools to university, students were required to 
learn Chinese literature, history, and geology. The KMT's 
official ideology, The Three Principles of the People, was also a 
compulsory subject of study for those who intended to pass the 
university entrance examination. One passage may help us to 
see how the KMT utilizes education to implant Chinese 
nationalism in Taiwanese: 
My daughter now is in high school. She has to memorize all 
the cities, all the agricultural products, and industrial products 
of every province [of China], the weather, the rivers, and the 
natural resources. Everything. We had to memorize all this 
before, thirty years ago. I forget everything. Now, may 
daughter . .. has to memorize what I had memorized and we 
know so little about Taiwan .... we are forbidden to learn. We 
have no access. No resource. Some get into trouble when they 
began to know about Taiwan ... people feel you are associated 
with independence or the opposition. (Quoted in 
Wachman,1994,pp.82-83) 
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Through education and control of media and 
communication, the KMT convinced many post-war born 
Taiwanese of their Chinese identity. Considering himself or 
herself as a member of Chinese nation, many Taiwanese 
accepted the KMT' s undemocratic rule because the party 
promised it will recover China one day and guarantee all 
Chinese, including Taiwanese, to enjoy democracy. 
Because Taiwan did not have fundamental structural 
changes under the KMT's early rule, Taiwanese nationalist and 
democratic movements were not very prevalent as a result of the 
lack of leaders and supporters. The KMT' s propaganda and 
suppression also played important roles in preventing anti-KMT 
movement, either nationalist or democratic, from growing. 
Political elite's patronage 
During the KMT's early rule, opposition elite was still 
weak in their power to demand reform and bargain with the 
ruling elite. And the ruling group had very few changes. 
Important government posts were in Mainlanders' hands. 
Furthermore, the KMT's leader, Chiang Kai-shek was the only 
and ultimate power-holder for decades. The KMT justified its 
dictatorship by claiming that it was necessary as a result of the 
Chinese communist party's rebellion in China. 
The KMT's dictatorship and Mainlanders' privileges 
started from 1945 when Chen-I, the Taiwan governor, led KMT 
troops and officials landing in Taiwan. After the 228 Incident, 
Chen-I was replaced, but. the KMT's policies that favored 
. Mainlanders and discriminated against Taiwanese continued. In 
other words, Taiwanese were still in a subordinate position 
under the KMT's rule.Chiang Kai-shek's life-long position as 
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president solidified the authoritarian tendency of the KMT 
regime. The Temporary Provisions during the Period of National 
Crisis were implemented in China and Taiwan after 1947. They 
replaced the Chinese constitution, valid from 1946. The 
Provisions granted the President of the Republic of China 
limitless powers. 
To justify their legitimacy to rule the island after they lost 
Mainland China, the KMT claimed that the whole country 
(R. 0. C) was in an emergency situation due to the communist 
rebellion, so the constitution should be suspended until China 
was reunited by the KMT. Thus, Martial Law was announced 
and all the human rights guaranteed by the constitution were 
frozen. Furthermore, in order to ensure each province of China 
had its own representatives, the right to elect the members of 
both national representative bodies, the Legislature Yuan and 
the National Assembly, was to be postponed until China was 
recovered. 
Between 1949 and 1975, opposition candidates were only 
permitted to compete with KMT candidates in local elections, 
but no national opposition organizations were allowed 
(Domes,1993,ppl19-120). In addition, dissidents were severely 
oppressed. 
To sum up, under the KMT's early rnle, the ruling group 
was composed primarily of Mainlanders. For fear that they 
might lose political power in Taiwan because they were a 
minority group, it is understandable that the Mainlanders would 
not allow demand for democracy or for Taiwanese 
independence to grow; these demands would threaten their 
regime. Accordingly, Taiwanese did not get equal opportunities 
in the political arena. Furthermore, nationalist and democratic 
movements were severely suppressed under the KMT' s early 
rule. 
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External influences 
The U.S. and Japan are the most important foreign 
countries in Taiwan's modern political development. Because 
the US was afraid that the Soviet Union and China might co-
operate, its government supported the KMT' s undemocratic 
regime during the Cold War. Support and aid from the American 
government were always a foundation of the legitimacy of the 
KMT's one-party dictatorship. 
Originally the Truman administration adopted a hands-off 
policy regarding Taiwan when the KMT lost China and retreated 
to Taiwan. But the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June, 
1950 caused Washington to believe that the existence of Taiwan 
was in the US interest, because of China's slogan to aid Korea 
and to oppose America. Therefore, Taiwan became seen as 
essential to the security of the Pacific and the US in that area. 
From then on, the US Seventh Fleet was sent twice to the 
Taiwan Strait to protect the small island from China's attacks. 
Furthermore, the US government also continuously supplied the 
ROC with economic and military aid, and had military bases in 
Taiwan until the mid-seventies. 
As a result of their economic and military aid, American 
influence had a significant two-fold effect on Taiwan's domestic 
politics. On the one hand, its endorsement of the KMT solidified 
the dictatorial regime. On the other hand, however, the 
American government also used their aid to push the regime to 
take on a series of economic reforms that led to the emergence 
of Taiwan's middle class37 as Taiwan's economy took off. This 
changed Taiwan's politics as a consequence. Furthermore, 
pressure from the US government also eased the KMT' s 
37 Although the Taiwanese middle class first appeared under Japanese rule, 
they were not a large group. Under the KMT, another group of new middle 
class emerged. They were educated in Chinese and larger in number, 
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coercive actions against political dissidents. 
Japan was less influential compared with the US. But it 
provided a shelter for Taiwanese nationalists. After the 1947 
massacres, many Taiwanese sought exile in Japan. They 
conducted research on the origins of Taiwanese nationalism and 
provided theoretical foundations for the later political movement 
for independence (Cohen,1991,pp.281-282). Under the 
leadership of Thomas Liao38, they established a Provisional 
Government of the Republic of Formosa. In the 1950s and 
1960s, Japan was the overseas anti-KMT activity center that 
attracted the largest population of Taiwanese nationalists. Later 
other Taiwanese association were created in Japan as well. For 
instance, the Taiwan Youth Association(Formosan Association 
in English) was established in 1960 with Wang Yu-teh39 as its 
first chairperson. Shih-Ming40 also established the Association 
for Taiwanese Independence in 1967. 
Japan attracted so many early Taiwanese nationalists due to 
its 50 years of colonial rule over Taiwan. The sympathy of 
Japanese politicians and people toward Taiwanese nationalism 
was another factor. Despite pressure from the KMT, the 
Japanese government seldom deported Taiwanese. 
Consequently, Japan became an imp01iant base for the 
development of Taiwanese nationalism. But as more Taiwanese 
went abroad for further studies in the United States, the U.S. 
gradually became a more significant place for the growth of 
compared to their earlier Japanese-educated counterparts. 
38Thomas Liao was a US-trained engineering Ph.D. was a professor of a 
university in China. Between 1945 and 1946, he also worked for Taiwan's 
government led by Chen-I (Geoffroy, 1997, pp.55-56). 
39 Wang was born in a rich family. Although he didn't get his Ph.D. from 
Tokyo University due to the interruption of the Pacific War, he was a well-
known linguist, writer and intellectual (Geoffroy, 1997,p.60). 
40 Shih-Ming got his Bachelor of Political Science in Japan. He had personal 
experience of fighting the war ofresistance against Japan's invasion of China 
with the Chinese Communist Party (Geoffroy,1997,p.63). 
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Taiwanese nationalism, beginning m the 1960s 
(Kuan,1994,p.116). 
Legitimacy Crises 
The KMT's first legitimacy crisis, as shown in chapter 4, 
happened in 1947 when Taiwanese initiated an uprising against 
mainlanders and the KMT. At the beginning of the 228 incident, 
Taiwanese were able to overthrow the KMT regime. Because 
the Taiwanese believed in Chen-I's promises to undertake 
reform in Taiwan, the KMT was able to solve the legitimacy 
crisis by killing and coercion. The KMT' s cruelty toward 
dissidents frightened Taiwan's population so much that few of 
them were brave enough to threaten the regime afterwards. 
Consequently, the KMT did not face another serious legitimacy 
crisis after the 228 incident until early 1970s. Although there 
were challenges both from abroad and from within Taiwan, they 
never won island-wide support to threaten the KMT regime. 
Two years after the 228 incident, the KMT lost the civil 
war with the Chinese communists and retreated to Taiwan , in 
1949. It suppressed political dissidents with all possible means. 
Security agents were almost everywhere, especially on 
campuses and in working places. Anyone who called for the 
implementation of democracy or promoted the Taiwanese 
independence movement was jailed or even executed. 
Sometimes the regime even arrested innocent people who might 
simply be unlucky enough to know people who made 
"subversive" demands. 
Under Martial Law, those who "threatened national 
security" were tried by courts martial. Due to the secret trials 
and continuous physical torture, people were often forced to 
admit to offences they never committed. Consequently, the price 
to challenge the KMT was so high that Mainlanders and 
Taiwanese alike were afraid to speak out. During the long 
Under the KMTI15 
darkness in politics, however, there were still some brave 
dissidents who criticized the regime and demanded political 
reform. These political demands started from the publication of 
the well-known journal, Free China. 
Political movement 
Free China 
In consequence of the regime's authoritarian characteristics, 
dissidents usually faced severe oppression ( Domes, 1993, pl20). 
Led by pro-democracy KMT supporters like Hu Shih and Lei 
Chen41 , Free China was at first even supported by the KMT. The 
regime intended to use the journal to win American support by 
showing it was a 'democratic' regime that allowed free criticism. 
As the critiques toward it became harsh, however, the KMT 
withdrew its endorsement and began to crush the journal and 
people like Lei. 
From 1955 to 1960, articles by scholars, native Taiwanese 
dissidents, and former KMT officials dissatisfied with the 
authorities appeared in Free China. They questioned the KMT' s 
ruling style and demanded political reforms to replace the 
KMT's one-party rule with pluralism and demanded it give up 
the myth ofrecovering the mainland (Berman,1990,pp.247-249). 
In October 1956, the journal published a special issue in which 
several articles criticized Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT party 
leader and president of the Republic of China, for his dictatorial 
leadership style. They recommended Chiang find a successor 
and establish a cabinet system. In late 1956, a professor at 
National Taiwan University, Yin Hai-kuang42 also criticized the 
41 Hu Shih was famous for his role in China's pro-democratic May Fomth 
Movement in 1919.Hu got his Ph.D. in the US. Lei Chen was a follower of 
Hu. Lei graduated from Japan's Kyoto University. 
42 Yin Hai-kuang was trained in China. According to his student, however, he 
was deeply influenced by a very pro-liberalism scholar at university so he 
admired western civilization, especially science and democracy 
(Lin, 1990,p.312). 
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regime for its authoritarian policies and its application of 
emergency law. In addition, he questioned Chiang's claim that 
"the KMT was the government and the KMT government was 
the nation"(Chiou,1993,p.32). 
Lei Chen also attempted to form an opposition party, the 
Chinese Democratic Party, with support from some of the 
Taiwanese intellectual political elite who luckily escaped the 
228 Incident, such as Kuo Yu-hsin and Hsu Shih-hsien43 
(Berman, 1990, p.251;Chiou, 1993, p.33; Kuan,1994,p.109). But 
the attempt was interrupted when Lei and the editor of his 
journal, Fu Cheng were arrested on the 4th of September 1960. 
Lei was accused of untrue charges of 'making propaganda for 
the communist bandits', and 'lmowing a communist bandit but 
not reporting on him' and he was jailed for ten years as a result 
(Berman, 1990,pp.251-252). 
After the attempt to form an opposition party with liberal 
Chinese failed, Taiwanese dissidents continued their struggle for 
democracy and self rule through participation in local elections, 
because these local elections were their only channel to voice 
their demands. There were no substantial parties to compete 
with the KMT. Furthermore, sovereignty was never an issue at 
election campaigns due to the KMT' s harsh punishment for 
challenging its claim as the only legitimate government of China. 
At the earliest stage after the KMT founded its regime in 
the island, opposition groups comprised both liberal Mainland 
intellectuals and local born upper class Taiwanese elite. The 
KMT' s suppression of liberal Chinese not only "impaired the 
growth of democratic movements in Taiwan for the next 
decade", it also "ended any possibility of reconciliation between 
the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, of bridging the painful gap 
43 Kuo Yu-hsin graduated from Taiwan's only university under Japanese rule, 
Taihoku Imperial University. Hsu Shih-hsien was the first Taiwanese female 
to get her medical doctorate in Japan. 
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between the two groups of people caused by the February 28 
Uprising"(Chiu, 1993,p.35). As Chiu puts it, "[i]f the February 
28 massacre had pushed many Taiwanese into the irreversible 
separatist Taiwan independence path, the Lei Chen or Free 
China affair further alienated the Taiwanese people and made 
them even more committed to the independence 
cause"(Chiu,1993,p.35). Taiwanese became disillusioned to find 
it was impossible to have democracy or sovereignty under the 
KMT without completely overthrowing the regime. 
In other words, the failure of the attempt of liberal 
Mainlanders like Lei Chen and the Taiwanese elite to organize a 
party in fact convinced the Taiwanese that the KMT would not 
grant them democracy even if the Taiwanese followed the 
KMT's rules within the KMT's ROC framework. Since the 
KMT used Chinese nationalism to justify their undemocratic 
rule, there seemed to be only one ideology that could possibly 
counter the KMT's legitimacy and grant the Taiwanese 
democracy, that is, Taiwanese nationalism. To put it differently, 
only Taiwanese nationalism could deny the KMT's claim that 
Taiwanese were Chinese so they should be ruled by the KMT. 
As a consequence, Taiwanese nationalism became the 
Taiwanese's tool for democracy after the KMT suppressed 
dissidents like Lei Chen. 
One of the reasons that nationalist and democratic 
movements did not win popular support in Taiwan may be a 
lack of leadership. First, after the 228 Incident, most Taiwanese 
elite were either killed or exiled. Second, as noted earlier, the 
land reform resulted in the decline of landlord economic power. 
Traditionally, in addition to the educated middle class and 
bureaucrats, the landlord had composed part of Taiwan's 
leadership group for political movements. As a result of the loss 
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of their lands, however, landlords lost both their ability and 
interest to participate in politics. Consequently, the Taiwanese 
could not be efficiently mobilized to challenge the KMT. 
Changing Identity 
The identity of Taiwanese could divide them into two 
groups during the KMT' s early rule. While the KMT convinced 
one group to believe in their Chinese ethnicity, the other 
believed that Taiwanese were different from Chinese due to 
their disappointment at the KMT and the Mainlanders. Because 
of the KMT's harsh penalties against Taiwanese nationalists, 
however, Taiwanese nationalism did not prevail on the island. 
But the KMT's severe repression of the activities of 
Taiwanese independence could not exclusively explain why 
Taiwanese nationalism was not as popular in Taiwan as in the 
overseas Taiwanese communities. Another more significant 
factor was that residents of Taiwan had the KMT's official 
ideology, Chinese nationalism deeply instilled in them. This 
ideology emphasized the goal of recovering China and opposing 
Chinese Communists, so they accepted the "imagined 
community" of the Chinese nation that was invented and 
propagated by the KMT (Wang,1996,p.164). 
The KMT also undertook a program to resuscitate 
traditional Chinese culture. But their version of the traditional 
culture was very selective, and was invented by them. Schools, 
media, family· and the military were all part of this program 
(Chun,1994,p.54). Furthermore, the KMT consistently insisted 
that they were the guardians of traditional Chinese culture. In 
addition to preserving national treasures the regime brought 
when it retreated from China, the KMT criticized the Chinese 
communists' efforts to simplify Chinese characters. Textbooks 
were filled with the portrait of how a high civilization, China, 
advanced in science and technology in ancient history, failed to 
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face foreign challenges from the mid-nineteenth century, with 
the sufferings of the Chinese for more than a century as a result. 
Post-War Taiwanese students have been educated to believe in 
the superiority of Chinese culture. In addition to learning to be 
proud of their Chinese cultural heritage, they were always 
continuously reminded that they have a holy mission to fulfil: to 
save their brothers and sisters in mainland China from brutal 
communist rule, to catch up with the advancement of Western 
civilization and to create a civilization that can match what their 
ancestors achieved in the glorious past. 
In reaction to the Cultural Revolution on the mainland 
between 1966 to 1976, the KMT initiated a large-scale Cultural 
Renaissance movement (wenhua fuxing yundong) in 1966. 
Several committees of provincial government and city district 
and rural township were set up in the following years to carry 
out the work of promoting the movements in elementary and 
middle schools (Chun,1994,p.57). The methods these 
committees employed to undertake their task to spread Chinese 
culture was summarized by Allen Chun (Chun,1994,p.58): 
Within the schools, Cultural Renaissance was an important part 
of both curricula and extra-curricula programs. Courses on 
society and ethics as well as citizenship and morality were 
taught at the elementary and middle-school levels. At the high-
school level, introduction to Chinese culture, military 
education, and thought became a staple part of the curriculum. 
Outside the classroom, essay and oratory contests on topics 
pe1taining to Chinese culture were regularly held as well as 
study sessions to discuss current speeches and writings .. These 
were supplemented by activities in other aspects of traditional 
culture, such as music, dance, folk art, painting, calligraphy 
and theatre. Moral education, moreover, was not limited to the 
schools and children. The schools were meant to be a cultural 
training ground that extended eventually to the family and local 
community in the form of army training groups, social work 
teams as will as women's and neighborhood associations. 
Local organizations usually awarded prizes to model youth, 
model mothers, model teachers, model farmers and other 
deserving Samaritans on convenient occasions like Martyr's 
Day, the biithdays of General Yuefei, the Ming dynasty naval 
hero Koxinga, the consummate teacher Confucius, and others. 
Even teachers underwent moral supervision and training by 
periodically participating in study groups and attending various 
Under the KMTI20 
talks given by scholars on topics pertaining to Chinese culture. 
Not all traditional Chinese culture was encouraged, 
however. Only the authoritarian aspects of Confucianism were 
emphasized. The KMT' s propaganda efforts were devoted to 
"filial piety, respect for social authority, and everyday etiquette" 
(Chun,1994,p.60). The KMT's leader, Chiang Kai-shek,was also 
portrayed as a national hero, even a national savior. He was also 
labeled as the successor of the founding father of the Republic 
of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. And Sun was described as the 
successor of the great Confucius. They both inherited China's 
rich cultural legacy so their status was unchallengable. 
Furthermore, challenging the leader was equated with being 
unnationalist and unpatriotic because Chiang was the only 
person who could lead the Chinese to a bright future . 
The KMT created myths to justify its undemocratic rule. It 
urged Taiwanese to endure the current undemocratic conditions 
because their brothers and sisters in China were still suffering. It 
was promised that once the KMT recovered China, Taiwanese 
could have democracy immediately. The reason they could not 
elect members of parliament was because, the KMT argued, 
Chinese on the mainland could not elect their representatives, 
and if the KMT allowed Taiwanese to elect their MPs, they 
could only represent local public opinion, not that of the whole 
of China. Therefore, Taiwanese should wait patiently until the 
whole of China was united by the KMT again. 
By propagandizing the myth of mainland recovery, the 
KMT was in fact trying to create a Chinese nation in Taiwan. 
When the KMT claimed that its Republic of China was the only 
legitimate government of China, Taiwanese nationalists or 
democrats could be labeled as heretics because they threatened 
the Chinese nation. The KMT' s indoctrination of Chinese 
nationalism also created a group of Taiwanese who identified 
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themselves strongly as Chinese so they never challenged the 
legitimacy of the KMT. 
In contrast to their effort to transform Taiwanese into 
"true" Chinese, the KMT discouraged any development of 
Taiwanese consciousness, which might threaten their regime. 
Consequently, they discouraged the usage of the Taiwanese 
native dialects and downgraded native Taiwanese culture. 
Many Taiwanese had common humiliating experiences in 
childhood when they spoke their own mother tongue and were 
punished at schools. The KMT's policy to promote the national 
language, namely Mandarin, and Chinese culture did make 
Taiwanese children identify as Chinese in childhood, but it 
alienated them when they grew up and realized what they 
learned from textbooks was only propaganda and myths.The 
influence of the KMT's indoctrination is clear if we examine the 
following passage: 
Under KMT indoctrination... we not only don't know much 
about Taiwan ... we learn[ ed] to despise Taiwanese , Taiwanese 
language. They said Taiwan has no language, no culture. 
Taiwanese history started from the day the KMT arrived in 
Taiwan. Taiwan has no purpose in itself. The purpose of 
Taiwan is to be a stepping stone to go back to China. It is a 
transition. It is like a hotel. So, the only hope for Taiwanese is 
the mainland. The ultimate goal is in the mainland. Everything 
here is so small. Mountains are small, rivers are so short . 
[There are] volcanoes, earthquakes. "So, how can we stay 
here?[ Mainlanders asked.] The KMT brought that kind of 
philosophy, that kind of view to Taiwan and imposed that .. . 
view on Taiwanese. So, we feel humiliated... downgraded ... . 
We have no hope because we are too small. We have no 
culture (Quoted in Wachman,1994,pp. l l 1). 
In other words, Taiwanese were educated to believe in the 
superiority of Chinese and their culture. They were not allowed 
to develop their distinctive identity from the Chinese nation. 
Due to the effects of both penalties and indoctrination, 
Taiwanese nationalism was never openly prevalent in Taiwan 
during the KMT' s early rule. 
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Conclusion 
We have discussed the KMT's early rule, but see structural 
changes, political elite's patronage, external influences and 
legitimacy crisis did not have a major positive impact on Taiwan 
during 1950s to 1960s. So Taiwan's nationalist and democratic 
movements were not potent between the two decades. 
We can conclude this chapter as follows: 
First, Taiwan was still basically an agricultural society so it 
lacked a powerful middle class. Furthermore, many Taiwanese 
elite were killed in the 228 Incident. As a consequence, 
structurally speaking, the KMT's ROC did not face major 
changes during these two decades, so both Taiwanese 
nationalism and the demand for democracy did not have enough 
support. 
Second, under the KMT' s early rule, there was very few 
changes within the ruling group: both in the composition and the 
group's attitude. The Mainlanders dominated political power as 
the Japanese did. As a group, they were hostile to both 
Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements so these 
movements were suppressed. 
Third, although both American and Japanese governments 
provided shelter for some Taiwanese elite, they basically 
tolerated undemocratic conditions in Taiwan and supported the 
KMT. Even though the US government occasionally put 
pressure on the KMT to ease the regime's harsh suppression of 
local dissidents, the US support of the KMT increased the 
regime's legitimacy. In sum, although external influences had 
both positive and negative effects on Taiwan's nationalist and 
democratic movements during the KMT's early rule, negative 
effects prevailed over the positive ones in the two decades 
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between 1950 and 1970. 
Fourth, the KMT did not have a significant legitimacy 
crisis during the two decades. This resulted from both their 
severe suppression of political dissidents and their indoctrination 
of Chinese nationalism. The KMT' s suppression resulted in 
Taiwanese indifference toward politics. Furthermore, the 
Taiwanese lacked leaders as a result of the massacre after the 
228 Incident. Accordingly, no island-wide political movement 
was possible to challenge the KMT. The indoctrination of 
Chinese nationalism also created a group of post-war Taiwanese 
who did not doubt the legitimacy of the KMT because they 
believed in the myth of mainland recovery and the imagined 
community of the Chinese nation. 
To sum up, nationalist and democratic movements were not 
widespread in Taiwan under the KMT's early rule because the 
preconditions (structural changes, the political elite's patronage, 
external influences and legitimacy crises ) were too immature 
to support the movements. 
Chapter Six 
Taiwanization of the KMT 
Because of the KMT' s terrifying suppression of political 
dissidents since the 1950s, very few Taiwanese or Mainlanders 
dared to challenge the dictatorial regime. Nevertheless, we still 
see, as the last chapter indicates, some brave liberal Chinese like 
Lei Chen who attempted to force the KMT to establish 
democracy in Taiwan although their efforts failed. Then there 
was a long dark period for those who promoted democracy or 
Taiwanese nationalism until Taiwan's first opposition party, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP afterwards) was formed in 
1986.The birth of the DPP was a milestone event in the 
development of Taiwan's democratization and Taiwanese 
nationalism so we will discuss it in this chapter. We will also 
discuss the KMT' s Taiwanization and the rise of the DPP from 
the point of view of structural changes, the political elite's 
patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises. 
Structural changes 
Through their indoctrination and oppression, the KMT 
established a stable authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, as 
Taiwan's economy took off from the 1960s, social changes such 
as better education followed economic development. A new 
middle class came into existence as a result. Well-educated and 
self-assured, they were no longer satisfied with the limited 
freedom they had and demanded more political participation and 
liberties. They took more active roles in politics through 
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The emergence of middle class 
Since the 1970s, Taiwan has gradually transformed into an 
industrial society. In 1973, the industrial sector (3 3. 7%) for the 
first time accounted for a larger share of the workforce than the 
agriculture sector (30.5%) (Pang, 1993,pp.33-34). Meanwhile, 
the literacy rate kept increasing from 85.3 percent in 1970 to 
89.7 percent in 1980 to 92.6 percent in 1988(Chan & Clark, 
1992,p.166). The percentage of college students also rose from 
0.12 in 1952,to 0.32 in 1960, to 1.39 in 1970, to 1.92 in 1980 to 
and 2.49 in 1988 (Chan & Clark, 1992,pp.168-169). 
At the same time, Taiwan's economic success and 
industrialization also stimulated a growing population of middle 
class (See Table 6.1 ). As a group, they replaced the previous 
majority group of the KMT's supporters, the farmers, and 
became a significant group in Taiwan's society. 
Table 6.1 Employment Pattern as a percentage of the Labor Force in 
Taiwan, 1951-1989. 
Professionals Administrators Supervisors Salespersons Servicepersons Agriculture 
& technicians &managers & clerks & forestry 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) workers(6) 
2.49 0.28 5.70 10.34 6.26 56.07 
3.27 0.35 6.57 9.46 6.57 52.62 
3.91 0.37 7.33 9.27 6.53 49.33 
4.93 0.41 8.32 9.93 7.05 44.53 
4.81 0.44 9.94 11.23 7.20 34.95 
5.18 0.85 10.90 11.73 5.82 28.59 
5.59 0.87 13.32 12.87 7.46 18.60 
6.26 0.85 13.77 13.45 8.57 16.90 
7.12 1.01 15.62 14.77 9.03 12.78 
Source: Pang, 1993,p.37, Table 7. 
According to Pang (1993,p.36), Taiwan's middle class is 
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see the growth of the middle class from the table above. In other 
words, Taiwan's middle class population increased from 25.07 
percent in 1951, to 27.33 percent in 1961, to 33.62 percent in 
1971, to 40.14 percent in 1981, and to 47.55 percent in 
1989.Although the new middle class are composed of both 
Mainlanders and Taiwanese, it is ce1iain that the majority of 
them are Taiwanese. 
This type of new Taiwanese middle class is distinctive from 
the Mainlanders, most of whom rely heavily on the KMT's 
system of rules, and are mainly soldiers, teachers and civil 
servants. They differ in several aspects: first, their culture is 
different from the Mainlanders. They use Taiwanese, the 
language recognized by the KMT as a dialect and which the 
KMT prohibited for public usage. Second, the Taiwanese all got 
a complete post-war "Chinese education", and they all can speak 
the "national language", Mandarin, without any difficulty. Third, 
many of them have overseas personai networks through either 
commercial business or their own overseas study, or that of their 
friends or their family members. They are freer from the KMT' s 
party-state domination than the Mainlanders (Wakabayashi, 
1994,pp.242-243). 
In addition, the new middle class is mostly from the private 
sector, not the bureaucracy or state enterprises. Therefore, the 
KMT cannot threaten their jobs as in the past. Furthermore, 
because the new Taiwanese middle class can retreat from 
politics at any time they encounter the KMT's oppression, many 
of them became political movement activists. They challenged 
the KMT' s dictatorship and took over the role played by those 
traditional Taiwanese dissidents who had Japanese education. 
Therefore, the emergence of the new Taiwanese middle class is 
an essential condition for the growth of political movements for 
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democratization and Taiwanese nationalism (Wakabayashi, 
1994,p.243). 
Since the 1970s, Taiwan's economic development 
improved the general living standards of Taiwan's population. 
For instance, the number of television sets per 1,000 population 
increased from 1.4 in 1963 to 60.1 in 1974. The popularity of 
telephones also rose from 9.8 per 1,000 population in 1961 to 
57.0 in 1974 (Yeh, 1978, p.40). Taiwanese also had disposable 
income to travel and study abroad and consume foreign products, 
especially those from the US, such as movies, music, magazines 
and books. Accordingly, as Berman puts it, " Increased literacy 
and higher education levels, coupled with study abroad for the 
elite, made it difficult to enforce the dictates of the government 
upon its citizenry." (Berman, 1990, p.290). In other words, 
higher literacy and experiences of study abroad increased the 
exposure of the Taiwanese to western ideas such as democracy 
and nationalism so they became more difficult to control, 
manipulate or indoctrinate by the K.MT regime. Consequently, 
democracy and Taiwanese nationalism had larger potential 
Taiwanese proponents. 
Political elite's patronage 
After 1949 when the KMT regime was stabilized, party 
leaders created a system which favored the Mainlanders, to 
solidify their support and discourage the Mainlanders from 
cooperating with the Taiwanese. According to Gates (1981,p 
248), the distribution of power between the Taiwanese and the 
Mainlanders used to be so uneven that the ethnic boundary 
surpassed class consciousness. In other words, even a poor 
Mainlander had enough relative advantage over a wealthy 
Taiwanese that he would not unite with a poor Taiwanese to 
compete for their class interest. 
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The Mainlanders' dominion and the KMT's dictatorship 
changed slowly after Chiang Ching-kuo took control of the 
government. Chiang began to assume formal ruling power in 
1972 when he was nominated as Premier of the Executive Yuan. 
He became president of the Republic of China later in 1978. He 
began the process of the KMT's Taiwanization (Domes, 
1993,p.121; Lee, 1991,p.495; Liu, 1991,p.201). 
Realizing the KMT could not survive without local support, 
the party had begun to recruit Taiwanese in the 1950s. The status 
of these Taiwanese KMT members, however, was low, as they 
had few important posts in the KMT or the government. In the 
early 1970s, the KMT's myth of "China recovery" completely 
collapsed after the US established formal diplomatic relations 
with China, and the PRC entered the United Nations (Chiang, 
1995,p.196). To prevent the KMT from losing domestic support, 
Chiang Ching-kuo accelerated the KMT's Taiwanization by 
appointing Taiwanese to important government posts that had 
been dominated by Mainlanders, such as governor of Taiwan 
province and mayors of Taiwan's two largest cities, Taipei and 
K.ao-hsiung. The number of Taiwanese ministers in the 
Executive Yuan Cabinet was also increased from three out of 
nineteen in 1972 to seven out of nineteen by 1986 (Domes, 
1993,p.121). 
Another change in the ruling group was the fact that the 
younger and better-educated generation, most of whom were 
Taiwanese, were gradually included in the decision-making 
process. After 1969, the KMT recognized that it was impossible 
to wait for the re-election of the representatives of its three 
national "elected" organs until the KMT recovered China. To 
partially meet Taiwanese' s expectation of political participation, 
the regime argued that Taiwan's voters would be able to vote for 
representatives of "Taiwan's area" in the National Assembly and 
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the Legislative Yuan because of the population growth in 
Taiwan (Cohen, 1991,p.22). As a result, representatives of these 
national organs were composed of two groups. While one group 
was elected in mainland China in 194 7 so they did not have to 
face election pressure, the other locally-elected group had to 
worry about losing their seats if they did not win enough votes 
at the next election. 
By the 1980s, the average age of the KMT's life-long 
representatives was 80 and their numbers began to dwindle 
rapidly (Cohen, 1991,pp.21-22; Tien, 1989,p.146). This 
endangered the KMT' s claim that a complete re-election should 
not be undertaken until mainland China was recovered, because 
these senior representatives had comprised fa'tung (traditional 
legitimacy). In addition, their younger colleagues were 
increasingly inclined to reject these senior members' continuing 
supremacy, because they did not need to respond to the 
electorate's demand while the former had to compete in winning 
elections (Domes, 1993, p.122). The younger and better-
educated new blood enabled the KMT leaders to be more aware 
of growing criticisms. This change was another force that 
pushed the KMT to reform. 
Chiang was replaced by his vice president Lee Teng-hui 
after his death on 13 January 1988.Lee continued the reform. 
Lee's education in both Japan and the US made him a pro-
democratic leader. His Taiwanese background also made him 
less hostile to Taiwanese nationalism. In fact, many Taiwanese 
believe Lee is emotionally pro-independence although he 
repeatedly claimed that he would follow the KMT' s traditional 
policy of reuniting with China. Even though Lee's true intention 
is unclear, there is one thing for sure, that is, he at least tolerates 
Taiwanese nationalism and definitely has a strong Taiwanese 
consciousness and identity. This can be seen from policies under 
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his leadership. 
For instance, under Lee's leadership, Taiwan has actively 
tried to join many international organizations. The KMT 
supports the movement to re-enter the United Nations. Taiwan's 
international status is also promoted in the international 
community as a de facto independent political entity. Second, 
President Lee publicly expressed his views on "the sorrow to be 
a Taiwanese", that the "KMT is an alien regime" and on 
"Taiwan First" (before the Mainland) without any hesitation. He 
leads the state to devote itself to construct a community culture 
and to reinforce Taiwan consciousness and the sense of identity 
with "Common life Community", i.e. with Taiwan. These 
policies are quite contrary to the traditional KMT's past attempt 
to always strengthen "Chinese identity". Third, Lee also 
criticized the fact that Taiwan's textbooks placed too much 
emphasis on Chinese history and culture while overlooking 
Taiwan's history and geography. Fourth, his government stresses 
the independent characteristic of Taiwanese culture from 
Chinese culture. Taiwanese culture is no longer viewed as a sub-
culture of Chinese culture, as the KMT and Mainlanders used to 
believe. These policies make it clear that the KMT's state under 
Lee's leadership has transformed from a regime identifying with 
China to one identifying with Taiwan. It also demonstrates its 
goal to build a new nation. Because of Lee's efforts, rhetoric like 
"Love Taiwan", "Taiwan First" and "The sorrow to be a 
Taiwanese" is no longer the patent of the DPP; the KMT's 
mainstream elite also utilized the same expressions to appeal to 
Taiwanese people (Chien and Wang, 1995,pp.26-27). 
These policy changes illustrate the new disposition to 
"emphasize political representation grounded on Taiwan's 
localism" and to "use Taiwan consciousness and sovereignty for 
Taiwan's population" to reinforce Taiwan's residents to associate 
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their national identity with Taiwan (Chien and Wang, 1995,p.27). 
External influences 
In addition to Taiwan's domestic changes that provided a 
better environment for the growth of democracy and Taiwanese 
nationalism, international factors also nourished them and 
increased their popularity in Taiwan. The main foreign actors 
were the United States and China. The Philippines and South 
Korea also played a minor role in terms of demonstration effect 
as they democratized, but they will not be discussed in detail 
here. 
American influences 
The US government decided to build up an official 
relationship with China in the 1970s45 • Washington's first act 
was to send the National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger to 
make his secret visit in 1971. This eventually motivated many 
states to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of 
China. The KMT's ROC was forced to withdraw from the 
United Nations. When American President Nixon agreed on the 
PRC-US Joint Communique of 28 February 1972(the Shanghai 
Communique) that the US government "acknowledge" and "not 
challenge" Beijing's claim to Taiwan, Taiwan was further 
isolated from international society. As a result of the Americans' 
removal of their support, the KMT's claim to represent and rule 
the whole of China also lost its appeal, due to its international 
isolation. 
Losing both the representative seat as China in the United 
Nations and American support was a serious crisis for Taiwan's 
population and for the KMT regime. But this also reminded 
residents of Taiwan of the possibility of seeldng other solutions 
to resolve Taiwan's international isolation. One of the potential 
choices for them was to replace the KMT' s ROC by a Republic 
45 The decision was announced on 15 December 1978 but their official 
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of Taiwan as some Taiwanese nationalists desired. 
Consequently, some Taiwanese were attracted to Taiwanese 
nationalism in their eagerness to have a nation to identify with, 
so they could resist China's threat and return to international 
associations. Furthermore, democracy also became an urgent 
demand for them; since the KMT could no longer represent 
China as they claimed, there was no need for Taiwan's people to 
sacrifice democracy to fulfill the KMT's impossible dream of 
reuniting China. 
The Chinese government's continuous efforts to isolate 
Taiwan by all means in the international arena and its cruel 
suppression of political dissidents also reinforced Taiwan's 
population to embrace Taiwanese nationalism. This will be 
discussed in the following section. 
The effect of China's diplomatic 
and domestic policies 
Ever since the PRC won the battle for the seat in the United 
Nations, it has been trying to hinder any chance for Taiwan to 
actively participate in the international community. Its boycotts 
occur not only in political events when Taiwan's high-ranking 
officials have opportunities to meet leaders of other countries, 
but also in other areas, for instance, international economic and 
athletic events, such as the WTO and the Olympic games. 
Taiwan normally is either forbidden to join or has to use 
demeaning names such as Chinese Taipei instead of the ROC, 
due to China's protest and pressure on other countries. 
The PRC's hostile policies against Taiwan m the 
diplomatic arena seems only to irritate Taiwan's residents, 
especially Taiwanese, to eagerly desire a separate identity. 
Furthermore, because of Taiwan's isolation in the international 
community, the ROC's passports have not been formally 
relationship with each other did not commence until 1 January 1979. 
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recognized in the majority of the countries around the world. 
Sometimes middle class tourists suffer humiliation, depression 
and inconvenience when they use ROC passports. For instance, 
they are unable to visit certain countries because their passports 
are not recognized (Cohen, 1991,p.223). These all reinforce 
enthusiasm to have a Taiwanese nation instead of being 
recognized as part of the Chinese nation because they realize 
that the ROC's one-China policy restrains Taiwan from 
participating in the international community. 
For most people from other countries, they probably never 
realize how fortunate they are to have a nationality recognized 
by the international community. Consequently, it may be 
difficult for them to imagine how hard and frustrating it may be 
to hold passports from the ROC, a country which is not 
officially accepted by the majority of countries. But we can see 
this clearly from a quotation from Wachman when he did an 
interview in Taiwan. An informant, Chiang Chun-nan, said: 
The people in general don't care about reunification or 
independence .... They want to be a sovereign state ... [in the] 
international community. They want to have their passpmt 
accepted in every country. Just like [people] from other 
countries. That's all (Quoted in Wachman, 1994,p.72). 
Chiang may be right when he claimed that most people in 
Taiwan might not have cared about reunification with China or 
independence when they first had unpleasant experiences 
travelling overseas as ROC residents. But China's merciless 
crushing of the 1989 pro-democracy movement in Tienanmen 
Square, and China's attitude toward democracy in Hong Kong, 
disappointed and frightened them. Taiwan's population became 
more and more skeptical about Deng's proposal that Taiwan 
could reunite with China under the guideline of "one country 
two systems". They doubted the Chinese government's sincerity 
and willingness to guarantee Taiwan could maintain its 
democratic political system if they did reunite with China. 
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Suffering from more than 45 years of authoritarian rule by the 
KMT, and finally seeing some movement toward democracy, 
they did not welcome another dictatorial government like the 
PRC. These factors also pushed them to expect to have their 
own nation. 
Legitimacy crises 
The KMT' s legitimacy was in fact based on its claim that it 
was the government of China, and Taiwan was part of China. 
The withdrawal of US government support for that claim posed 
a threat to the KMT regime. 
As stated earlier, the Chinese government's continuous 
efforts to isolate Taiwan by all means in the international arena 
and its cruel suppression of political dissidents also reinforced 
Taiwan's population to support Taiwanese nationalism. 
With the winding down of the Cold War, the name that the 
KMT called its regime, "Free China", became more and more 
ironical because everyone knew the KMT' s ROC was neither 
free nor China. As the KMT lost its international support, 
mainly from the US, it had to strengthen its domestic legitimacy 
so it relaxed the suppression of dissident opinions (Wakabayashi, 
1994,pp.242-243). 
The KMT's political reforms might also have had other 
purposes, such as to win more international support. To diminish 
China's military threats, Taiwan has tried to tie itself closely to 
the world economy and to the West. The reason the US 
withdrew its support of the KMT was that it no longer saw the 
need to support the authoritarian KMT to pressure China when 
the Cold War ended. After the Cold War was over, the KMT's . 
leaders, especially Chiang Ching-kuo, probably realized that 
democratization was a very important way to tie Taiwan closer 
to the West, because if communist China threatens Taiwan, the 
KMT's appeal for help will be more effective if Taiwan is 
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democratic. 
Probably it was due to these considerations that Chiang 
decided to undertake political reforms. Under the relaxed 
circumstances, many of the Taiwanese middle class became the 
forerunners for Taiwan's democratization and Taiwanese 
nationalism. 
Political Movements 
Since the 228 incident, exiled Taiwanese had attempted to 
win support both from Taiwan and abroad to reach their goal of 
building their own Taiwanese nation. Several Taiwanese 
nationalist associations were created in Japan and the US 
between the 1950s to 1960s. In 1970, Trong R. Chai united 
several overseas independence groups into the World United 
Formosans for Independence (WUFI) (Cohen, 1991,p.290; 
Geoffroy, 1997 ,p.227). Its membership included the two largest 
groups, the Japan-based Taiwan Youth Association, and the US-
based UFAI (United Formosans in America for Independence). 
According to Chai, the goal of WUFI was to seek 
the establishment of a free, democratic, and independent 
Republic of Taiwan (Formosa) in accordance with the principle 
of self-determination of peoples. We are committed to the 
fundamental freedoms and human rights embodied in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and therefore repudiate 
all forms of totalitarian rule, Chinese Nationalist or Communist 
(Quoted in Cohen, 1991,p.290). 
WUFI is only an example that demonstrates Taiwanese 
nationalists' goal is both nationalist and democratic. Their 
activities, however, were not very successful in winning island-
wide support in Taiwan as a result of the KMT' s repression and 
indoctrination. 
After the attempt to form an opposition party with Chinese 
liberals like Lei Chen failed in 1960, as mentioned in the last 
chapter, Taiwanese opposition did not vanish, even though the 
KMT harshly suppressed activists. Taiwanese dissidents were 
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restricted to participation only in local politics. Some of them 
built up their popularity and reputation through competing with 
KMT nominees as independent candidates in local elections. 
Gradually, they associated with each other and a sort of network 
was achieved. 
By 1975, the old term "no-party, no-faction" as a phrase to 
refer to independent candidates against the KMT regime was 
replaced by "personalities outside the party" ("tang-wai jen-
shih" or "tang-wai" for abbreviation). As a result of their 
success in the local and provincial elections of autumn 1977, 
their organization was gradually improved. In October 1978, 
they established a "Tang-wai Campaign Corps" to organize joint 
advertisements and meetings. This action was officially illegal 
but was tolerated by the government. 
By 1979, the main domestic concern of Taiwan's 
opposition movement was democratization. The political views 
of those political activists inherited the issues of 1950s Free 
China. Before the 1980s, most opposition activists only intended 
to be the loyal opposition of the KMT regime. They did not 
challenge the KMT's claim as the only legitimate regime of 
China (Wang, 1996,pp.157-158). In August 1979, however, as 
an opposition journal, Formosa (Mei-li-tao) published its first 
issue, the pattern was changed. Formosa's local offices became 
the organizational network of the opposition movement (Tien, 
1989,p.96). 
On 10 December 1979, a large Tang-wai demonstration 
organized by Formosa's Kaohsiung offices resulted in a violent 
confrontation between the participants and the police (Domes, 
1993,p.124; Tien, 1989,pp.96-97). As a result, several leaders of 
the opposition movements such as Huang Hsin-chieh, Yao Chia-
wen, Chang Chun-hung, Lin Yi-hsiung, Lu Hsiu-lien, Chen Chu, 
Lin Huang-hsuan and Shih Ming-te were arrested (Chiou, 
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1994,p.31; Tien, 1989,p.97). 
The trial of these political dissidents attracted widespread 
domestic and international attention (Lu, 1997,pp.311-312). 
Even though they did not attempt to overthrow the KMT 
government, they were charged with advocating Taiwanese 
independence, a serious crime in the authorities' eyes. Therefore, 
they were sentenced to from twelve years to life in prison. 
Self-determination became an issue in the trial. Lin Yi-
hsiung, for instance, claimed that: 
Taiwan's future should be decided by its some 17,000,000 
residents, Mainlanders and Taiwanese. It is a conclusion 
deducted from the democratic ideal in which I believe. This is 
not consciousness of Taiwanese independence. 17,000,000 
people may also decide to recover mainland immediately 
(Quoted in Lu, 1997,p.428). 
Although these opposition leaders did not admit that they 
advocated Taiwanese independence, they at least believe in the 
right of self-determination for the Taiwanese. Most of them were 
probably pro-independence. Their denial might simply result 
from their fear of the KMT's suppression. Lu Hsiu-lien's speech 
during the Kaohsiung demonstration may represent the views on 
Taiwan of some political dissidents. She stated: 
What is Taiwan question? What is the history of 
Taiwan? ... What is the theory that Taiwan's legal status is 
unsettled? Do you know Taiwan is an orphan internationally? 
[Taiwan] has been an orphan for a long time. Do you 
know? ... After 51 years of cession to Japan, Taiwanese' s 
[nationality] changed from Japanese to Chinese [ when the 
KMT took over] . 
. . . . I want to ask, can our parliament, ... fully represent us? .... 
The US announced: Taiwan's question should be solved 
peacefully between the Chinese[ in Mainland China and in 
Taiwan]. I want to ask all of you, under our current condition 
as an international orphan, with what conditions can we have 
peace talk with the PRC? And who is entitled to reflect the will 
of our 18,000,000 residents? Who is entitled to represent us to 
strive for [our] rights? .... Under these circumstances, on the 
one hand, we are unable to negotiate peacefully with the PRC; 
on the other hand, when those who take part in the negotiation 
do not represent us, to whom will we leave the Taiwan question 
to solve? (Quoted in Lu, 1997,pp.428-429). 
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Lu's remark seemed to show that there was a connection 
between Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan's democratization. 
As we have seen in preceding chapters, the Taiwanese were 
never allowed to make decision for themselves concerning their 
future. And they were prohibited from ruling themselves for 
centuries. Since the KMT justified every undemocratic element 
of their regime in the name of "China", when the middle class 
wished to push opposition movements for democratization, and 
confront the KMT' s authoritarianism, "Taiwan" and 
"Taiwanese" seemed to be the only symbol and identity they 
could manipulate (Wakabayashi, 1994,p.243, p.245). 
By the early 1980s, international society posed a greater 
impact on Taiwan. Taiwan's internationalization, however, 
revealed that Taiwan's insufficient international status as a 
consequence of the KMT's one-China policy gave the PRC 
excuses to suppress Taiwan from actively participating in the 
international community. Economic achievement could not 
mend the damage to Taiwanese's dignity from diplomatic 
setbacks. This resulted in Taiwanese resentment and opposition 
to the KMT's one-China policy. Because both the KMT and the 
PRC insisted that there was only one China, which caused the 
unpleasant international isolation, Taiwanese developed a 
stronger Taiwanese identity as a response to resist Chinese 
identity (You, 1997,p.228). 
After the take off of Taiwan's economy, Taiwanese 
nationalism became more popular, with the support of the 
middle class, in Taiwan's changing political atmosphere. Under 
the growth of Taiwanese identity, Taiwan's first opposition party, 
the Democratic Progress Party (DPP hereafter), was established 
on 28 September 1986 by Tang-wai personalities. Although the 
government declared this move "illegal", it did not take any 
action. With the birth of the DPP, Taiwan's political transition 
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was accelerated down the road to mature democracy (Domes, 
1993,p.126). 
Since its birth in 1986, the DPP has always been viewed as 
a party mainly supported by Taiwanese and closely associated 
with Taiwanese nationalism. Although the party has several 
factions, its members generally agree that Taiwan independence 
is one of the party's most significant goals. Its former chairman, 
Hsu Hsin-Liang, for instance, once announced publicly: " The 
DPP is a party for Taiwan independence. We do not have 
inconsistency on the goal of our party to advocate Taiwan 
independence, not even on using the Republic of Taiwan as 
Taiwan's official name. What we disputed in the past was 
"when" we should propound the use of the official name [ to 
Taiwan's residents]" (Chi, 1996, p.795). On 13 October 1991, 
the DPP also passed the so-called "Taiwan Independence 
Clause" that confirmed "based on the principle of popular 
sovereignty, the proposition to build a Republic of Taiwan with 
independent sovereignty and to write a new constitution should 
be chosen and decided by the whole population of Taiwan's 
residents by referendum" (Chi, 1996,p.795). 
Because the DPP is a party that endorses Taiwan 
independence, its factions can be used as an example to show 
the relationship between democracy and Taiwanese nationalism. 
From the disagreement of the DPP's two major factions, we can 
also understand how Taiwanese nationalists see democracy and 
Taiwanese nationalism and their correlation. The DPP's two 
major factions, the Formosa Faction and the New Tide Faction 
have always held very different views on how to achieve the 
objective of Taiwan independence and build a new Taiwan 
nation. Members of Formosa believe politics is "a combination 
of both ideals and power", so the DPP should "separate its 
ultimate goal and it current policies". They are convinced that 
Taiwanization of the KMT140 
Taiwan should pursue democracy first. Once democracy is 
instituted, then the DPP may win elections and rule Taiwan. 
Consequently, the Formosa faction's goal for Taiwan 
independence can be fulfilled and guaranteed by democratic 
means. In other words, in their view, the DPP should "replace 
the KMT and win the power to govern Taiwan in the process of 
fair democratic competition". Then it will make Taiwan a 
society that enjoys "freedom, democracy and wealth". And in 
the final stage, the DPP will lead Taiwan's population to build 
an independent Republic of Taiwan. Therefore, this faction 
believes the DPP should not advocate Taiwan independence now 
but should instead " push Taiwan's democratization and provide 
alternatives for public policies". Generally speaking, this faction 
articulates that the DPP should "pursue political democratization 
before Taiwan independence" (Chi, 1996,p.807). 
On the other hand, however, the New Tide Faction 
considers Taiwan independence is "the best choice to solve the 
problem of Taiwan's future". Its members believe there is no 
possibility to establish democracy in Taiwan if Taiwan does not 
have independence. Therefore, they propose to "write a new 
constitution, elect a new parliament, build a new nation, and put 
Taiwan independence into practice". In sum, they emphasize the 
belief that Taiwan independence should be achieved before 
political democratization (Chi, 1996,pp.807-808). 
Although they disagree on the sequence of Taiwan 
independence and democracy, we can see both factions see these 
two complement each other. While the Formosa Faction 
considers democracy as the means to achieve the goal of 
Taiwanese nationalism, i.e. gaining Taiwan independence and 
building a new Taiwan nation, the New Tide Faction assumes 
only by achieving Taiwan independence can democracy be 
secured in Taiwan. policies. Generally speaking, this faction 
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articulates that the DPP should pursue political democratization 
before Taiwan independence (Chi, 1996,p.805) 
The DPP's advocacy of Taiwanese independence and 
Taiwanese nationalism is a good example of Taiwanese's 
response to the KMT' s undemocratic rule. Before Martial Law 
was abolished, the KMT suppressed political dissidents and 
deprived the Taiwanese of their freedom of speech and human 
rights. Because the KMT sacrificed Taiwanese's political rights 
for its legitimacy, Taiwanese had to destroy the KMT's myth of 
"Chinese legitimacy". In other words, only by constituting the 
political reality that the KMT only ruled Taiwan could the goal 
of popular sovereignty and democratization can be achieved in 
Taiwan (You, 1997,p.228). 
To assert that the KMT's sovereignty was only over Taiwan, 
Taiwanese had to emphasize the importance of Taiwan so it 
involved a process of Taiwanization. To break the KMT's 
legitimacy it was necessary to stem Chinese nationalism, and 
granting Taiwanese political power involved democratization. 
Consequently, Taiwanese independence became an important 
issue of Taiwan's democratic movement because it covers both 
Taiwanization and democratization (You, 1997,p.228). 
After the abolishment of Martial Law in 1987, the KMT' s 
authority was curtailed so the Taiwanese increasingly called for 
re-entering the United Nations and seeking Taiwan's 
independent international personality. Unwilling to be 
dominated by either the KMT or the PRC, Taiwanese wish to 
have Taiwan's sovereignty and determine their own fate. 
Accordingly, the goal to let Taiwan re-enter the international 
community as an independent and autonomous nation with the 
name of Taiwan became widely speculated (You, 1997,pp.228-
229). 
laiwanization of the KMT142 
Changing identity 
When the Mainlanders anived in Taiwan, they only planed 
to temporarily stay on the island. Because they were born and 
brought up in Mainland China, they had no strong emotional 
attachment to the island as local born Taiwanese did. As years 
passed by, however, they gradually realized that it was 
impossible to recover China, and their attitude toward Taiwan 
changed. 
The efforts of the KMT to instill Chinese nationalism and 
Chinese identity did have some success. But it is increasingly 
difficult for post-war generations in Taiwan to identify with a 
place where most of them have never been. Thus, it is natural 
for them to have stronger Taiwanese identity than Chinese 
identity. Taiwanese nationalism, therefore, becomes more 
attractive. 
The developing popularity of Taiwanese nationalism, however, 
did not solve the controversial problem of national identity in 
Taiwan. Table 6.2 may give us an idea of the current national 
identity of Taiwan's population. 
Table 6.2 Province origin and ethnic identity 
Ethnic identity Total Fukien Hakka 
Taiwanese Taiwanese 
365 322 (88.22%) 40 (10.96%) 
Taiwanese 28.69% 34.81(%) 26.14 (%) 
Both Taiwanese 455 360 (79.12%) 49 (10.77%) 
and Chinese 35.77% 38.92 (%) 32.03 (%) 
452 243 (53.76%) 64 (14.16%) 
Chinese 35.53% 26.27 (%) 41.83 (%) 
1272 925 153 
Total 100% 72.72% 12.03% 
Chi-square=l81.258, DF=4, p< .001 
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If we look at table 6.2, it is obvious that few mainlanders 
identify themselves as Taiwanese. Most people view themselves 
both as Taiwanese and Chinese. Mainlanders are the group who 
tend to identify with Chinese while Fukien Taiwanese are more 
likely to consider themselves as solely Taiwanese than Hokka 
Taiwanese are. To sum up, although Taiwanese nationalism is 
more prevalent than it was, it is still not influential enough to 
convince the whole population of Taiwan to believe that they 
are Taiwanese. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have seen that the structural changes 
from the 1970s resulted in a stronger middle class. They actively 
pa1ticipated in politics. As a group, they were well educated and 
more independent from state dominance. They became activists 
of Taiwan's nationalist and democratic movements. 
At the same time, the KMT ruling group also faced changes. 
Chiang Ching-kuo's Taiwanization policy and the 
supplementary elections of Taiwan's representatives in both the 
National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan recruited more 
Taiwanese to important posts in both government and the KMT. 
As more Taiwanese joined the ruling group, the regime became 
less hostile to democracy and Taiwanese nationalism. After Lee 
Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-Imo on 13 January 1988 and 
became Taiwan's first Taiwanese president, he continued 
political reform to increase democratization. Although Lee's 
national identity is unclear, he at least tolerates Taiwanese 
nationalism. Therefore, democratization and Taiwanese 
nationalism have developed since the 1970s. 
The 1970s also saw the end of the Cold War. As a 
consequence, the US established formal relations with China. 
The KMT was forced to withdraw from the United Nations. 
Withdrawal from the United Nations threatened the KMT's 
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domestic legitimacy because it seemed the KMT could no 
longer represent "China". Understanding the US would no 
longer tolerated its dictatorial rule and hoping to strengthen its 
domestic legitimacy, the KMT decided to undertake political 
reforms due to external influences from the US, and its 
legitimacy crisis. 
In sum, since the 1970s, structural changes, the political 
elite's patronage, external influences and a legitimacy crisis 




As mentioned in the introduction, the main focus of this 
research is to explore why and how democracy and Taiwanese 
nationalism have been correlated and have complemented each 
other in the process of Taiwan's political transition to 
democracy. As indicated in preceding chapters, the correlation 
between the two was not made explicit until the 1970s because 
Taiwanese nationalism was taboo in Taiwan for decades due to 
the KMT' s success in suppressing dissident beliefs and instilling 
Chinese nationalism. 
Chapter 1 gave us an introduction to Taiwan's history and · 
politics. It briefly discussed the correlation between Taiwanese 
nationalism and Taiwan's democratization. 
In chapter 2, definitions of nation as well as the meaning 
and content of nationalism, democracy and democratization 
were the main topics. How colonialism enriched anti-colonial 
nationalism was also covered. As Anderson and Kahin found in 
Indonesia, when colonial powers introduced Western-style 
education to their colonies, colonial regimes dug their own 
graves because the education provided brought about a new 
group of local elite who were able to use the knowledge and 
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skills they learned from colonial education to contest with the 
regime. The colonial regimes' discriminatory polices also 
intensified the sense of community of the colonized people as a 
result of their common suffering. We also see there are four 
common forces that may push democracy and nationalism to 
grow in any nation: structural changes, the political elite 's 
patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises. 
Then we began looking at Taiwan's political development 
under Japanese colonial rule in chapter 3. We viewed several 
political movements with both nationalism and democratic 
elements during this period. Unlike nationalist movements in 
other countries such as Indonesia, however, Taiwanese 
nationalist movements under Japanese rule did not arduously 
promote the goal of building a new nation state in Taiwan. The 
explanation to this phenomenon might be that although 
Taiwanese recognized their characteristics as an ethnic group 
distinct from the Japanese, they did not separate themselves 
from the Chinese nation. Realizing China could not provide 
practical or even moral support to their national aspirations, the 
Taiwanese elite attempted to gradually accomplish their 
nationalist goals by urging Japanese to grant them self-rule, 
democracy and equal rights. But we do see one of the significant 
phenomenons pointed out by Anderson and Kahin in their 
research on Indonesia was repeated in Taiwan's colonial 
experience: the majority of leaders of these nationalist and pro-
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democracy movements were graduates of Japanese universities, 
so their educational achievements were the by-products of 
Japanese colonialism. Furthe1more, they also used tactics and 
skills they learned from their Japanese education, for instance, 
petitions to challenge colonial rule. The most significant 
meaning of Japan's fifty years of colonial dominion was to mold 
Taiwanese into an ethnic group with a sense of community and a 
common historical experience that made them incompatible with 
later arriving Mainlanders, so the conflict between these two 
groups created hostility as well as tragedy and changed the 
evolution of Taiwan's political history from 1945. 
Chapter 4 provided a detailed description of the watershed 
event in Taiwan's history, the 228 Incident of 1947. Originally 
a mmor accident, the incident turned into an island-wide 
rebellion against the KMT' s corruption and inefficiency in 
Taiwan since 1945. When the KMT ignored Taiwanese people's 
demands for democracy, justice, and fairness and crushed the 
rebellion by ruthlessly killing thousands of Taiwanese, 
especially intellectuals, the hatred of the Taiwanese toward the 
regime was silenced but not diminished. The massacre carried 
out by Chinese soldiers after the 228 Incident reminded 
Taiwanese of their differences from Mainland Chinese. As a 
result, Taiwanese identity began to divide clearly from Chinese 
identity and Taiwanese nationalism developed. In response to 
the KMT' s cruelty, many Taiwanese were exiled and started 
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their struggle for a democratic and independent Taiwan. In this 
chapter, we also saw the impo1iance of common shared history 
and common language in forming a nation, at least in Taiwan. 
Chapter 5 described early KMT rule. To build up its power 
base in Taiwan, the Chinese KMT government initiated land 
reform. The reform was crucial for the KMT's survival in 
Taiwan in two ways. On the one hand, it decreased the wealth of 
Taiwanese landlords, one of the traditional opposition groups, so 
they lost the power and will to challenge the KMT regime. On 
the other hand, the reform won the KMT popular support from 
rural residents, especially peasants. At this stage, Taiwan was 
basically an agriculture society so it did not have a powerful 
middle class to threaten the KMT regime. The KMT also 
promoted Chinese nationalism at schools so many post-war 
generations in Taiwan were educated to believe in the myth of 
China recovery and to have strong Chinese national identity. As 
a result, national identity divided Taiwan's population into two 
main groups. While one group identify with the Chinese nation, 
the other were convinced that they were Taiwanese. 
Furthermore, since Mainlanders dominated the political 
arena during the KMT's early rule, they were hesitated to open 
up the opportunity for Taiwanese to participate in politics 
because of the fear of losing its regime. Consequently, the 
authoritarian regime suppressed _every possible political 
movement so both nationalist and democratic movements could 
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not mobilize mass support. Although some Taiwanese dissidents 
were able to stay in the US and Japan safely, these two 
governments basically tolerated the KMT's harsh political 
control in Taiwan. Therefore, external influences, although 
helpful, did not favor the growth of Taiwan's nationalism and 
democracy during the 1950s to the 1960s. 
Chapter 6 explained how structural changes, the political 
elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises 
enlivened the correlation between democracy and Taiwanese 
nationalism from the 1970s. Beginning in the early 1970s, 
Taiwan's economic condition improved dramatically and 
gradually became an industrial society with a large middle class 
and with high literacy rate. At the same time, the KMT' s myth 
of claiming itself as the sole legitimate Chinese government was 
severely collapsed as the number of its life-long Mainlander 
representatives declined and Taiwan was forced to withdraw 
from the United Nations. Losing both domestic and external 
legitimacy, the KMT reluctantly took political reforms and 
Taiwan's nationalist and democratic movements had a better 
chance to survive since then. 
From the discussion of previous chapters, we can see the 
national identity of Taiwanese changed at different times. We 
also see this change intertwined with Taiwan's democratization 
process. In this chapter, we shall summarize the whole thesis by 
answering the four following questions: 1. How did national 
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identity develop in Taiwan? 2. How did political movements 
(both nationalist and democratic) come about and develop? 3. 
Why was there a connection between nationalism and 
democracy in Taiwan? 4. What is the contemporary identity in 
Taiwan? 
The development of Taiwanese's national identity in Taiwan 
National identity of Taiwanese transited through three 
stages. At first, there was no national identity. In the second 
stage, they did not clearly distinguish themselves from the 
Chinese. In the third stage, there was divided national identity 
because they could not find a consensus on the issue of whether 
they are a part of a Chinese nation or a new Taiwanese nation. 
The first stage can be traced from the seventeenth century 
when Chinese did not have national identity. Sub-ethnic conflict 
was common during this time because Chinese in Taiwan 
divided themselves into two groups: Fukiennese and Hakka. 
Each group fought with the other group for better land so they 
never considered each other as fellows who shared a common 
destiny, territory, and history. 
This situation changed, however, when Japanese colonized 
Taiwan and became Taiwanese's masters. Japanese brought in 
new inventions such as railways, radios, and Western-style 
education; they also created Taiwanese's feeling of sharing a 
common history due to Japanese discrimination against them. 
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But Taiwanese did not clearly distinguish themselves from 
Mainland Chinese in this stage. 
Then Japan lost the Second World War and Taiwan was 
returned to China once again. Taiwanese identification with 
Chinese faced serious disillusion so some of them refused to 
consider themselves as Chinese any longer. On the other hand, 
however, the KMT instilled Chinese identity to Taiwan's post-
war generations so the issue of national identity divided 
Taiwan's population because many accepted the Chinese 
"imagined community" due to the KMT's educational efforts. 
Political movements 
Modern political movements in Taiwan began during 
Japan's administration. Japan played a significant part in the 
evolution of Taiwanese nationalist and democratic movements. 
The first group of modern Taiwanese intellectuals emerged 
under Japanese rule. Their education either in Japan, China, or 
Taiwan enabled them to absorb modern Western political, social 
and cultural ideas, such as democracy, liberalism, socialism, and 
self-determination (Turumi, 1977,p. l 79; Watabuyashi, 
1987,pp.40-41). Under Japanese rule, political movements often 
had both nationalist and democratic demands, although the 
former were less explicit. 
Political movements under the KMT's rule, however, 
concentrated on demanding democracy only in the beginning. 
From the 1970s,Taiwan's economic growth created a larger 
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middle class and as the US and Chinese policies contributed to a 
KMT legitimacy crisis, Chinese nationalism was also 
challenged. 
To summarize Taiwan's political movements under the 
Japanese and the KMT, we will find that these movements were 
in response to external suppression. Before Japanese ruled the 
island, Taiwanese were divided into sub-ethnic groups among 
themselves. Their common suffering under Japanese rule 
solidified their identity with the same imagined community, 
Taiwan. Originally they did not distinguish themselves from the 
Chinese. But the KMT' s government discriminative policies 
convinced them that Taiwanese were not Chinese. Facing unfair 
treatments from Japanese and Mainland Chinese, Taiwanese 
were determined to demand equality, political participation, and 
democracy. Although their democratic and nationalist 
movements failed under both Japanese colonization and the 
KMT' s early rule, Taiwanese never gave up the hope to attain 
democracy and to establish a Taiwanese nation. Nationalism was 
their weapon against the ruling group, either Japanese or 
Chinese. In other words, Taiwanese utilized nationalism to 
consolidate themselves and differentiate themselves from their 
rulers. 
Both the Japanese and the KMT suppressed these 
movements. They used control of the media and education as 
means of suppression. Their harsh punishment also stopped 
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these movements from growing. After the 1970s, however, the 
KMT could no longer resist the trend demanding political 
reforms. Economic development helped the growth of a new 
middle class. They became supporters of political movements. 
In addition to their eagerness for democracy, resulting from 
Taiwan's deteriorating international status, the middle class were 
also attracted to the idea of building a Taiwanese nation because 
they considered it an alternative to gain higher dignity and to 
sustain democracy for Taiwan's population. 
Relationship between democracy and 
Taiwanese nationalism in Taiwan 
Theories mentioned in chapter 2 seemed to demonstrate 
that major social scientists focused their research on either 
democracy, democratization or nationalism. Very few, if any, 
paid attention to the fact that there might be a connection 
between nationalism and democracy in some nations. Based on 
Huntington and other social scientists' theories on how and why 
democratization happened, I proposed that forces (structural 
changes, the political elite's patronage, external influences and 
legitimacy crises) that stimulated democracy might have also 
driven nationalism in some nations. 
Discussion in previous chapters appears to have proved this 
argument. At least in Taiwan, these four forces had related 
nationalism to democracy. Structural changes helped both 
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nationalism and democracy to evolve because they resulted in a 
new group of new middle class who were more independent 
from government control. They became leaders or supporters of 
democratic and nationalist movements. 
The political elite's patronage also had a significant 
influence in the development of both nationalism and 
democracy. Taiwan's experience showed the political elite's 
attitude toward democracy and nationalism was important. If the 
suppression from the ruling group is too severe, there is no 
chance for nationalism or democracy to grow. To put it another 
way, while opposition elite had significant influence on 
promoting democratic and nationalist ideas, the chance for 
democracy and nationalism to grow will be limited if the ruling 
elite resist and suppress them. 
The growth of nationalism and democracy may also be 
affected by external influences, especially superpowers' policies. 
As we have seen in Taiwan's case, the American government 
was influential in Taiwan's democratic and nationalist 
movements. The US support strengthened the KMT' s legitimacy. 
Consequently, it increased the difficulty of challenging the 
regime either by nationalistic or democratic demands. But the 
US also had positive impact on the development of Taiwanese 
nationalism and democracy when it provided shelter for 
Taiwanese political dissidents, urged the KMT government to 
reform and aided Taiwan to create the so-called economic 
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miracle. 
Although the three factors mentioned above were crucial, 
the legitimacy crisis was also important. Without legitimacy 
crises, nationalist and democratic movements would not pose a 
meaningful threat to a regime. A legitimacy crisis would make 
nationalistic and democratic demands more appealing. At the 
same time, a legitimacy crisis might force the ruling group to 
yield because they were afraid to lose power. This might lead to 
better chances for political reforms and for democratic and 
nationalist movements to develop. 
Current national identity in Taiwan 
National identity is still an unsettled issue in contemporary 
Taiwan. As demonstrated in the last chapter, the population of 
Taiwan can be divided into three groups according to their 
national identity: Taiwanese, Chinese, and those who believe 
they are both. 
Will the controversy over national identity in Taiwan be 
solved in the future? Probably not in a short time. It is possible 
that more and more people, Aborigines, Mainlanders and 
Taiwanese, will identify with Taiwan if Taiwan maintains the 
status quo. If Taiwan's status, whether as a part of China or as 
an independent state, cannot be settled, however, national 
identity may still divide Taiwan's residents. 
Although Taiwanese nationalism was one of the motivating 
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forces of Taiwan's democratization, its recent development 
worries some scholars as it may turn into a force against 
democracy in the future. Some Taiwanese are very hostile 
toward those who cannot speak Taiwanese, especially 
Mainlanders. They dislike those who identify themselves as 
Chinese instead of Taiwanese. This kind of intolerant attitude 
may hurt democracy because one of its most important 
characteristics is to respect people's opinions. The strong and 
irrational fever for Taiwanese nationalism also appears in some 
Taiwanese's unconditional support of President Lee Teng-hui 
simply because he is a member of the Taiwan nation, a 
Taiwanese. It is believed that some Taiwanese voted for Lee 
based on their rationale that if they voted for others, Taiwanese 
may lose control of Taiwan's government to Mainlanders. The 
mutual suspicion between these two major groups produces an 
uneasy tension in Taiwan. Therefore, emphasizing Taiwanese 
nationalism too heavily may pose a threat to the prospect of 
democracy in Taiwan, because it creates conflict between major 
ethnic groups on the island. 
To solve problems mentioned above, a growing number of 
people are trying to create a new "imagined community" in 
Taiwan. President Lee Teng-hui, for instance, advocated a 
concept of "New Taiwanese". The concept re-defines the 
meaning of Taiwanese by claiming Mainlanders can also be 
Taiwanese as long as they identify with Taiwan. The concept 
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strives to include all ethnic groups of Taiwan into the framework 
of a Taiwanese nation. Furthermore, it is increasingly argued 
that anyone in Taiwan is a Taiwanese as long as they identify 
with the island and are willing to dedicate themselves to the 
welfare of the Taiwan nation. This new interpretation of 
Taiwanese is more inclusive so it may ease the worry that 
Taiwanese nationalism will threaten democracy. If the concept 
can be widely accepted, national identity may not be a 
controversial issue any longer. 
Conclusion 
I will conclude this thesis by pinpointing its main findings. 
The development of Taiwanese nationalism is theoretically 
significant for its two distinct characteristics. First, even though 
Taiwanese nationalism also developed as a result of decades of 
colonial rule, it was moderate comparing to its counterparts in 
other countries, for instance, Indonesia. In other words, 
Taiwanese did not demand to build their own nation under 
Japanese rule when the nationalist movement was first launched. 
Second, after Japan left Taiwan, Taiwanese faced a new 
ruling regime, the Chinese KMT government. Although Chinese 
proclaimed that they were Taiwanese's countrymen, they ruled 
Taiwan in a way similar to Japan's colonial style. As a result, 
Taiwan's most dramatic anti-colonial nationalist movement, the 
228 Incident, was not against the previous colonizers, the 
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Japanese, but against the newly arrived rulers, the Chinese. The 
event demonstrated that in fact so-called common blood is 
probably less crucial in generating nationalism than shared 
history and common suffering, at least in Taiwan. 
Third, common forces ( structural changes, the political 
elite's patronage, external influences and legitimacy crises) 
stimulated Taiwan's democratization and Taiwanese nationalism 
in the 1970s-90s. Although these forces were not as powerful 
during the Japanese colonial era, they also contributed to the 
early growth of Taiwan's political movement under the Japanese 
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